Image differentiation and locational proximity among retail firms

Hotelling's (1929) classic paper gave rise to a voluminous literature and founded a controversy concerning the validity of the Principle of Minimum Differentiation (PMD). This research has produced conflicting theoretical results and inconsistencies between theory and empirical observations of retail competition. This paper develops a theory of market behavior that encompasses the extent and direction of customer loyalties, the multiplicity of chains and stores, and three forms of competitive expectations. Under conditions of shared competitive expectations, competitive pessimism, and competitive optimism, it provides a theoretical test of PMD and an explanation for the prevalence of spatial proximity and the differentiation of images in retail competition.     

Are U.S. Companies Really Holding That Much Cash—And If So,Why?

Non‐financial S&P 500 companies are now estimated to hold a total of $2.1 trillion of “cash,” a figure that is larger than the annual GDP of all but eight countries. In this report, J.P. Morgan's Corporate Finance Advisory team notes that while many observers have attributed the buildup to offshore cash growth alone, onshore cash levels are also up significantly. To be sure, the companies that have shown the greatest increases also tend to be highly successful, with strong cash flow and business performance. And the managers of such companies tend to prefer to retain much if not most of this cash to take advantage of investment opportunities and to maintain the flexibility to respond to the next economic downturn. Also adding to the cash build‐ups, the executives of large MNCs with significant overseas cash holdings typically try to avoid the higher tax bill triggered by repatriating funds to the U.S. Nevertheless, investors continue to expect growth and high returns on capital; and corporate distributions of capital in the form of dividends and stock buybacks can play an important role in encouraging companies to operate efficiently. While pursuing both of these goals—preservation of enough cash to weather downturns and invest in all positive‐NPV projects, and commitment to paying out excess capital—boards and senior decision makers should continuously reexamine their cash holdings and capital allocation policies to ensure they are appropriate not only for today's environment, but throughout the economic cycle.     

Corporate Repurchase Decisions Following Mutual Fund Sales

This paper examines managerial response to widespread selling by mutual funds. We study the effect on share repurchases of liquidity‐based price pressure measured by mutual fund transactions caused by capital outflows. Firms whose shares undergo widespread selling by funds experiencing large outflows are more likely to repurchase their own shares, controlling for the effect of returns on share repurchases. The empirical results suggest that firms act as buyers of last resort and provide price support for their own shares.     

Capital structure and large investment projects

This paper provides empirical evidence that lumpy investment projects provide firms with the opportunity to adjust leverage at low marginal cost. Consistent with a theoretical model, I find that 1) firms sequence equity before debt during the financing period of their investment projects, and 2) that firms adjust their leverage ratios toward their target leverage during these investment periods. I also show that proactive increases in leverage observed in other studies can be explained by the evolution of firms' target leverage ratios over the financing period of a project. My results are consistent with trade-off theory and imply that firms move toward their target capital structures when they invest.     

A theory of gridlock: Strategic behavior in legislative deliberations

This paper studies compromise and inflexibility in political negotiations. It provides the first analysis of gridlock, a result in which politicians fail to agree on an ideal compromise but which most voters find preferable to the status quo. A multistage game is developed in which contending political blocs choose from hardline or compromise strategies. The outcomes—compromise, gridlock, or one party's ideal legislation—are a function of the incentives of political actors to cooperate or fight. The model illustrates problems in political markets that may occur when consumers are poorly informed.     

Pairs Trading: Performance of a Relative-Value Arbitrage Rule

We test a Wall Street investment strategy, "pairs trading,"with daily data over 1962–2002. Stocks are matched intopairs with minimum distance between normalized historical prices.A simple trading rule yields average annualized excess returnsof up to 11% for self-financing portfolios of pairs. The profitstypically exceed conservative transaction-cost estimates. Bootstrapresults suggest that the "pairs" effect differs from previouslydocumented reversal profits. Robustness of the excess returnsindicates that pairs trading profits from temporary mispricingof close substitutes. We link the profitability to the presenceof a common factor in the returns, different from conventionalrisk measures.     

Political rents in a non-corrupt democracy

A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the people in power may extract rents to the detriment of the general public. In a democracy, electoral competition and information provided by the media may keep such rent extraction at bay. We develop a simple model where rents are decreasing in the degree of political competition and voter information. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that both increased political competition and increased local media coverage substantially reduce direct measures of legal political rents among local governments in a non-corrupt democracy (Sweden).