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51.
We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally
complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented
as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry
properties of the structure 相似文献
52.
Criminal investigation and prosecution of politicians, top civil servants and other public figures are topics frequently discussed in the media. The nature of the investigating or prosecuting authority varies between countries – from the general public prosecutor, through magistrates to independent counsels or parliamentary investigation commissions. This paper analyzes the role and status of public prosecutors within the separation of powers-concept. Prosecutors are usually part of the executive and not the judicial branch, which implies that they do not enjoy the same degree of independence as judges, and are ultimately subordinated to the directives of the minister of justice or the government. Conflicts of interest may hence arise if members of government can use the criminal process for their own or partisan interests. The incentives of public prosecutors in different jurisdictions are compared. 相似文献
53.
Charles J. Corbett Frank J. C. Debets Luk N. Van Wassenhove 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1996,7(3):287-305
Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable. 相似文献
54.
55.
56.
Small dimension PDE for discrete Asian options 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper presents an efficient method for pricing discrete Asian options in presence of smile and non-proportional dividends. Using an homogeneity property, we show how to reduce an n0 dimensional problem to a one- or two-dimensional one. We examine different numerical specifications of our dimension reduced PDE using a Crank–Nicholson method (interpolation method, grid boundaries, time and space steps) as well as the extension to the case of non-proportional discrete dividends, using a jump condition. We benchmark our results with Quasi Monte-Carlo simulation and a multi-dimensional PDE 相似文献
57.
Bias is a much-debated issue in survey research. Answer effects (respondents claim to have behaved differently than they did in reality), nonresponse bias (nonrespondents differ on important variables from the respondents) and stimulus effects (by participating in a previous wave of a study, respondents change their behavior or attitude) can seriously distort the results of survey research. By using data from the 1998 Dutch National Election Study the authors show that the results of election research can indeed be affected by bias. Not only are significant effects found in the distribution of political attitude and voting behavior variables as a result of both nonresponse bias and stimulus effects, it is also shown that relations between variables change as a result of bias. 相似文献
58.
The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win. 相似文献
59.
Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous
and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem
stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social
value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because
of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems
often studied in macroeconomics.
Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due
to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful
comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235
“Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization
for public policy and industry regulation”).
Correspondence to: C. Le Van 相似文献
60.
This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects
is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state
at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information.
This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the
interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions.
Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program
provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research
Program. 相似文献