The impact of Milton Friedman on modern monetary economics: Setting the record straight on Paul Krugman's “Who was Milton Friedman?”

Paul Krugman's essay “Who Was Milton Friedman?” seriously mischaracterizes Friedman's economics and his legacy. In this paper, we provide a rejoinder to Krugman on these issues. In the course of setting the record straight, we provide a self-contained guide to Milton Friedman's impact on modern monetary economics and on today's central banks. We also refute the conclusions that Krugman draws about monetary policy from the experiences of the United States in the 1930s and of Japan in the 1990s.     

Road Transport Externalities

During the last decade much progress has been made in defining & measuring the external costs of transport. As the cost of tolling equipment falls, the set of realistic policy options to internalise these externalities will continue to grow. This will determine the research and policy agenda. We make three points. Firstly, empirical work is still necessary to better identify marginal external costs, including congestion, accident and environmental costs. Secondly, any assessment of policy options should treat externalities simultaneously. The use of pricing instruments and emissions standards are discussed within this framework. Thirdly, we emphasise the role of government. Designing the optimal road-pricing institutions requires consideration of horizontal and vertical tax competition, while double-dividend arguments are central to the question of securing public support.     

The human cost: A comment on dardis

The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is okay as far as it goes. The second step is to disregard that which can't be measured or give it an arbitrary quantitative value. This is artificial and misleading. The third step is to presume that what can't be measured easily isn't very important. This is blindness. The fourth step is to say what can't be easily measured really doesn't exist. This is suicide (Daniel Yankelovich in Smith, 1972, p. 286).J. Edward Russo is Associate Professor of Marketing and Behavioral Science at the Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 14853, U.S.A.     

Salesperson Resistance to Sharing Market Intelligence in Sub-Saharan Africa

This article presents a framework for exploring salesperson(s) resistance to sharing market intelligence in emerging markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors propose that resistance to sharing market intelligence with relevant others, including the firm, coworkers, intermediaries, and sales managers, is a function of various individual, leadership, and organizational (firm) factors. This framework helps researchers understand how and why resistance develops among salespeople. Moreover, implications from these findings are presented to assist practitioners who wish to persuade and encourage African salespeople to share market intelligence for the benefit of their firms.     

The Production,Transfer and Spillover of Technology: Comparing Large and Small Multinationals as Technology Producers

Multinational enterprises are, sina qua non, the world's technology producers. In this paper, we explore the concept of technology production by multinationals, focusing on three aspects: (i) technology as a firm-specific advantage, (ii) the costs of technology transfer, and (iii) technology spillovers. In each case, we outline current views and debates in the field about the role played by large multinationals in technology production. Finally, we compare MNEs with small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) as technology producers. We conclude that SMEs face certain constraints, due to small size and inadequate financing, that raise their costs of technology production and transfer, relative to the costs for MNEs. On the other hand, their flexibility and use of unconventional methods can create successful mini-nationals in niche markets.     

Stakeholder Capitalism

In this article, we will outline the principles of stakeholder capitalism and describe how this view rejects problematic assumptions in the current narratives of capitalism. Traditional narratives of capitalism rely upon the assumptions of competition, limited resources, and a winner-take-all mentality as fundamental to business and economic activity. These approaches leave little room for ethical analysis, have a simplistic view of human beings, and focus on value-capture rather than value-creation. We argue these assumptions about capitalism are inadequate and leave four problems in their wake. We wish to reframe the narrative of capitalism around the reinforcing concepts of stakeholders coupled with value creation and trade. If we think about how a society can sustain a system of voluntary value creation and trade, then capitalism can once more become a useful concept.     

The Ethics of Innovation: p2p Software Developers and Designing Substantial Noninfringing Uses Under the Sony Doctrine

This essay explores the controversy over peer-to-peer (p2p) software, examining the legal and ethical dimensions of allowing software companies to develop p2p technologies. It argues that, under the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Sony betamax case, technology developers must be accorded the freedom to innovate and develop technologies that are capable of substantial noninfringing uses. This doctrine, known as the Sony doctrine, provides an important safe harbor for technological development, including p2p. The safe harbor, however, does not immunize conduct beyond the design, sale, or supply of the product. For other conduct that falls outside the Sony safe harbor, the traditional standards of secondary liability apply.     

A Documentary Theory of States and Their Existence as Quasi-Abstract Entities

This article is concerned with the existence of states as a matter of fact, and it approaches that subject within the context of the ontology of social reality as a whole. It argues, first, that states do not have a place in the traditional Platonist duality of the concrete and the abstract. Second, that states belong to a third category – the quasi-abstract – that has received philosophical attention with a recently emerging theory of documentality. Documentality, derived from Austin’s theory of performative utterances, claims that documents acts can bring quasi-abstract objects, such as states into being. Third and finally, it argues that the existence of quasi-abstract states should not be rejected on the basis of the Principle of Parsimony, because geopolitical theories that recognise the existence of quasi-abstract states will have greater explanatory power than theories that deny their existence.     

Taking,giving, and impure altruism in dictator games

We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.     

Cheating to win: Dishonesty and the intensity of competition

We argue that the intensity of competition within a group or organization can have an important influence on whether or not people cheat. To make this point we first work through a simple model of strategic misreporting in the workplace. For low and high levels of competition we show that, in equilibrium, few are predicted to misreport. It is for medium levels of competition that misreporting is predicted to be highest. We test this prediction experimentally and find good support for it. This finding has implications for the design of incentive structures within groups and organizations.