Approval voting reconsidered

Summary. The merit of approval voting has been widely discussed in the past 25 years. The distinct property of this rule is the extent of flexibility it allows; any voter can approve as many alternatives/candidates as he wishes. Nevertheless, this advantage is the very reason for two drawbacks of approval voting: its extreme vulnerability to majority decisiveness (Theorem 1) and its extreme vulnerability to erosion of the majority principle (Theorem 2). On the one hand, under some feasible voting strategies any majority of more than 1/2 of the voters can guarantee the selection of its most favorable candidate, regardless of the preferences of the other voters. On the other hand, under alternative voting strategies even the largest majority cannot impose its common most preferred candidate. A simultaneous resolution of the two problems is possible by restricted approval voting (RAV), a voting rule that allows partial voter flexibility by restricting the minimal and maximal number of candidates that can be approved. Our main result (Theorem 3) clarifies how the foregone flexibility in voters sovereignty mitigates the above mentioned drawbacks under sincere and insincere coordinated voting. Our findings suggest a new possible justification of a particular voting rule which is based on the significance assigned to three considerations: the advantages of voters flexibility, immunity to majority decisiveness and immunity to erosion of the majority principle. Such justification can provide a possible explanation to the prevalent use of some special cases of RAV, notably, of the plurality rule and of approval voting.Received: 8 October 2003, Revised: 17 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D72. Correspondence to: Shmuel NitzanWe are indebted to Steve Brams, Remzi Sanver and an anonymous referee for their very useful comments and suggestions.     

Clicks and Mortar: The Effect of On-line Activities on Off-line Sales

Retailers did not immediately extend their business to the Internet environment, fearing that on-line activities could adversely impact their off-line sales. To facilitate assessment of the impact of on-line activities on off-line sales, we develop a method that allows retailers to use readily available market data for making informed decisions. The proposed method determines (1) the extent to which on-line sales cannibalize off-line sales, and (2) whether on-line activities build on-line equity for the firm. We illustrate the method using data from Tower Records' Internet sales division. We find that on-line sales do not significantly cannibalize retail sales and that the firm's web activities build long-term on-line equity. While the proposed method can be used by any clicks-and-mortar firm, our firm-specific results indicate that Towers' fears regarding cannibalization due to its own Internet activities were unfounded.     

Voting in Hiring Committees: Which “Almost” Rule is Optimal?

We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the “almost” rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.     

The Role of Private Label Brands in Enhancing Service Satisfaction in the Hotel Industry: Comparing Luxury and Boutique Hotels

ABSTRACT

This research proposes private label branding as a strategy that can have a positive effect on guest satisfaction and loyalty in hotels that cater to travelers seeking a special hotel experience. We test this using a sample of guests in two hotels: a five-star luxury hotel (N = 225) and a boutique hotel (N = 101). Findings show that in the luxury hotel but not the boutique hotel, perception of a private label had a direct impact on loyalty, and an indirect impact on loyalty through its effect on guest satisfaction. The theoretical implications and recommendations for hoteliers based on the findings are discussed.     

Trading with the crowd

We formulate and solve a multi-player stochastic differential game between financial agents who seek to cost-efficiently liquidate their position in a risky asset in the presence of jointly aggregated transient price impact, along with taking into account a common general price predicting signal. The unique Nash-equilibrium strategies reveal how each agent's liquidation policy adjusts the predictive trading signal to the aggregated transient price impact induced by all other agents. This unfolds a quantitative relation between trading signals and the order flow in crowded markets. We also formulate and solve the corresponding mean field game in the limit of infinitely many agents. We prove that the equilibrium trading speed and the value function of an agent in the finite N-player game converges to the corresponding trading speed and value function in the mean field game at rate $O(N^{-2})$. In addition, we prove that the mean field optimal strategy provides an approximate Nash-equilibrium for the finite-player game.     

Closed-loop Nash competition for liquidity

We study a multiplayer stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium exists if the price impact parameter is small enough. Compared to the corresponding open-loop Nash equilibrium, both the agents' optimal trading rates and their performance move towards the central-planner solution, in that excessive trading due to lack of coordination is reduced. However, the size of this effect is modest for plausible parameter values.