PUBLIC PROTECTION OR PRIVATE EXTORTION?

We analyze the strategic interaction between a firm, an extortionary mafia, and a potentially corrupt government. The model identifies several results. First, government spending is not monotonic in revenues. Second, although the firm wants the government to challenge the mafia (it uses the threat of electoral sanctions to induce the government to do so), in equilibrium, the firm does not directly appeal to the government for protection even though it is extorted. The more likely the government is to uncover mafia extortion independent of an appeal from the firm, the more effective the firm's threat of electoral sanction is at motivating the government to invest in law enforcement. This is because the electoral threat to punish failure on the government's part is only a compelling reason to invest in law enforcement when the government actually expects to confront the mafia. This same logic also implies that the relationship between mafia strength and government corruption is somewhat counterintuitive. When the mafia is strong in equilibrium (i.e. pervasive and extorting large fees), the government is not very corrupt. When the mafia is weak, the government is highly corrupt. Finally, an extension shows that if the mafia and government can collude, then the harsher the threatened sanctions against the mafia, the less likely the government is to challenge the mafia because the mafia is more willing to bribe the government.     

Financial Structure,Acquisition Opportunities,and Firm Locations

This paper investigates the relation between firms' locations and their corporate finance decisions. We develop a model where being located within an industry cluster increases opportunities to make acquisitions, and to facilitate those acquisitions, firms within clusters maintain more financial slack. Consistent with our model we find that firms located within industry clusters make more acquisitions, and have lower debt ratios and larger cash balances than their industry peers located outside clusters. We also document that firms in high‐tech cities and growing cities maintain more financial slack. Overall, the evidence suggests that growth opportunities influence firms' financial decisions.     

On the International Dimension of Fiscal Policy

This paper analyzes the international dimension of fiscal policy in a small open economy framework. We consider the case in which the government finances its spending by levying distortionary taxes and issuing state‐contingent debt. While in a closed economy taxes are essentially invariant, in an open economy taxes can be as volatile as output. This is because the presence of a terms of trade externality introduces efficient fluctuations in the consumption–leisure wedge driven by movements in the real exchange rate. As a result, the optimal fiscal rule suggests that taxes should be varied to replicate these fluctuations.     

Fiscal Data Revisions in Europe

Revisions of budget balances in Europe could be particularly worrisome as adherence to multilateral surveillance rules is judged upon initial data releases. We use a pool of real‐time vintages of data for 15 EU countries over the period 1995–2008. Our main findings are: (i) preliminary releases are biased and nonefficient predictors of subsequent releases, (ii) such systematic bias in revisions is a general feature of the sample, (iii) Eurostat's decisions explain a significant share of the bias and provide some evidence of window dressing practices, and (iv) expected real gross domestic product growth, political cycles, and the strength of fiscal rules also contribute to explain revision patterns.     

Debt Contracting on Management

Change of management restrictions (CMRs) in loan contracts give lenders explicit ex ante control rights over managerial retention and selection. This paper shows that lenders use CMRs to mitigate risks arising from CEO turnover, especially those related to the loss of human capital and replacement uncertainty, thereby providing evidence that human capital risk affects debt contracting. With a CMR in place, the likelihood of CEO turnover decreases by more than half, and future firm performance improves when retention frictions are important, suggesting that lenders can influence managerial turnover, even outside of default states, and help the borrower retain talent.     

Microfinance: Development Intervention or Just Another Bank?

This paper is based on a systematic review of evidence of the impact of microfinance on the lives of poor women, men and children in sub‐Saharan Africa. It focuses specifically on longer‐term non‐financial outcomes related to health and nutrition and education. The paper contrasts microfinance's early days' initially refreshing and encouraging promises of a development initiative that empowers people to help themselves while ‘paying for itself’ with a more gloomy picture that derives from the synthesis results of our systematic review. It presents two simple models that show the pathways from microfinance to increased investment in improved health and education, contrasting theory with our synthesis results. Our discussion highlights that thinking through microfinance makes it necessary to thoroughly investigate both the theory behind interventions and the evidence for their impact. It raises the essential question: Is microfinance about providing banking services to the unbanked, or is microfinance a development intervention that concerns itself with the attainment of long‐term sustainable responses to high levels of poverty?     

INFLATION AND DEBT INDEXATION: THE EQUIVALENCE OF TWO ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES FOR THE CASE OF PERIODIC PAYMENTS

The presence of inflation has induced the financial institutions to implement procedures devised to protect the real values of their loans. Two of such procedures, the floating rate scheme and the monetary correction mechanism, tend to lead to very different streams of payments. However, whenever the floating rate scheme follows the rule of strict adherence to the Fisher equation, the two procedures are financially equivalent.