Market power and fiscal policy in OECD countries

We compute average markups as a measure of market power throughout time and study their interaction with fiscal policy and macroeconomic variables in a VAR framework. From impulse-response functions, the results, with annual data for a set of 14 OECD countries, show that the markup (i) depicts a pro-cyclical behaviour with productivity shocks and (ii) a counter-cyclical behaviour with fiscal spending shocks. We also use a PVAR, increasing the efficiency in the estimations, which confirms the country-specific results.     

Disruption management in distributed enterprises: A multi-agent modelling and simulation of cooperative recovery behaviours

Disruption management in industrial areas consists in dealing with unanticipated events that get the plans deviate from their intended course. The solution results from the design and the maintenance of an operating mode ensuring a relevant deployment of individual recovery behaviours.The paper proposes an approach to minimize the impact of disrupting events on the whole system. It is based on an analysis of disrupting events and the characterization of the recovery process, and on a cooperative repair method for distributed industrial systems. This method is based on a cooperative distributed problem solving approach supported by a multi-agent system framework.     

Espoused drum-buffer-rope flow control in serial lines: A comparative study of simulation models

This paper documents an investigation of drum-buffer-rope (DBR) scheduling and flow control methodology in single-product serial production lines. In particular, DBR flow control is reviewed and the importance of correctly representing this type of flow control mechanism in serial lines is discussed. Departures from valid DBR conceptual and simulation modeling are illustrated. It is shown that the model of a previously published paper is a push system not a DBR system, and that related conclusions regarding protective capacity and constraint location are unsupported. Correct modeling of DBR flow control is shown using discrete simulation experiments that compare the DBR model and a similar push model. Suggestions for additional research are offered.     

近岸装置实施以风险为基础的综合检查(RBI)

企业在进行管理安全和风险时,以风险为基础的方法用于管理检查和维修工作是最近十年出现的一种优化资产费用的工具。这个较先进的量化方法有可能预知装置风险程度的检查结果,并且有助于开发优化的检查计划。这些方法,由于综合软件解决方法的开发,现在已经开始变得成熟。综合软件解决方法能够与设备数据库交换信息,能够管理检查计划和维修计划的实施,以及永久保持资产和检查的数据。本文介绍中东地区对近岸装置实施这种综合RBI和检查系统的情况。根据详细的RBI分析和过去的检查记录,对所选择的设备进行现场无损检测技术（NDT）的检测。资产数据、检查记录和文档集中保存在计算机化的系统中。该系统有能力存储和审查各种类型的文档和图样。这个系统还可能生成和监测检查和维修工作单,并且能够与其他企业系统进行交流。知识数据库对全部资产的活动很有用处。与MS Exel输入输出功能进行数据交换也很方便。     

Financial distress,financial constraint and investment decision: Evidence from Brazil

This paper analyses the presence of financial constraint in the investment decisions of 367 Brazilian firms from 1997 to 2004, using a Bayesian econometric model with group-varying parameters. The motivation for this paper is the use of clustering techniques to group firms in a totally endogenous form. In order to classify the firms we used a hybrid clustering method, that is, hierarchical and non-hierarchical clustering techniques jointly. To estimate the parameters a Bayesian approach was considered. Prior distributions were assumed for the parameters, classifying the model in random or fixed effects. Ordinate predictive density criterion was used to select the model providing a better prediction. We tested thirty models and the better prediction considers the presence of 2 groups in the sample, assuming the fixed effect model with a Student t distribution with 20 degrees of freedom for the error. The results indicate robustness in the identification of financial constraint when the firms are classified by the clustering techniques.     

Trust, reputation and relationships in grazing rights markets: An experimental economic study

Trust is frequently a requirement for economic exchanges and the management of natural resources. Providing public information on past actions can promote trust through the formation of reputations. We developed an economic experiment to test whether a formal reputation mechanism could facilitate trusting relationships in the tradable grazing rights markets. Providing information to create formal public reputations for market participants did not increase the overall efficiency of the market. However, it did result in greater equality of income between partners, suggesting that participants showed more concern for their partners when they knew they would be rated. Even with public reputation information, bilateral relationships remained central to the market. Market failures in existing grazing rights markets may be better addressed by measures to increase communication between partners rather than simply relying on a formal reputation mechanism.     

Connecting strategic orientation,innovation strategy,and corporate sustainability: A model for sustainable development through stakeholder engagement

This paper aims to enhance our understanding of the relationship between organizations' strategic orientation (i.e., instrumental, equidistant, and stewardship) and their innovational strategy (i.e., organizational ambidexterity and open innovation), and this relationship's influence on their sustainability performance. We expected organizations' strategic orientation to influence their innovational strategy and exhibit better corporate sustainability. We focused on 12 different multinational organizations in the Eurozone and found that inbound open innovation acts as a driver for corporate sustainability while simultaneously positively enabling organizations to pursue both financial and social initiatives. After suggesting open innovation as a new corporate sustainability antecedent, we only found empirical evidence of inbound open innovation. However, we would suggest that if organizations incorporated outbound open innovation in their strategy, they could likely improve their corporate sustainability. Also, we found that achieving an equidistant or stewardship orientation paves the way for sustainability to become an integral part of an organization's innovational culture and actualizes the organization's strategic behavior. Our findings further contribute to a deeper understanding of organizations' characteristics as their sustainability commitment grows and as they move from an instrumental to a stewardship orientation and implement an open innovational strategy.     

Choosing for others

Experiments conducted in the US and France were used to study how individuals make trade-offs between health and taste for themselves and others. When someone receives a choice made for them that differs from their preference, they experience a welfare loss; at least in the short-term. We measure the empirical magnitude of this loss, and suggest it play a role in assessing the desirability of paternalistic policies motivated by behavioural economics. We show that the welfare loss changes with the provision of new information and the impact of this information differs for the two countries.     

THE MEASUREMENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN KOREA

South Korea began its measurement of Gross National Product during the turbulent 1950's, a period of postwar rebuilding and of political and social changes. With only a small and largely inexperienced staff, and with little support from other statistical agencies whose data were essential to adequate GNP measurement, the Bank of Korea began this task in the early 1950's. Early estimates were extremely rough; over the years, the statistical staff was trained and other statistical agencies were upgraded. Measurements of output in the large agricultural sector and in manufacturing have gradually but consistently been strengthened as recent input-output data has been developed. Gaps still persist, particularly in the wholesale and retail sectors, but certain strengths are present: an outstanding job has been done in product pricing. The author describes the evolution of Korea's improving GNP program, presents its sources of data and its methodologies, and gives an assessment of problems of the past and prospects for the future.     

Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives induced by insurance buyers’ net trades. When there are many agents to share the insurance buyers’ risks, Cournot equilibrium outcomes are close to being second-best. In contrast, if insurance buyers are price takers, equilibria fail to exist or are bounded away from being second-best.