WHY SMALL GROUPS AND LOW INCOME SECTORS OBTAIN SUBSIDIES: THE “ALTRUISTIC” SIDE OF A “SELF-INTERESTED” GOVERNMENT*

We develop a model of political support seeking politicians and support supplying voters. Based on Downs' original formulation, the framework yields endogenous political weights with both liberal and conservative properties. Our model reconciles the apparent contradiction between models of self-interested politicians and of governments motivated by social concerns. We show that the “altruistic” aspect of government behavior is consistent with its “self-interested” behavior. We determine that the Olson-Becker pressure group model is not unique. An increase in deadweight costs reduces the equilibrium subsidy. Smaller groups receive a larger per capita subsidy. These results are consistent with Becker's model.     

Marketwide Private Information in Stocks: Forecasting Currency Returns

We present a model of equity trading with informed and uninformed investors where informed investors trade on firm‐specific and marketwide private information. The model is used to identify the component of order flow due to marketwide private information. Estimated trades driven by marketwide private information display little or no correlation with the first principal component in order flow. Indeed, we find that co‐movement in order flow captures variation mostly in liquidity trades. Marketwide private information obtained from equity market data forecasts industry stock returns, and also currency returns.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Microfinance: Development Intervention or Just Another Bank?

This paper is based on a systematic review of evidence of the impact of microfinance on the lives of poor women, men and children in sub‐Saharan Africa. It focuses specifically on longer‐term non‐financial outcomes related to health and nutrition and education. The paper contrasts microfinance's early days' initially refreshing and encouraging promises of a development initiative that empowers people to help themselves while ‘paying for itself’ with a more gloomy picture that derives from the synthesis results of our systematic review. It presents two simple models that show the pathways from microfinance to increased investment in improved health and education, contrasting theory with our synthesis results. Our discussion highlights that thinking through microfinance makes it necessary to thoroughly investigate both the theory behind interventions and the evidence for their impact. It raises the essential question: Is microfinance about providing banking services to the unbanked, or is microfinance a development intervention that concerns itself with the attainment of long‐term sustainable responses to high levels of poverty?