The global financial crisis and the evolution of markets, institutions and regulation

This paper analyses the recent global financial crisis in the context of the dual processes of market development and regulation. It discusses how, in the absence of a globally integrated financial framework, past and present regulations and interventions in reaction to national and global financial crises did not resolve the cross border regulatory arbitrage. The paper discusses how crises often lead to the emergence of new national and international institutions. It also analyses the proposed “new global framework” that needs to be in place if the policy recommendations contained in the G20 communiqué are going to be effectively implemented. The paper argues that unless international agreements are ratified by all nations and become part of national rules and laws, the presence of regulatory arbitrage and the lack of adequate cross border information and data may prevent the global economy from addressing the underlying causes of the recent global financial crisis. The paper also discusses the evolution of central banks and their new role in contributing to global financial stability. The paper argues that the recent global financial crisis has provided a unique opportunity to go beyond economic data and attempt to capture cross border financial data and other information that could assist international and national institutions to measure and manage financial risk more effectively. Finally, the paper discusses “too big to fail” and argues that only an internationally integrated financial system will make large banks global, both when operational and in the event of insolvency.     

Stock market liberalization and innovation

We investigate the effect of stock market liberalization on technological innovation. Using a sample of 20 economies that experience stock market liberalization, we find that these economies exhibit a higher level of innovation output after liberalization and that this effect is disproportionately stronger in more innovative industries. The relaxation of financial constraints, enhanced risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors, and improved corporate governance are three plausible channels that allow stock market liberalization to promote innovation. Finally, we show that technological innovation is a mechanism through which stock market liberalization affects productivity growth and therefore economic growth. Our paper provides new insights into the real effects of stock market liberalization on productivity growth and the economy.     

The Demand for Life Insurance in OECD Countries

This article examines the determinants of life insurance consumption in OECD countries. Consistent with previous results, we find a significant positive income elasticity of life insurance demand. Demand also increases with the number of dependents and level of education, and decreases with life expectancy and social security expenditure. The country's level of financial development and its insurance market's degree of competition appear to stimulate life insurance sales, whereas high inflation and real interest rates tend to decrease consumption. Overall, life insurance demand is better explained when the product market and socioeconomic factors are jointly considered. In addition, the use of GMM estimates helps reconcile our findings with previous puzzling results based on inconsistent OLS estimates given heteroscedasticity problems in the data.     

Corporate governance or globalization: What determines CEO compensation in China?

This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation in China. In contrast to results derived from U.S. data, we find little evidence that Chinese CEOs take advantage of weaker board structures or less demanding shareholders to extract higher compensation packages. Instead, our results lend support to the view that the increasingly global managerial labor market and compensation standards have a greater impact on CEO pay level. Our study suggests that CEOs in developing economies like China, in our case, benefit more from their degree of exposure to these changes than from corporate governance imperfections.