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排序方式: 共有224条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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We study the evolution of investor confidence in 1992-1998 over the chance of individual currencies to converge to the Euro, using data on currency option prices. Convergence risk, which may reflect uncertainty over policy commitment as well as exogenous fundamentals, induces a level of implied volatility in excess of actual volatility. This volatility wedge should gradually decrease as confidence grows over time as convergence policy is maintained, and the risk of a reversal is progressively resolved. Empirically, we indeed find a positive volatility wedge which declines over time only for currencies involved in the Euro convergence process. The wedge and other convergence risk measures are correlated with both exogenous fundamentals and proxies for policy commitment uncertainty. We also find that the wedge responds to policy shocks in an asymmetric fashion, suggesting that policy risk is resolved at different rates after negative and positive shocks. Finally, we estimate a regime-switching model of convergence uncertainty, using data on interest rates, currency rates, and currency option prices. The results confirm the time-varying and asymmetric nature of convergence risk, and indicate that investors demand a risk premium for convergence risk.  相似文献   
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The purpose of this paper is to analyse how different types of controls are applied in different mechanisms for commercialising science, depending on the inter-organisational interactions involved. To achieve this purpose, we followed a multiple-case study design and selected four cases from Uppsala University and the Karolinska Institutet that provided variation in the commercialisation mechanisms (PET Centre, Ångström Materials Academy, Actar, and Karolinska Development). We find that action and result controls dominate in linear ‘spin-out’ funnel mechanisms, while interactive mechanisms entail a combination of action, result and personal controls. However, the inter-organisational interactions also impact which controls are applied in a commercialisation mechanism: conflicting goals between a few closely related organisations or limited external interactions are associated with result controls, while action controls dominate in the absence of external interactions if time and efficiency are key goals. Result controls also assume very different roles, depending on the inter-organisational context of a specific commercialisation mechanism.  相似文献   
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Tariffs, licensing and market structure   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124].  相似文献   
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In this paper we present a crisp-input/fuzzy-output regression model based on the rationale of generalized maximum entropy (GME) method. The approach can be used in several situations in which one have to handle with particular problems, such as small samples, ill-posed design matrix (e.g., due to the multicollinearity), estimation problems with inequality constraints, etc. After having described the GME-fuzzy regression model, we consider an economic case study in which the features provided from GME approach are evaluated. Moreover, we also perform a sensitivity analysis on the main results of the case study in order to better evaluate some features of the model. Finally, some critical points are discussed together with suggestions for further works.  相似文献   
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Simon’s notion of bounded rationality is deeply intertwined with his activity as a cognitive psychologist and founder of so-called cognitivism, a mainstream approach in cognitive psychology until the 1980s. Cognitivism, understood as ‘symbolic information processing,’ provided the first cognitive psychology foundation to bounded rationality. Has bounded rationality since then fully followed the development of cognitive psychology beyond symbolic information processing in the post-Simonian era? To answer this question, this paper focuses on Simon’s opposition during the 1990s to a new (paradigmatic) view of cognition called situated cognition, which has since put into question the entire view in cognitive psychology of humans as symbolic information processors. This paper then reads the cognitivism/situated cognition debate through the lens of current bounded rationality research in economics, in order (i) to inquire into whether it has tackled the issues in that controversy; (ii) to envisage possible new foundations for a cognitive psychology-based bounded rationality.  相似文献   
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We analyse the optimal location choice of a monopolistic firm that operates two arbitrarily located platforms on a two‐sided market. By extending the traditional Hotelling framework, we show that the optimal platform locations are equivalent to the one‐sided benchmark if both sides are either restricted to single‐ or multi‐homing. In the mixed case (one side single‐homes, the other one multi‐homes), the optimal platform locations are in line with the respective symmetric case. If the monopolist is restricted to choosing the same location on either side of the market, the optimal locations are determined by the relative profitability of the market sides.  相似文献   
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Quality & Quantity - This paper aims to represent that levels of customer satisfaction of tourist accommodation are an important prerequisite when the goal is building a loyal relationship with...  相似文献   
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