Evolving Game Theory

Jörgen W. Weibull (1995) Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press. £18.50 $30 xv+265 pp. Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman and Piero Tani (eds) (1993) Frontiers of Game Theory. MIT Press. £40.50 $47.50 350 pp.     

Long-term economic consequences of hedge fund activist interventions

Review of Accounting Studies - We examine the long-term effects of interventions by activist hedge funds. Research documents positive equal-weighted long-term returns and operating performance...     

Understanding Top Management and Organizational Change Through Demographic and Processual Analysis*

abstract Top management theory has been strongly influenced by demographic studies of top management teams (TMTs), but not by research into organizational adaptation to conditions of extreme institutional turbulence. This article analyses the transformation of a post‐socialist enterprise through a combination of demographic and processual methods to develop an enriched account of the micro‐processes through which top management constructed organizational change. Adding layers of narrative data and processual explanation directly addresses the well rehearsed problems in demographic TMT studies. From the findings, we propose a set of theoretical arguments that conceptualizes top management in terms of management regimes, to which TMTs are politically tied and through which they seek to realize their values and strategies in organizational outcomes.     

Human Resource Management In Building Societies: Making the Transformation?

Ed Snape, Tom Redman and Adrian Wilkinson examine the implications of the changing competitive environment for the management of staff in building societies. In particular, they draw on the results of a detailed case study to discuss attempts to introduce policies and practices associated with ‘HRM’. the conclusion is that the competitive pressures which led to the demand for these policies and practices may also make their successful implementation especially dificult. Ed Snape is a Lecturer in the Department of Human Resource Management at the University of Strathclyde, Tom Redman a Lecturer at Teesside Business School, and Adrian Wilkinson a Lecturer at the Manchester School of Management (UMIST).     

A model of (the threat of) counterfeiting

A simple matching-model of money with the potential for counterfeiting is constructed. In contrast to the existing literature, lotteries are included. These provide scope for the operation of the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps. The application of that refinement is shown to imply that there is no equilibrium with counterfeiting. If the cost of producing counterfeits is low enough, then there is no monetary equilibrium. Otherwise, there is a monetary equilibrium without counterfeiting. In other words, the threat of counterfeiting can eliminate the monetary equilibrium.