Municipal Bond Demand Premiums and Bond Price Volatility: A Note

The behavior of different components of municipal bond yields may have a significant impact upon bond price behavior. Specifically, demand premiums created by banks may stabilize bond yields in some maturity ranges but not in others; for example, short-term municipals may be stabilized but not long-term. This research implies that bank demand behavior may create demand premiums that stabilize prices of short-term municipal bonds relative to those of Treasury bonds of like maturity. While this implication is inconsistent with the residual theory of bank demand, it is consistent with the tax-shield theory attributed to Hendershott and Koch [3, 4].     

Lemon Laws: Intent,Experience, and a Pro-Consumer Model

Under deregulation, public policies regarding consumer rights and product warranties have shifted. This paper reviews the rationale for lemon laws, state legislation intended to help consumers resolve new car performance, and repair problems. It then compares consumers’ redress under these laws to redress under other remedies. Experience with Vermont's legislation, one of the most aggressive lemon laws, is reviewed and analyzed in detail as the basis for formulating public policy recommendations in this area.     

Screening,Market Signalling,and Capital Structure Theory

This paper develops an equilibrium model in which informational asymmetries about the qualities of products offered for sale are resolved through a mechanism which combines the signalling and costly screening approaches. The model is developed in the context of a capital market setting in which bondholders produce costly information about a firm's a priori imperfectly known earnings distribution and use this information in specifying a bond valuation schedule to the firm. Given this schedule, the firm's optimal choices of debt-equity ratio and debt maturity structure subsequently signal to prospective shareholders the relevant parameters of the firm's earnings distribution.     

Is Common Stock Obsolete?

Agency theory rests on a well-defined relationship between shareholders and managers. That relationship is examined and found to be a poorly denned state-contingent contract. The implications of that finding, and the existence of only a weak market for managers, lead to the conclusion that the traditional assumptions about the rights of shareholders no longer apply and that common stock (ordinary share capital) is obsolete.     

Federal Deposit Insurance,Regulatory Policy,and Optimal Bank Capital*

This paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the FDIC. Essentially, the FDIC sells two products—insurance and regulation. To span the product space, it must and does set two prices. We argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk-taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value (i.e., the value of their right to continue in business) stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the FDIC's insurance reserves.     

The Impact of Federal Interest Rate Regulations on the Small Saver: Further Evidence

This paper provides further evidence on the distributional impact of interest rate ceilings on the small saver. Cross-section data from the 1977 Consumer Credit Survey was used to estimate the implicit losses imposed on different income classes by government regulations. Our findings generally support earlier studies which found the implicit burden to be regressive among income classes. However, the degree of regressivity showed a marked decrease since 1970. These results may be explained by portfolio adjustments of households and financial innovations in response to deposit rate ceilings and accelerating inflation during the 1970s.     

Volume,Volatility, and New York Stock Exchange Trading Halts

Trading halts increase, rather than reduce, both volume and volatility. Volume (volatility) in the first full trading day after a trading halt is 230 percent (50 to 115 percent) higher than following “pseudohalts”: nonhalt control periods matched on time of day, duration, and absolute net-of-market returns. These results are robust over different halt types and news categories. Higher posthalt volume is observed into the third day while higher posthalt volatility decays within hours. The extent of media coverage is a partial determinant of volume and volatility following both halts and pseudohalts, but a separate halt effect remains after controlling for the media effect.