MARKET STRUCTURE AND TRADING VOLUME

Historically, trading volume reported for NASDAQ stocks has been overstated vis‐à‐vis New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks, both because of the dealer's participation in trades as a market maker and because of interdealer trading. Beginning in 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission changed order‐handling rules and trade‐reporting rules, which may have reduced or eliminated the overstatement of NASDAQ trading. We examine trading volumes of firms changing from NASDAQ to the NYSE since 1997 and document that reported trading volume for NASDAQ stocks continues to be overstated. Moreover, the degree of overstatement is much larger for firms with high trading volume.     

Mean-Variance Preferences and Investor Behaviour

We study the comparative statics implications of mean-variance preferences for optimal portfolios. Specifically, we show that all risk-averse mean-variance investors raise their investment in a risky asset in response to a change in that asset's return distribution if and only if the change lowers both the mean and standard deviation of the return by the same percentage. Besides being of interest in its own right, our results allow us to compare some comparative statics implications and the expected utility and mean-variance models systematically.     

Generic Product Strategies for Emerging Market Exports into Triad Nation Markets: A Mimetic Isomorphism Approach

ABSTRACT Based on the concept of mimetic isomorphism, we theorize that, by imitating the home country MNE modal generic product strategy in each Triad nation, emerging market firms (EMFs) can improve their export performance satisfaction. We hypothesize that EMFs which: (1) target the EU and use a Premium strategy, (2) target Japan and use a Superior Value strategy, or (3) target the USA and use an Economy strategy will, on average, achieve higher levels of satisfaction with export performance than EMFs that enter emerging markets or EMFs that employ other product strategies in Triad nation markets. Our hypothesis is tested and supported on a sample of Romanian and Chinese exporters. Managerial implications of our theory and findings are discussed.     

Are regulations the answer for emerging stock markets? Evidence from the Czech Republic and Poland

Does the emergence of a stock market require a well-developed legal and/or regulatory system? Although historical work by Neal and Davis [Neal, L., & Davis, L. (2005). The evolution of the rules and regulations of the first emerging markets: The London, New York, and Paris stock exchanges, 1792–1914. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 45, 296–311] and Stringham [Stringham, E. (2003). The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth century Amsterdam. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43, 321–344] suggests that securities markets have successfully developed with little government oversight, numerous authors [including Black, B. (2001). The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. University of California Law Angeles Law Review, 48, 781–855; Coffee, J. (1999). Privatization and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure. Journal of Corporation Law, 25, 1–39; Frye, T. (2000). Brokers and bureaucrats: Building market institutions in Russia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Glaeser, E., Johnson, S., & Shleifer, A. (2001). Coase versus the Coasians. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 853–899; Mlčoch, L. (2000). Restructuring of property rights: An institutional view. In L. Mlčoch et al. (Eds.), Economic and Social Changes in Czech Society After 1989. Prague: The Karolinum Press; Pistor, K. (2001). Law as a determinant for equity market development – the experience of transition economies. In Peter Murrell (Ed.), The Value of Law in Transition Economies (pp. 249–287). Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press; Stiglitz, J. (1999). Whither reform. Ten years of the transition. Keynote Address, Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, April 28–30, 1999; Zhang, X. (2006). Financial market governance in developing countries: Getting the political underpinnings right. Journal of Developing Societies, 2, 169–196] argue that the Czech Republic and other Eastern European governments need more regulation for their newly created stock markets. They maintain that the Warsaw Stock Exchange, which is seen as more regulated, has outperformed the Prague Stock Exchange which is seen as largely unregulated. Thus increased regulations are a key to increased performance. This article, however, maintains that the evidence from the Czech experience has been misinterpreted. This article provides an in depth case study of the Czech stock market and finds that (a) Czech capital markets have been hindered by government intervention from their beginning, (b) that the evidence on Poland's superior performance is not as strong as suggested, and (c) that Czech regulators seem to be unqualified, lack the proper incentives, and are unlikely to benefit the market. Under these circumstances it appears that Neal and Davis (2005:311) are correct that increased government involvement is unlikely to improve the situation.     

Buying group choice: The effect of individual group member's prior decision frame

This article reports the results from two experiments that tested decision‐framing effects on choices made by simulated organizational buying groups. The first experiment showed that the choice of suppliers by buying groups varied depending on the nature of the decision frame. Moreover, group influence seemed to intensify the effect of the loss decision frame. The second experiment tested whether mixed‐frame groups used a lexicographic strategy to make multidimensional supplier choice decisions. Buying groups faced with a choice between two suppliers that differed with respect to price and quality chose the supplier that was best on the most important attribute—quality. Also, the decision frame associated with the important attribute affected the buying groups' choices. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.