The empirical relevance of the competitive storage model

The empirical relevance of models of competitive storage arbitrage in explaining commodity price behavior has been seriously challenged in a series of pathbreaking papers by [Deaton and Laroque, 1992], [Deaton and Laroque, 1995] and [Deaton and Laroque, 1996]. Here we address their major criticism, that the model is in general unable to explain the degree of serial correlation observed in the prices of twelve major commodities. First, we present a simple numerical version of their model which, contrary to Deaton and Laroque (1992), can generate the high levels of serial correlation observed in commodity prices, if it is parameterized to generate realistic levels of price variation. Then, after estimating the [Deaton and Laroque, 1995] and [Deaton and Laroque, 1996] model using their data set, model specification and econometric approach, we show that the use of a much finer grid to approximate the equilibrium price function yields quite different estimates for most commodities. Results are obtained for coffee, copper, jute, maize, palm oil, sugar and tin that support the specifications of the storage model with positive constant marginal storage cost and no deterioration as in Gustafson (1958a). Consumption demand has a low response to price and, except for sugar, stockouts are infrequent. The observed magnitudes of serial correlation of price match those implied by the estimated model.     

THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL PRICING MECHANISMS*

Consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved. Since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous, this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers. Results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits. Furthermore, evidence suggests that a menu of optional two‐part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective.     

The innovation process as a complex structure with multilevel rules

Increasingly, innovation is conceived in a context of conventions or rules and complexity. However, there is a need for a theoretical basis that describes the innovation process based on complexity. In this essay, we propose a multilevel micro-meso-macro framework that aims to meet this need and further the discussion on complexity. In this framework, the rule is adopted as an analytical concept and used to establish a bridge between the several theories employed. Two gaps are identified in the innovation process: the first is related to the simplicity with which complexity is generally treated, and the second refers to a lack of focus on the rules embedded in the theories used in innovation. The goal of this theoretical essay is to propose a multilevel micro-meso-macro framework, based on the rules and principles of complexity, which can be used to analyze the innovation process. As a result, we propose a new framework in which the innovation rules and the interactions between those rules are detailed and based on principles of complexity.     

Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics

This paper studies a class of multidimensional screening models where different type dimensions can be aggregated into a single-dimensional sufficient statistic. The paper applies results of totally positive functions to show that some critical properties of distributions of asymmetric information parameters, such as increasing hazard rate, monotone likelihood ratio, and single-peakedness are preserved under convolution or composition. Under some general conditions, these invariance results also provide a natural ordering of alternative screening mechanisms. I illustrate how these preservation results provide a unifying framework to interpret several contributions in economic models of adverse selection, moral hazard, and voting.     

Factors Influencing Corporate Environmental Disclosure

In this paper, we have studied the factors that influence the environmental disclosures of Italian listed companies. We also aimed to verify the effects produced by the introduction of specific legislation (albeit of a voluntary nature) on environmental disclosures. The analysis has the advantage of including all of the informational documents produced by the company. The analysis shows an (excessively) low level of disclosure of environmental information by the companies examined. The econometric analysis then shows, contrary to our hypothesis and the results of previous analyses carried out in other countries, a negative and statistically significant relationship between environmental disclosures, the presences of minority shareholders and large auditors and the listing of the company, including in foreign markets. We lastly observed that the introduction of ad hoc legislation as purely voluntary only affects the contents of quantitative environmental disclosures, which are unsuitable for a highly industrialized developed country. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information and Optional Calling Plans

In this paper, I study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents' uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique, mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two–part tariffs. Agents' uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types. In such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type, by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule. The theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by South Central Bell in two cities in Kentucky in 1986. The empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist, leading to different, nested, econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information. The empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes. All expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters.     

Time-consistent protection with learning by doing

Can a government induce efficiency gains in his domestic industry by protecting it against foreign competition? Would such trade protection be time consistent? The present paper builds a dynamic equilibrium model that accounts for learning-by-doing effects that link firms’ strategies over time. The model shows that the existence of dynamic economies of scale suffices to overcome the traditional government's lack of commitment of its tariff policy. This paper compares the infinite horizon Markov perfect equilibrium of this game with the dynamic equilibrium under commitment as well as the static Nash equilibrium. Equilibrium strategies are derived in closed form by solving a linear-quadratic differential game. Optimal trade policy involves higher tariff levels than in the static setup in order to account for future gains in efficiency. Under reasonable assumptions, the unique stable MPE is characterized by a domestic price and tariff that decrease as experience accumulates, thus supporting the future liberalization of trade as an equilibrium feature of this dynamic game.     

Testing for complementarity when strategies are dichotomous

We show that it is not possible to extend Arora (1996) reduced form test for the existence of complementarity to evaluate the relationship between a couple of dichotomous strategies as it leads to an incoherent simultaneous discrete response model.     

The Tax Paradox and Weak Tax Neutrality

We introduce the concept of weak tax neutrality that establishes that the relationship between the tax rate and the user cost of capital may be non-monotonic. We show that most existing corporate tax systems allow for weak neutrality. That is, given the tax allowances permitted by these systems, it is possible that neutrality may arise for at least one positive corporate tax rate. Moreover, we show the practical relevance of weak neutrality in realistic situations where there are several asset types and heterogeneous levels of firms' debt ratios.