Choice Consistency and Preference Stability in Test-Retests of Discrete Choice Experiment and Open-Ended Willingness to Pay Elicitation Formats

This study tests the temporal stability of preferences, choices and willingness to pay (WTP) values using both discrete choice experiment (DCE) and open-ended (OE) WTP elicitation formats. The same sample is surveyed three times over the course of two years using each time the same choice sets. Choice consistency is positively correlated with choice certainty and choice complexity. The impact of choice complexity fades away in time, most likely as a result of learning and preference refinement. Although the OE WTP values remain stable over a time period of 2 years as in previous stated preference studies, DCE based WTP measures differ significantly, suggesting their use in benefits transfer may be limited.     

Is time-variant information stickiness state-dependent?

This paper estimates information stickiness with regard to inflation expectations in the United States and the Eurozone for the 1981/06–2015/12 and 1998/Q4–2015/Q2 periods, respectively, and further investigates whether such information stickiness is state-dependent. Based on a bootstrap sub-sample rolling-window estimation, we find that information stickiness varies over time, which contradicts the strict time dependency implied under sticky-information theory. We provide evidence that information stickiness depends on inflation volatility, which indicates that information stickiness is state-dependent and that it has a time trend. Using a threshold model, we estimate structural changes in the state-dependence and time-trend of information stickiness. The results show that information stickiness has been more dependent on inflation volatility and has had a higher time-trend in both regions following the 2008 financial crisis.     

Real interest rates: nonlinearity and structural breaks

Real interest rate is a crucial variable that determines the consumption, investment and saving behavior of individuals and thereby acts as a key policy tool that the central banks use to control the economy. Although many important theoretical models require the real interest rates to be stationary, the empirical evidence accumulated so far has not been able to provide conclusive evidence on the mean reverting dynamics of this variable. To resolve this puzzle we re-investigate the stochastic nature of the real interest rates by developing unit root tests for nonlinear heterogeneous panels where the alternative hypothesis allows for a smooth transition between deterministic linear trends around which stationary asymmetric adjustment may occur. When the newly developed panel unit root tests are applied to the real interest rates of the 17 OECD countries, we were able to uncover overwhelming empirical support in favor of mean reversion in the short-run and long-run real interest rates. Therefore, these results show that the conclusions drawn from a miss-specified test that ignores the presence of either nonlinearity, structural breaks or cross sectional dependence can give quite misleading results about the stochastic behavior of the real interest rates.     

The law and economics of sycophancy

Tullock (in: Rowley (ed) The selected works of Gordon Tullock, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, pp 399–455, 2005) was skeptical of the presumed economic efficiency of the common law, as adversarialism, apparently inherent to common law procedures, allowed for and was prone to litigiousness. Common law litigations accord to patterns of rent-seeking, as litigants invest ever more resources to assure victory. This paper asks if viable institutional solutions can emerge to resolve the problem Tullock identified. I survey the historical development of the term sycophancy within ancient Greek law as a revealing case study. Though a relatively innocuous pejorative in contemporary parlance, the term’s etymological roots stem from a formative process of ancient legal and institutional change within Athenian Greece. In the wake of specific legal reforms that expanded the scope of governmental authority under Solon (born 638–558 BCE), citizens were given explicit financial incentive to report violators of newly implemented public laws. Thereafter, social stigma surrounding third party legal representation leveraged the term sycophancy in reference to prosecutors motivated by private interests over the public welfare. Forgone social status and eventually formal criminal sanction emerged as offsetting differentials against the incentives of sycophancy.     

Compensating for unforeseeable damages in torts

The doctrine regarding unforeseeable damages in a contract was established in the well known case of Hadley vs. Baxendale. According to the judgement, a plaintiff cannot be compensated for unforeseeable damages in an incomplete contract unless he informs the defendant of the possible unforeseen contingency beforehand. In this paper, I extend the argument to the tort case in which it is hardly possible to communicate between a plaintiff and a defendant before an accident occurs. In the case of the sequential bilateral accident in which the victim’s care level is observable to the injurer, the victim’s care level can be a signal of the unforeseen contingency. I mainly discuss the implementability of the social optimum by the contributory negligence with dual standard of care enabling the communication between the parties.     

The influence of redemption time frame on responses to incentives

In the present research, Construal Level Theory is used to predict that consumers will mentally characterize incentive offers differently as a function of their redemption time frames. Data from two experiments indicate that concrete features, such as the face value of an offer or its mode of presentation (as a dollar figure or as a percentage discount), are prominent for incentives with short time frames but not for incentives with long ones. In the latter case, abstract features, such as the incentive’s goal congruity or fit with personal values, are more likely to influence responses.     

Global dynamics,capabilities and the crisis

The financial crisis started in 2007–8, initially in the US, but its consequences have been felt throughout the global economy. However, its effects were far from uniform. While parts of Asia and Africa continued to grow fast, Europe experienced a large set back. This paper emphasizes three important factors: differences across countries in technological development; differences in capacities to exploit the opportunities offered by technology; and differences in the ability to compete in international market. A formal model, based on this approach, is developed and applied to data for 100 countries in the period 1997–2012. Empirical indicators reflecting the various factors are developed, a dataset constructed and econometric estimates of the model performed. The results are used to explore the factors behind the slowdown in economic growth, with a particular emphasis on the continuing stagnation in Europe. A major factor turns out to be the increased financialization of the economy. The negative effect of the growth of finance prior to the crisis is especially pronounced for the countries that suffered most during the crisis.     

Heterogeneity of southern countries and southern intellectual property rights policy

Abstract.  We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectual property rights. We find that, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, governments resist IPR protection, but collectively southern countries benefit from some protection. We show that, in general, countries with more efficient firms prefer higher collective IPR protection than those with less efficient firms. Given the aggregate level of IPR protection, it is more efficient if the more efficient countries have weaker IPR protection.     

“Thirlwall’s Law” reconsidered

Thirlwall’s Law is found to be the necessary but not sufficient condition for balanced long-run growth. A simple equation is considered whose empirical analysis could confirm—or reject—the validity of the Law. The analysis, conducted by means of econometric co-integration using the Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares method applied to data for 59 countries covering the years 1960–2012, suggests that Thirlwall’s Law may not hold for the decisive majority of countries.