The Long-Horizon Performance of REIT Mergers

We study long-horizon shareholder returns in a comprehensive sample of Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) mergers, to test whether or not the anomaly of post-merger underperformance observed in conventional firms applies to the case of REITs. Constructing synthetic benchmark portfolios controlling for firm size and for book-to-market value ratio, we find that 60-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns for REIT acquirers are significantly negative at approximately −10%, supporting the position that REIT merger acquirers underperform non-merging REITs in the long run. We find no evidence to challenge previous studies reporting positive announcement period returns for acquirers when the target is privately held, but we do find evidence that these positive returns do not persist. The long term performance of acquiring REITs is approximately the same whether the target is public or private.

How Entrenchment, Incentives and Governance Influence REIT Capital Structure

Although recent literature has confirmed the importance of viewing a firm??s capital structure choices of leverage and debt maturity as jointly determined, to date there has been little analysis of the importance of traditional governance variables on a firm??s capital structure decisions using a simultaneous equations approach. We examine the influence of managerial incentives, traditional managerial monitoring mechanisms and managerial entrenchment on the capital structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Using panel data, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations for leverage and maturity and find that firms with entrenched CEOs use less leverage and shorter maturity debt. This is consistent with the expectation that managers acting in their own self interest will choose lower leverage to reduce liquidity risk and use short maturity debt to preserve their ability to enhance their compensation and reputations by empire building. We also find evidence that traditional alignment mechanisms such as equity and option ownership have an offsetting effect; and that firms where the founder serves as CEO choose higher leverage and longer maturity debt. The results also provide evidence that leverage and maturity are substitutes, firms with high profitability and growth opportunities use less leverage and firms with liquid assets use more leverage and longer maturity debt.     

Strategic trading in the wrong direction by a large institutional insider

Many theoretical papers suggest that large informed traders should make misleading or random trades to disguise their trading. Alternatively, informed traders may trade purely on their estimate of stock value. This paper examines the trading behavior of a large institutional insider that periodically trades in the wrong direction, i.e., makes occasional sell (buy) trades within packages of buy (sell) trades. Using a hand-collected data set, we find that three quarters of the trade packages include wrong-direction trades. Wrong trades appear to be used mostly to disguise right-direction trades. We find that the wrong-trade stocks are larger and have less noisy returns, hence, they lack natural disguise. Wrong trades are relatively small, used to accentuate return volatility, distributed evenly during a package of trades, and are not consistently profitable.     

Explaining the Variation in REIT Capital Structure: The Role of Asset Liquidation Value

We test the Shleifer-Vishny hypothesis that asset liquidation values influence both firm leverage and the choice of debt maturity. Using panel data on real estate investment trusts, we estimate a simultaneous equation model and find that firms specializing in the most (least) liquid assets use more (less) leverage and longer (shorter) maturities. The evidence also suggests that, for REITs, debt maturity and leverage are substitutes, consistent with the theory and predictions of Barclay, Marx and Smith.     

The external cost of prostitution: Evidence from shutting down red light districts in the Netherlands

This article examines the value of externalities created by the presence of sex workers in the city. Although a legal paid-sex industry might contribute to the economy, it may also generate negative externalities. To identify the net impact of overt prostitution, we estimate changes in housing prices following the sudden closure of the two red light districts (RLDs) in the Dutch City of Utrecht. Our results show that the capitalization effect of RLDs is spatially heterogeneous. While some areas are unaffected, others are up to 12% more expensive if far from operating brothels. Interestingly, though, evidence also shows that RLDs increase local employment in a variety of sectors. All the aversion to living near RLDs is instead explained by petty crimes.