Does Ethnic Discrimination Vary Across Minority Groups? Evidence from a Field Experiment*

We conduct a large‐scale field experiment to measure labour market discrimination in Australia, one quarter of whose population was born overseas. To denote ethnicity, we use distinctively Anglo‐Saxon, Indigenous, Italian, Chinese and Middle Eastern names. We compare multiple ethnic groups, rather than a single minority as in most other studies. In all cases we applied for entry‐level jobs and submitted a CV indicating that the candidate attended high school in Australia. We find significant differences in callback rates: ethnic minority candidates would need to apply for more jobs in order to receive the same number of interviews. These differences vary systematically across ethnic groups.     

Estimating the intergenerational persistence of lifetime earnings with life course matching: Evidence from the PSID

Why do estimates of the intergenerational persistence in earnings vary so much for the United States? Recent research suggests that lifecycle bias may be a major factor [Grawe, N., Lifecycle bias in estimates of intergenerational earnings persistence. Labour Economics 2006, 13:551–570; Haider, S., and Solon, G., Life-cycle variation in the association between current and lifetime earnings. American Economic Review 2006, 96(4):1308–1320.]. In this paper we estimate the intergenerational correlation in lifetime earnings by using sons' and fathers' earnings at similar ages in order to account for lifecycle bias. Our estimate based on earnings measured at 35–44 for both fathers and sons is similar to that for the age range 45–54.     

Does money impede convergence?

Inspired by Clower’s conjecture that the necessity of trading through money in monetised economies might hinder convergence to competitive equilibrium, and hence, for example, cause unemployment, we experimentally investigate behaviour in markets where trading has to be done through money. In order to evaluate the properties of these markets, we compare their behaviour to behaviour in markets without money, where money cannot intervene. As the trading mechanism might be a compounding factor, we investigate two kinds of market mechanism: the double auction, where bids, asks and trades take place in continuous time throughout a trading period; and the clearing house, where bids and asks are placed once in a trading period, and which are then cleared by an aggregating device. We thus have four treatments, the pairwise combinations of non-monetised/monetised trading with double auction/clearing house. We find that: convergence is faster under non-monetised trading, implying that the necessity of using money to facilitate trade hinders convergence; that monetised trading is noisier than non-monetised trading; and that the volume of trade and realised surpluses are higher with the double auction than the clearing house. As far as efficiency is concerned, monetised trading lowers both informational and allocational efficiency, and while the double auction outperforms the clearing house in terms of allocational efficiency, the clearing house is marginally better than the double auction in terms of informational efficiency when trade is through money. Crucially we confirm the conjecture that inspired these experiments: that the necessity to use money in trading hinders convergence to competitive equilibrium, lowers realised trades and surpluses, and hence may cause unemployment.     

Lab and framed lab versus natural experiments: Evidence from a risky choice experiment

Some recent papers have studied data from TV game shows to examine the behaviour of individuals towards risk. It is generally agreed that data from these shows are useful in detecting individual risk aversion in the field, with both “real life” subjects and incentives. Field experiments also include some interesting reality features that could affect individuals’ behaviour and possibly lead to different findings. This paper aims at investigating lab versus field evidence in risk taking attitudes, especially controlling for framing effects. To assess whether the behaviour of subjects in the field is consistent with that of experimental subjects, we designed an experiment to mimic (with experimental rewards and subjects) the rules of a well-known Italian TV game show, Affari Tuoi, in two different settings: a traditional lab setting, where the game was played individually (109 subjects) (Treatment 1); and a framed lab, in which the experiment was replicated in the Italian public television (RAI) studio where the show was actually recorded, with a smaller sample of undergraduate students (33) and in the presence of an audience (Treatment 2). Our comparison between the two different settings aims at establishing whether the presence of an audience, or of a situation that reproduces the stress that contestants must experience in the TV studio, can affect experimental subjects’ choices. We did not find any significant evidence of framing effects: students behave in a similar way in the two lab settings, responding essentially to incentives. Comparing the risk attitudes shown by experimental subjects in the two lab treatments with those exhibited by the contestants in the field, we found that contestants in the TV show are generally more risk averse than students in the lab.     

Regret in auctions: theory and evidence

The sealed-bid first-price auction of a single object in the case of independent privately-known values is the simplest auction setting and understanding it is important for understanding more complex mechanisms. But bidders bid above the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium theory prediction. The reasons for this “over bidding” remain an unsolved puzzle. Several explanations have been offered, including risk aversion, social comparisons, and learning. We present a new explanation based on regret and a model that explains not only the observed over bidding in sealed-bid first-price auctions, but also behavior in several other settings that is inconsistent with risk aversion. The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation.     

Exchange Rate Management and the External Debt Burden: The Case of the Philippines

The paper develops a simple macroeconomic model which is then estimated for the Philippines. Econometric evidence shows that Philippines monetary authorities have been reluctant to allow a real devaluation, because of a large public external debt and for the fear of fueling inflation. Simulations show that, while an overvalued exchange rate may bring some benefits in the form of lower inflation and improved budgetary performance, its current account costs may be significant. Brady-like deals can reduce fiscal imbalances, limit the sensitivity of fiscal aggregates to the exchange rate, and increase the benefits of a more aggressive exchange rate policy.     

Resource determinants of strategy and performance: The case of British exporters

This study adopts the RBV of the firm in order to identify critical advantage-generating resources and capabilities with strong positive export strategy and performance implications. The proposed export performance model is tested using a structural equation modelling approach on a sample of 356 British exporters. We examine the individual as well as the concurrent (simultaneous) direct and indirect effects of five resource bundles on export performance. We find that four resources/capabilities: managerial, knowledge, planning, and technology, have a significant positive direct effect on export performance, while relational and physical resources exhibited no unique positive effect. We also find that the firm's export strategy mediates the resource–performance nexus in the case of managerial and knowledge-based resources. The theoretical and methodological grounding of this study contributes to the advancement of export related research by providing better specification of the nature of the effects – direct or indirect – of particular resource factors on export performance.     

Non‐Homothetic Multisector Growth Models

Multisector growth (MSG) models are dynamic versions of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Non‐homothetic preference (utility) functions are required for the evolution of factor allocations and industrial structures in accordance with consumption expenditure patterns implied by the non‐unitary income elasticities observed in all budget data since Engel in the 1850s. But comparative static general equilibrium solutions and particularly solving the dynamics of MSG models require explicit specifications of all demand and cost (price) functions. On the demand side, the constant differences of elasticity of substitution (CDES) non‐homothetic indirect utility functions and Roy's identity provide the explicit Marshallian demand functions and budget shares. Sectorial constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions and Shephard's lemma provide the explicit relative commodity price functions and the sectorial cost shares and capital–labor ratios. Walrasian equilibria are given by one equation and the multisector dynamics by three differential equations. Benchmark solutions are given for three cost regimes of a 10‐sector MSG model. History patterns of industrial/allocational evolutions are recognized.