Foreign outsourcing, exporting, and FDI: A productivity comparison at the firm level

This paper documents how productivity varies with globalization modes, based on a firm-level data set covering all manufacturing industries in Japan without any firm-size threshold. Only a small fraction of firms outsource, export, or invest abroad. Foreign outsourcers and exporters tend to be less productive than the firms active in FDI or in multiple globalization modes but more productive than domestic firms. This productivity ordering is robust even when firm size, factor intensity, and/or industry are controlled for. This paper also finds that outsourcers are on average less capital intensive than other globalized firms.     

Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions

We study house allocation problems introduced by L. Shapley and H. Scarf (1974, J. Math. Econ.1, 23–28). We prove that a mechanism (a social choice function) is individually rational, anonymous, strategy-proof, and nonbossy (but not necessarily Pareto efficient) if and only if it is either the core mechanism or the no-trade mechanism, where the no-trade mechanism is the one that selects the initial allocation for each profile of preferences. This result confirms the intuition that even if we are willing to accept inefficiency, there exists no interesting strategy-proof mechanism other than the core mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78, D89.     

Industrial development in Malaysia and Singapore: Empirical analysis with multiple‐cone Heckscher–Ohlin Model

This paper employs the multiple‐cone Heckscher–Ohlin model to analyze industrial development in Malaysia and Singapore. In particular, we focus on industrial upgrading along with capital accumulation as a key determinant for the cross‐country difference in production technology and income. By pooling two countries’ data on factor endowment and sectoral output in manufacturing from 1990 to 2008, we estimate the common industrial development paths of the two‐cone Heckscher–Ohlin model, the Rybczynski linear relationship between capital–labor ratio and sectoral output per capita. Our results demonstrate that, after controlling for quality of workers (by educational attainment), the two countries resided in different cones during our sample period, implying that Singapore succeeded in accumulating capital steadily with the support of foreign investment and upgrading its industry mix to make it more capital‐intensive. The separation of cones is also consistent with the observed gap in gross domestic product per capita between the two countries. Furthermore, we implement a factor‐augmenting productivity test to see the gaps in efficiency of capital and human‐capital‐augmented labor and confirm no significant difference between the two countries.     

Giffen behavior independent of the wealth level

We demonstrate that a well-behaved utility function can generate Giffen behavior, where “well-behaved” means that its indifference curves are smooth, convex, and closed in a commodity space; the resulting demand function of each good is differentiable with respect to prices and income. Moreover, we show that Giffen behavior is compatible with any level of utility and an arbitrarily low share of income spent on the inferior good. This contrasts sharply with the common view that the Giffen paradox tends to occur when households’ wealth levels are low. Comments from Murray C. Kemp, Binh Tran-Nam, Ngo Van Long, Masao Oda, Noritsugu Nakanishi, and Chiaki Hara have greatly improved the paper. We have also benefited from discussions with Koichi Hamada, Satya Das, Takashi Kamihigashi, Tomoyuki Kamo, Toru Kikuchi, Katsufumi Fukuda, Yu-chin Chen, Fahad Khalil, Takeshi Nakatani, Kazuo Nishimura, Ken-Ichi Shimomura, and Stephen J. Turnovsky. We thank the anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. Iwasa would like to acknowledge financial support from Research Fellowships of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for Young Scientists. Professor Koji Shimomura passed away on February 24, 2007. This paper was completed after his untimely death.     

Offshore Outsourcing and Productivity: Evidence from Japanese Firm‐level Data Disaggregated by Tasks

This paper examines the relationship of offshoring with productivity, based on the original survey data of Japanese firms. Productivity gains were found in the firms offshoring both manufacturing and service tasks, but not in the firms offshoring only either manufacturing or service tasks. This paper also finds that firms offshoring to various destinations tend to be more productive than non‐offshoring firms. These results suggest that the level of firms' engagement in offshoring is more important for productivity than whether or not firms engage in offshoring.     

Commodity Taxation and the Effects of Entry: A Case of Variety Preferences

We study the relationship between commodity taxation and the effect of entry with imperfect competition. We develop a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect competition in which consumers have variety preferences. As a result, we see that introducing specific taxes increases social welfare. Furthermore, we show that the optimal tax rule is contrary to the inverse elasticity rule.Acknowledgement We wish to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs

The folk theorem literature has been relaxing the assumption on how much players know about each other's past action. Here we consider a general model where players can “buy” precise information. Every period, each player decides whether to pay a cost to accurately observe the actions chosen by other players in the previous period. When a player does not pay the cost, he obtains only imperfect private signals. Observational decisions are unobservable to others. Known strategies such as trigger strategies do not work since they fail to motivate players to pay for information. This paper shows that the folk theorem holds for any level of observation costs. Unlike existing folk theorems with private monitoring, ours imposes virtually no restriction on the nature of costless imperfect signals. The theorem does not use explicit or costless communication, thereby having implications on antitrust laws that rely on evidence of explicit communication. The main message is that accurate observation alone, however costly, enables efficient cooperation in general repeated games.