Why is Corruption Tolerated?

It is maintained that a closer analysis of the features of the underlying contract reveals that under many circumstances corruption is in fact a rational and understandable reaction to institutional failures, which are often far from accidental. Sometimes it can even be considered legitimate, when instrumental in achieving goals shared by the vast majority of the electorate.To this purpose, three different stylized institutional frameworks are analyzed: developed, totalitarian and transition countries. The origin, scope and consequences of corruption vary significantly across the different frameworks. The normative conclusions should therefore be adjusted accordingly.     

Innovation,formal vs. informal R&D,and firm size: Some evidence from Italian manufacturing firms

On the basis of data from two recent surveys on innovation diffusion in Italian manufacturing industry, this paper shows that informal R&D is an important part of the total R&D undertaken by small and medium sized firms. Nevertheless, when an output indicator such as the number and the nature of the innovations introduced by firms of different size is used, it emerges that small firms have introduced mainly incremental rather than major innovations. The paper therefore suggests that systematic R&D undertaken by large firms within structured laboratories is more effective (in terms of product innovations) than occasional R&D carried out by small firms.     

New development: Integrating risk management in management control systems—lessons for public sector managers

Exploring multiple dimensions of management control systems (MCS), this article proposes a new framework to integrate risk management with strategy, MCS and performance measurement systems (PMS). Considering the public sector as a focal point, the article points to some enterprise risk management (ERM) issues and argues that ERM-enabled MCS has potential to improve PMS and strategic decision-making, leading to a more proactive risk management framework and a culture that promotes performance driven accountability. Consequently, the article calls for further research towards solving the public sector’s risk management problems, motivating its managers to adopt best practices, and stimulating suitable policy developments.     

Facilitating co-production in public services: management implications from a systematic literature review

Drawing on the results of a systematic literature review of empirical studies, this paper sheds light on six broad factors that facilitate the initiation and implementation of co-production in public services. The factors are classified into two overarching categories: organizational factors, including organizational arrangements, professional roles, and managerial tools; and procedural factors, including participant recruitment, participant preparation, and process design. For each set of factors, the paper provides a series of management implications. It concludes with additional observations for practice.     

Two Paradigms and Nobel Prizes in Economics: a Contradiction or Coexistence?

Abstract Markowitz and Sharpe won the Nobel Prize in Economics for the development of Mean‐Variance (M‐V) analysis and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics for the development of Prospect Theory. In deriving the CAPM, Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin assume expected utility (EU) maximisation in the face of risk aversion. Kahneman and Tversky suggest Prospect Theory (PT) as an alternative paradigm to EU theory. They show that investors distort probabilities, make decisions based on change of wealth, exhibit loss aversion and maximise the expectation of an S‐shaped value function, which contains a risk‐seeking segment. Can these two apparently contradictory paradigms coexist? We show in this paper that although CPT (and PT) is in conflict to EUT, and violates some of the CAPM's underlying assumptions, the Security Market Line Theorem (SMLT) of the CAPM is intact in the CPT framework. Therefore, the CAPM is intact also in CPT framework.     

Endogenous skill cycles

This paper explores the ability of a class of one-sector models to generate endogenous skills cycles. Skills cycles are here defined as endogenous fluctuations of the composition of equilibrium allocation of labor services. We consider a one sector economy in which there exist one type of capital stock and a finite number of different labor services, which are assumed to be heterogeneous along the skill/productivity dimension. We apply the Hopf bifurcation theorem and provide necessary conditions on the model’s parameters for having a closed orbit as the economy’s stable set. We also develop a numerical example (based on the United States economy) showing how this closed orbit can appear under reasonable parameter values.     

Civil conflict and secessions

This paper studies secessions as the outcome of conflict between regions. We study under what conditions regions will divert costly resources to fight each other over political borders. We derive the probability of secession and the amount of resources diverted to separatist conflict, and show how those variables depend on factors such as heterogeneity costs, economies of scale, relative size, and external threats. We also model civil conflict over types of government, after borders have been determined, and study how this political conflict affects the incentives to secede. This paper has been written in memory of Herschel Grossman, and owes much to his inspiration. I am grateful to Michelle Garfinkel and David Weil, who co-organized a conference in Herschel’s honor at Brown in April 2006, for their encouragement. I thank Michelle Garfinkel and an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.