The Socio-scientific Construction of Global Climate Crisis

This article adapts and applies a securitisation framework to produce an analytical explanation for the heightened geopolitical status of climate change over the past decade, as demonstrated by the breakthrough Paris Agreement of 2015. Rather than speech acts invoking security, the focus of this analysis is on the socio-scientific discourse of global climate crisis that emerged in the several year period leading to the 2009 COP 15 conference in Copenhagen. Two types of experts—contributory and interactional—are identified as the essential and interdependent actors that engaged in ‘crisification’, a novel crisis-based perspective on political agenda setting, in which climate crisis served as a primary discursive device employed by prominent advocates of urgent action. Contributory experts, that is, authoritative climate scientists and their institutions, together with interactional experts—non-scientist social actors who appropriated and mediated scientific data and knowledge in framing climate change as a global crisis—constituted an extended epistemic community of climate advocates. Through an array of speech acts, this extended community effectively co-constructed a convincing climate crisis discourse that consisted of quantitative data artefacts based on CO₂ concentration and global mean temperature, and qualitative invocations of existential threat to human civilisation, which contributed to the ascent of climate change on the global political agenda. In proposing crisification as a complement to securitisation, the article offers a theoretical innovation that facilitates constructivist analysis of issues framed as crises, including geopolitical problems in certain non-military sectors where crisis is a favoured label for perceived threats to core values.     

First Versus Second Mover Advantage with Information Asymmetry about the Profitability of New Markets

Is it better to move first, or second—to innovate, or to imitate? We show that if one player's information about the profitability of new markets is only modestly superior, the possibility of foreclosing the market can lead to a first‐mover advantage. On the other hand, more extreme information superiority can reverse this, leading to a second‐mover advantage. Knowing more surely what is the best choice, the better‐informed player wants to delay to keep his information private and the less‐informed player wants to delay to learn. Because of this, more accurate information can actually lead to inefficiency by increasing the incentive to delay, and exogenous costs of delay can aid efficiency by neutralizing that strategic incentive. In fact, in some circumstances a player may purposely coarsen his information to deter imitation.     

When does incentive compensation motivate managerial behaviors? An experimental investigation of the fit between incentive compensation,executive core self-evaluation,and firm performance

We develop and test an integrative model that examines the fit between compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, and situational factors. We propose that a fit among all three factors is crucial to motivate desirable managerial behaviors. Using a specially designed management simulation, our study demonstrates that the effectiveness of incentive compensation to motivate managerial behaviors depends on executives' core self-evaluation and firm performance. Our results show that, relative to fixed salary compensation, executives with higher core self-evaluation respond to incentive compensation with greater perseverance, competitive strategy focus, ethical behavior, and strategic risk taking during organizational decline. However, these interaction effects are not present during organizational growth. Our theory and empirical evidence provide significant insights into the complex relationships among compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, firm performance, and managerial behaviors. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coordination and learning in games with strategic substitutes and complements

This paper experimentally compares the impact of the presence of strategic substitutes (GSS) and complements (GSC) on players’ ability to successfully play equilibrium strategies. By exploiting a simple property of the ordering on strategy spaces, our design allows us to isolate these effects by avoiding other confounding factors that are present in more complex settings, such as market games. We find that the presence of strategic complementarities significantly improves the rate of Nash play, but that this effect is driven mainly by early rounds of play. This suggests that GSS may be more difficult to learn initially, but that given sufficient time, the theoretically supported globally stable equilibrium offers a good prediction in both settings. We also show that increasing the degree of substitutability or complementarity does not significantly improve the rate of Nash play in either setting, which builds on the findings of previous studies.     

Non-cooperative exploitation of multi-cohort fisheries—The role of gear selectivity in the North-East Arctic cod fishery

North-East Arctic cod is shared by Russia and Norway. Taking its multi-cohort structure into account, how would optimal management look like? How would non-cooperative exploitation limit the obtainable profits? To which extent could the strategic situation explain today’s over-harvesting? Simulation of a detailed bio-economic model reveals that the mesh size should be significantly increased, resulting not only in a doubling of economic gains, but also in a biologically healthier age-structure of the stock. The Nash equilibrium is close to the current regime. Even when effort is fixed to its optimal level, the non-cooperative choice of gear selectivity leads to a large dissipation of rents.     

On monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity: workers' rents also matter

Abstract .  In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, entry of firms is socially too small. Other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity. We show that workers' rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism. Larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and firms sales and profits, which entices too many firms to enter. We discuss the possibility of over-provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory frameworks where wages are not controlled.     

An evolutionary model of recycling and product lifetime extension

This paper presents a model-based analysis of the development and diffusion of so-called ‘green’ products, i.e. those which are easily recyclable and which have a long lifetime. We address this problem by developing an evolutionary simulation model to identify the impact of the environmental R&D strategies of business firms on the economy and the environment. The simulation results show that R&D investment both in product recyclability and in product lifetime extension can be positive for the firm. Adopting such a strategy means that the firm can then market green products, which provides it with a competitive advantage on firms investing mainly in product recyclability whatever consumers' preferences. From an environmental point of view, the diffusion of green products will reduce both waste flows in the economy and pressure on virgin resources. However, diversifying R&D investment to develop both product recyclability and lifetime can mean slowing down the flow of recycled materials and may lead to even greater quantities of unrecycled waste. Our results suggest introducing regulation policies aiming at encouraging firms to invest both in product recyclability and lifetime in order to benefit from their complementarities. Furthermore, simulations show that it should be better to direct environmental policies on firms' environmental innovation strategies than on demand attributes because significant changes in these strategies would provide much more radical environmental changes.     

Recycling and extending product-life: an evolutionary modelling

This paper presents a model-based analysis of firms’ economic incentives to extend product life and market recyclable products. We address this problem by developing an evolutionary simulation model to describe the behavior of business firms as interacting with consumers and recyclers. Market structure, business firms’ R&D strategies and consumers’ preferences are found to have an important influence here. The simulation results show that improvement in recycling is necessary but not sufficient to solve the issue of increase in waste. Recycling will need to be backed up with an extension in product-life to face such an unwanted increase. Adopting such a strategy could be positive for firms and for the environment because it could lead to high economic performance, both in terms of profits and market share, and to high environmental performance, both in terms of product recyclability and product lifetime. Our results suggest introducing regulation policies aimed at encouraging firms to invest in developing green products, i.e. those which are easily recyclable and which have a long lifetime, and getting consumers to buy them. It would also seem crucial to lend support to innovation outlay for such firms and to favor their seeking to improve product performance.

Inertia Risk: Improving Economic Models of Catastrophes*

We model endogenous catastrophic risk in a new way. We call it “inertia risk”, which accounts for delays between physical variables and the hazard rate – a characteristic often observed in reality. The added realism significantly affects optimal policies relative to the standard model of catastrophic risk. The probability of a catastrophe occurring at some point in time can span the entire interval [0,1], and is not 0 or 1 as is typical in standard models. Inertia risk can also generate path dependences. We illustrate the implications for policy in a simple model of climate change.     

互联网信息服务带来改变 消费者确定性、消费者满意度和中国品牌的发展

随着时间的推移,中国的消费者将能够在越来越充分的信息背景下做出消费选择,即使是针对新的、不熟悉的商品。随着时间的推移,制造商会意识到开发质量稳定、品牌知名的优势产品的莫大益处。届时,品牌的价值将大大增加,高质量产品的价格将会上升,劳动力也将得到