TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION*

This paper examines the gains from cooperative agreements on transportation infrastructure investments when there are terms of trade and technological spillovers between countries. In a two ‐country model, cooperation on investment levels will result in a lower level of transport costs. However, the cooperative equilibrium may have a higher or lower level of infrastructure investment between the partner countries in the case of preferential liberalization. The paper also addresses the desirability of linking trade and infrastructure agreements when investment choices can be used strategically.     

Monetary Policy, Determinacy, and Learnability in a Two-Block World Economy

We study how determinacy and learnability of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium may be affected by monetary policy in a simple, two-country, New Keynesian framework under both fixed and flexible exchange rates. We find that open economy considerations may alter conditions for determinacy and learnability relative to closed economy analyses and that new concerns can arise in the analysis of classic topics such as the desirability of exchange rate targeting and monetary policy cooperation.     

Schools and Location: Tiebout,Alonso, and Governmental Finance Policy

Many discussions of school finance policy fail to consider how households respond to policies that change the attractiveness of different residential locations. We develop a general equilibrium model that incorporates workplace choice, residential choice, and political choice of tax and expenditure levels. Importantly, we consider multiple workplaces, a fundamental feature of today's metropolitan landscape. This basic model permits investigating how accessibility and public goods interact in a metropolitan area. The model is used to analyze two conventional policy initiatives: school district consolidation and district power equalization. The surprising conclusion is that school quality and welfare can fall for all families when these restrictions on choice are introduced.     

An Analysis of Insiders' Use of Prepaid Variable Forward Transactions

This study examines firm performance surrounding insiders' prepaid variable forward (PVF) transactions to infer insiders' information when they enter these off‐market contracts. PVFs allow insiders to hedge downside risk, share performance gains, and obtain immediate large‐sum cash payments for investment or consumption. On average, PVF transactions cover 30% of a sample insider's firm‐specific wealth ($22 million), which is substantially larger than a typical open‐market sale. PVFs systematically follow strong firm performance and precede degraded stock and earnings performance. PVFs also precede periods of negative abnormal returns relative to potential alternative investments. The documented association between PVFs and performance declines does not appear to result from the market's response to transaction disclosure, participant self‐selection, or general price reversals. Thus, evidence suggests that insiders use PVFs to diversify firm‐specific holdings in anticipation of performance declines.     

Long‐Run Consumption Risk and Asset Allocation under Recursive Utility and Rational Inattention

We study the portfolio decision of a household with limited information‐processing capacity (rational inattention [RI]) in a setting with recursive utility. We find that RI combined with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty could lead to a significant drop in the share of portfolios held in risky assets, even when the departure from the standard expected utility setting with full‐information rational expectations is small. In addition, we show that the equilibrium equity premium increases with the degree of inattention because inattentive investors with recursive utility face greater long‐run risk and thus require higher compensation in equilibrium.     

COSTS OF CALIFORNIA's CORRELATIVE RIGHTS DOCTRINE AS A SOLUTION TO GROUNDWATER OVERDRAFT

This paper reports the present value of groundwater use under alternative institutional structures for the eastern portion of California's San Joaquin Valley. The Gisser-Sanchez model, with data from the California Department of Water Resources, produced these results. The paper, through the use of an optimal control model, shows that private property rights outperform common property rights as an institutional guide to groundwater use. Furthermore, the paper shows that adjudicating groundwater rights under claim of adverse possession gives rise to a discounted flow of future income which, when compared with that of common property, gives the incentive to adjudicate groundwater rights.