The strategic impact of external networks: subsidiary performance and competence development in the multinational corporation

This paper explores the importance of relational embeddedness in external networks as a strategic resource for performance and competence development in multinational corporations (MNCs). Two different types of relational embeddedness at the subsidiary level—business embeddedness and technical embeddedness—are proposed to have an influence on the subsidiary's market performance as well as its importance for competence development in the MNC. Using data on 97 Swedish MNC subsidiaries, five hypotheses are tested in a LISREL model analysis. The results suggest that technical embeddedness has a positive impact on both the subsidiary expected performance and its role in the development of products and production processes in the MNC. Indirectly, through external technical embeddedness, external business embeddedness also influences the sister units' product and process development and subsidiary market performance. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who gets credit after bankruptcy and why? An information channel

Conventional wisdom holds that individuals find it difficult to obtain new credit post-bankruptcy. Using credit bureau data, we test this hypothesis and show that more than 90% of bankrupt individuals receive credit shortly after filing. Individuals with good credit history prior to filing have reduced credit availability after bankruptcy while those with ex-ante low credit quality receive more credit. We show that credit supplied to low quality individuals is severely curtailed during the financial crisis. We also find that the default probability on new debt increases after bankruptcy, especially among individuals with high ex-ante credit score. These findings are consistent with an information channel, in which bankruptcy reveals new information about a borrower’s credit quality.     

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS GO ABROAD - A STEP IN THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION*

Why are division headquarters of multinational corporations in some cases located abroad? In the multinational corporation the physical location of division headquarters is a problematic issue because of the need for close links both to corporate headquarters and the foreign subsidiaries. This paper develops a model explaining this location as a consequence of power relations associated with the internationalization of the corporation and tests it on a sample of divisions of Swedish multinationals. the results support the view that power relations have an impact on location of division headquarters. One interesting result is the clear indication of countervailing forces, consisting of an attraction force of foreign dominant subsidiaries and a resisting force related to the interests of corporate headquarters.     

How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers?

Contributing to the debate on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal stimuli, we show that the impact of government expenditure shocks depends crucially on key country characteristics, such as the level of development, exchange rate regime, openness to trade, and public indebtedness. Based on a novel quarterly dataset of government expenditure in 44 countries, we find that (i) the output effect of an increase in government consumption is larger in industrial than in developing countries; (ii) the fiscal multiplier is relatively large in economies operating under predetermined exchange rates but is zero in economies operating under flexible exchange rates; (iii) fiscal multipliers in open economies are smaller than in closed economies; (iv) fiscal multipliers in high-debt countries are negative.     

Beyond perception: the role of gender across marketing scholars’ careers,in reply to Galak and Kahn (2021)

Marketing Letters - Galak and Kahn (2021), in their recent contribution on the organizational climate in Marketing academia, highlight important transgressions perceived by women and...     

Are returns to research quality lower in agricultural economics than in economics?

We compare effects of research quality and quantity on the salary of academics in agricultural economics and economics departments of the same universities. Agricultural economists get a significantly lower payoff to research quality, whether measured by quality‐weighted journal articles (based on nine different weighting schemes) or by citations. Instead, salary depends on the quantity of journal articles, while article counts have no independent effect on economist salaries. These differences in the reward structure for research are not due to either the extension focus of agricultural economists or to disciplinary differences in publishing with students and instead may reflect institutional factors that govern incentives within universities. One‐third of academics in the agricultural economics departments studied here have doctoral training in economics; the very different disciplinary reward structures may cause frustration for these faculty due to the muted returns to research quality that agricultural economics departments seem to offer.