The Relationships of Empathy,Moral Identity and Cynicism with Consumers’ Ethical Beliefs: The Mediating Role of Moral Disengagement

This study examines the relationships of empathy, moral identity and cynicism with the following dimensions of consumer ethics: the passive dimension (passively benefiting at the expense of the seller), the active/legal dimension (benefiting from questionable but legal actions), the ‘no harm, no foul’ dimension (actions that do not harm anyone directly but are considered unethical by some) and the ‘doing-good’/recycling dimension (pro-social actions). A survey of six hundred Australian consumers revealed that both empathy and moral identity were related to negative beliefs regarding the passive and the active/legal dimensions of consumer ethics and were related to positive beliefs regarding the ‘doing-good’/recycling dimension. Cynicism was related to positive beliefs regarding the passive dimension of consumer ethics and was related to negative beliefs regarding the ‘doing-good’/recycling dimension. The role of moral disengagement in mediating these relationships was examined. Empathy and moral identity were only indirectly negatively related to the ‘no harm, no foul’ dimension of consumer ethics through moral disengagement, while cynicism was indirectly positively related to this dimension through moral disengagement. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Are traditional timing models well specified?

Traditional timing models are affected by several biases, which generate spurious timing and stock-picking coefficients. Academics have appointed different causes as the possible sources of these biases. A negative correlation between timing and stock-picking abilities arises as a consequence of the biases in traditional timing models. This article provides evidence for one bias commonly found in traditional timing models, which is related with options. We focus on this bias in view of the scant attention it has so far received in the literature. We believe one possible cause for this bias is the failure to include the cost of the option implicit in timing activities in the timing models, and on this basis, we opt for a corrected version of the Merton and Henriksson model (1981 Merton, RC and Henriksson, RD. 1981. On market timing and investment performance II: statistical procedures for evaluating forecasting skills. Journal of Business, 54: 513–34. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). This study therefore is a pioneer in the assessment of the magnitude of this bias and in the measurement of the impact of its correction on fund managers’ results. Our results confirm both the existence of the bias and the correction of the problem when the cost of the option is included in timing models. The modified version of the Merton and Henriksson model, unlike the traditional model, reports positive timing and stock-picking coefficients, supporting the good performance by managers.     

Externalities, expectations, and growth

Summary. The paper studies a model of accumulation and growth where a continuum of heterogeneous firms play dynamically optimal strategies along a (rational expectations) equilibrium. The key feature of the model is that firms' technological decisions are assumed subject to both friction and external effects. This gives rise to a wide multiplicity of equilibrium behavior, any path of sustained growth requiring that the economy tackle a never-ending chain of fresh coordination problems. This setup is modelled as a (non-atomic) dynamic game, suitable conditions being provided that partially characterize when sustained growth is a possible (never the unique) equilibrium outcome. Received: May 25, 1995; revised version: March 25, 1998     

Unfolding Social Hierarchies

Consider a large population of finitely-lived agents organized into n different hierarchical levels. Every period, all those placed at each level are randomly matched to play a given symmetric game. Based on the resulting outcome, a ρ-fraction of agents who (within their own level) attain the highest payoffs are promoted upwards. On the other hand, newcomers replacing those who die every period enter at the lowest level and choose irreversibly the strategy to be played for the rest of their life. This choice is made, with some noise, by imitating one of the strategies adopted at the highest level.  In this setup, the unique long-run behavior of the system is fully characterized for the whole class of 2×2 coordination games and two alternative variations of the model. The results crucially depend on the key “institutional” parameters ρ and n. In particular, it is shown that inefficient behavior prevails in the long run (even when risk-dominated) if promotion is only mildly selective—high ρ—and the social system is quite hierarchical—large n. In a stylized manner, these parameter conditions may be viewed as reflecting a sort of institutional deficiency that impairs economic performance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C73, D72.     

What hinders innovation performance of services and manufacturing firms in Mexico?

Barriers to innovation are heterogeneous, of financial and non-financial nature. The importance of barriers to innovation and their actual influence on innovation depend on firms’ characteristics such as sectoral affiliation, technological behavior and their response to perceived obstacles to innovation. Firms either continue to engage in innovation, or they avoid the activity altogether. This paper explored the nature and perceived importance of the obstacles to innovation that firms confront, in a developing-country context; we build on survey data about firms in Mexico. Our findings suggest that two kinds of policy interventions should help offset a firm’s perception of barriers to innovation. On the one hand, policies should enhance the innovation capacity of firms interested in innovation; on the other hand, policies need to tackle factors that reduce the interest of firms in innovation. Policies that boost demand for locally generated innovations would assist in achieving both these goals.     

Using “Rapid Response” as a competitive tool

New technology allows companies to respond quickly to customer demands that differ from country to country. In the international arena, time and flexibility are competitive weapons.