The Hazard Rate of Foreign Direct Investment: A Structural Estimation of a Real‐option Model*

The hazard rate of investment is derived within a real‐option model, and its properties are analysed so as to directly study the relation between uncertainty and investment. Maximum likelihood estimates of the hazard are calculated using a sample of multinational enterprises (MNEs) that invested in Central and Eastern Europe over the period 1990–98. Employing a standard, non‐parametric specification of the hazard, our measure of uncertainty has a negative effect on investment, but the reduced‐form model is unable to control for nonlinearities in the relationship. The structural estimation of the option‐based hazard is instead able to account for the nonlinearities and exhibits a significant value of waiting, although the latter is independent of our measure of uncertainty. This finding supports the existence of alternative channels through which uncertainty can affect investment.     

A cognition paradigm clash: Simon,situated cognition and the interpretation of bounded rationality

Simon’s notion of bounded rationality is deeply intertwined with his activity as a cognitive psychologist and founder of so-called cognitivism, a mainstream approach in cognitive psychology until the 1980s. Cognitivism, understood as ‘symbolic information processing,’ provided the first cognitive psychology foundation to bounded rationality. Has bounded rationality since then fully followed the development of cognitive psychology beyond symbolic information processing in the post-Simonian era? To answer this question, this paper focuses on Simon’s opposition during the 1990s to a new (paradigmatic) view of cognition called situated cognition, which has since put into question the entire view in cognitive psychology of humans as symbolic information processors. This paper then reads the cognitivism/situated cognition debate through the lens of current bounded rationality research in economics, in order (i) to inquire into whether it has tackled the issues in that controversy; (ii) to envisage possible new foundations for a cognitive psychology-based bounded rationality.     

Controlling the commercialisation of science across inter-organisational borders: Four cases from two major Swedish universities

The purpose of this paper is to analyse how different types of controls are applied in different mechanisms for commercialising science, depending on the inter-organisational interactions involved. To achieve this purpose, we followed a multiple-case study design and selected four cases from Uppsala University and the Karolinska Institutet that provided variation in the commercialisation mechanisms (PET Centre, Ångström Materials Academy, Actar, and Karolinska Development). We find that action and result controls dominate in linear ‘spin-out’ funnel mechanisms, while interactive mechanisms entail a combination of action, result and personal controls. However, the inter-organisational interactions also impact which controls are applied in a commercialisation mechanism: conflicting goals between a few closely related organisations or limited external interactions are associated with result controls, while action controls dominate in the absence of external interactions if time and efficiency are key goals. Result controls also assume very different roles, depending on the inter-organisational context of a specific commercialisation mechanism.     

Full-cost pricing in the classical competitive process: A model of convergence to long-run equilibrium

In the last 10–15 years a lot of attempts has been devoted to study the calssical process of convergence of market prices toward natural prices. The two forces that one has thought could achieve this target were capital mobility, that determines the dynamics of output, and demand-supply forces, that determine the dynamics of prices. In this article a model of classical competition is proposed in which a full-cost pricing mechanism is adopted in the rule of evolution of market prices. An asymptotical stability result of long-run equilibrium is proved for a two-commodity model with and without a final demand.     

MONOPOLISTIC LOCATION CHOICE IN A TWO‐SIDED HOTELLING MODEL

We analyse the optimal location choice of a monopolistic firm that operates two arbitrarily located platforms on a two‐sided market. By extending the traditional Hotelling framework, we show that the optimal platform locations are equivalent to the one‐sided benchmark if both sides are either restricted to single‐ or multi‐homing. In the mixed case (one side single‐homes, the other one multi‐homes), the optimal platform locations are in line with the respective symmetric case. If the monopolist is restricted to choosing the same location on either side of the market, the optimal locations are determined by the relative profitability of the market sides.     

The choice and timing of foreign direct investment under uncertainty

This paper sheds new light on why timing and entry mode should be considered simultaneously in the international investment literature. We derive the profit levels at which it is optimal to switch from exporting to setting up a wholly owned subsidiary, creating a joint venture, or licensing production to a local firm. The preferred entry mode depends on uncertainty about future profits, tax differentials between the home and the foreign country, the cost advantages of local firms, institutional requirements, and the degree of cooperation between partners in a joint venture.     

A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

We consider two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. The characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs obtained by Hart allows for complex strategies, which are actually required by some equilibrium payoffs in some games. We show that appropriate one-shot public communication mechanisms make Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable by means of simple strategies. Furthermore, these mechanisms satisfy a notion of self-fulfillment.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, C72.     

Autonomy,responsibility and accountability in the Italian school system

The attention on education and the management of the schools represent important elements of the overall public sector management reforms in many OECD countries. The Italian school system has been characterised, in the last decade, by a process of granting schools a degree of autonomy in terms of educational, managerial and financial functions. Autonomy goes hand by hand with responsibility and accountability systems of schools. This paper delivers a critical analysis of the accountability system designed intentionally or not by the reform. The reform is based on the assumption that more local managed schools will improve the overall performance, through more autonomy, responsibility and accountability. In doing so, the concept of accountability web and the role of cultural traits in developing forms of accountability are used in order to analyse the context of three case studies. The findings suggest that the reform created a dual-based accountability on schools causing higher level of stress in the organisation, and a misalignment on the accountability web between school manager and teachers.