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排序方式: 共有535条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
31.
Andreas Schäfer 《Applied economics》2013,45(19):2316-2329
Although pension funds have gained importance in the last two decades, their role has not been described in detail by economic models. This article focuses on the scope of these institutional investors when they are not satisfied with a management team of a company in which the pension fund holds a block of shares. Stock holdings by pension funds are largely dispersed. Therefore, any intervention by pension funds in corporate governance requires the formation of a coalition of pension funds. The realization of a coordinated intervention, in turn, is subject to the problems related to the provision of public goods, such as free riding. We find that the stock dispersion and the combined share of pension funds, coordination costs and the attractiveness of the exit option are relevant factors for determining the probability of the success of interventions. 相似文献
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This paper shows that outsourcing of parts of the workforce in unionized firms leads to wage moderation both in the case of strategic and flexible outsourcing. As long as the share of the outsourced workforce is not too large, this wage‐moderation effect on domestic employment outweighs the direct substitution effect so that domestic employment increases in unionized firms as outsourcing costs fall. With respect to the impact of labor tax reform changes in the wage tax rate, the tax exemption and the unemployment benefit payments affect domestic wage setting in the same way as in the absence of outsourcing. Furthermore, increasing the degree of tax progression by keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant continues to be good for employment. However, except for low outsourcing activities, the impact of these policy measures will become smaller as outsourcing costs fall. 相似文献
33.
Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger Jens Robert Schöndube 《Management Accounting Research》2012,23(3):158-170
One of the main advantages of delegation is that specific department level information is used. Its main disadvantage is probably that central management looses direct control over certain actions. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted trade-off. We show that delegation might be favorable even if specific knowledge is completely absent. We consider a firm that lives for two periods. Due to its organizational structure part of the tasks and decision rights is inevitably delegated to a subordinate (agent). The agent performs the tasks assigned to him, tantamount to personal effort, in each of the two periods. Besides this effort the decision to implement a particular project has to be made at the beginning of period two. With regard to the project choice, central management can decide to delegate it to the agent (decentralization). Alternatively it can make it personally (centralization). If the project choice is decentralized it remains unobservable for central management. Along with second period effort it must be motivated via an incentive contract written on period output.We analyze two different contracting regimes: long-term commitment and long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. With full commitment we find that centralization is indeed favorable as compared to delegation if no informational advantage exists. This confirms conventional wisdom. However, the result does not necessarily hold with renegotiation-proof contracts. Renegotiation-proofness may force central management to set too low second-period incentives. Delegation counteracts this effect as it allows central management to implicitly commit to a higher second-period incentive rate. This arises as both, personal effort and the project choice, rather than effort alone need to be motivated. A necessary condition for too low second-period incentives, and thus for delegation to be favorable, is a negative intertemporal correlation of output. 相似文献
34.
Dorothea Diers 《保险科学杂志》2012,101(5):597-604
Increasing natural catastrophes, recent dynamics in capital markets, and fundamental changes in regulatory requirements (e.g., Solvency II for European Union member countries) have placed increasing challenges in management of insurance companies. While in the Solvency II framework the time horizon is one year, the strategic risk-return profile of the insurer should be set according to multi-year calculations. The aim of this paper is to introduce a multi-year risk-capital concept. This multi-year approach can help management to answer the following essential question: ??How many future years with extreme catastrophes or adverse capital market developments can the company withstand at a certain confidence level without external capital supply??? In the context of multi-year enterprise risk management a capital allocation method is needed in order (1) to set risk limitations for different segments, for example different lines of business and different years, and (2) to quantify the effect of management strategies on risk-adjusted performance indicators, defined per segment. We define a capital allocation method in the multi-year context and illustrate the use of the multi-year risk-capital concept within a simulation study. 相似文献
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A model of herding behavior in the labor market is presented where employers receive signals with limited precision about the workers types, and can observe previous employers decisions. Both the employer and the worker can influence the signal probabilities. In particular, the employer tries to increase the precision of the signal about the workers type whereas the worker wants to get a good signal, independent of her type. In a two-period model, we derive conditions for an equilibrium in which only down-cascades occur, i.e., the second employer does not hire a worker with a bad history even if he receives a favorable private signal about the workers type, but he follows his own signal if the workers history is good. 相似文献
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