A Comparison of Underwriting Costs of Initial Public Offerings by Investment and Commercial Banks

We examine differences in underwriting costs between commercial‐bank‐Section‐20‐underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs) and investment‐bank‐underwritten IPOs. Our results suggest that total underwriting costs (gross margin plus underpricing) are significantly lower for commercial bank IPOs. The lower cost for commercial bank IPOs is attributable to less severe underpricing for these issues. Gross margin costs generally do not differ between commercial bank and investment bank issues. Furthermore, we find that the long‐run stock price performance for commercial bank issues is superior to that of investment bank issues. That is, lower underpricing for Section 20 issues may not be a short‐run phenomenon. Rather, there appears to be a favorable outcome for investors in the long run for holding IPOs underwritten by Section 20 commercial banks. These results are inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis often associated with merging commercial and investment bank functions in one organization.     

Innovation, public choice and public control in the market for health insurance.

Innovation, public choice and public control in the market for health insurance/benefits in the United States are largely dependent upon the ability of the various stakeholders to successfully argue their positions with legislators, regulators, providers, purchasers and third party beneficiaries. Given the public/private nature of health benefits, these relationships are examined in a Stigler/Posner/Peltzman public choice framework. Conflicts among various stakeholders and their ability to influence innovation in the market for health benefits are discussed.     

An Empirical Evaluation of the Usefulness of Non-GAAP Accounting Measures in the Real Estate Investment Trust Industry

We conduct three sets of analyses to compare the usefulness of net income, based on generally accepted accounting principals (GAAP), and the industry-advanced funds from operations (FFO) in the context of the real estate investment trust (REIT) industry. In our first set of tests, we find that FFO is more strongly associated with one-year ahead FFO and one-year ahead operating cash flows than is net income. Conversely, we find that net income explains more variation in one-year ahead net income and current stock price than does FFO. Second, in support of the claim that some REITs manipulate FFO, we document that young REITs and REITs that are likely to access capital markets are more likely to manage FFO. Third, we find that, for a sample of firms that disclose current value information, both net income and FFO fail to reflect holding gains or losses on unsold properties in a timely manner. Overall, our analyses suggest that the REIT industry's claim that FFO is more useful than net income is premature because the superiority of one measure over the other is highly contextual.     

AN INVESTIGATION OF PREFERRED STOCK FINANCING BY BANK AND NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

We investigate the shareholder wealth effects of announcements of preferred stock issues made by financial institutions. Fixed-rate straight preferred stock and convertible preferred stock issue announcements result in insignificant common share price responses. However, the average stock price reaction to announcements of adjustable-rate preferred stock issues is positive and significant for banking firms. Our findings suggest that banks' common shareholders react positively to adjustable-rate preferred stock issue announcements because such securities provide a relatively low-cost way of increasing the primary capital used to satisfy legal minimum capital requirements without diluting common equity voting rights.     

EQUITY VALUATION EFFECTS OF FORCED WARRANT EXERCISE

We examine stock price reactions to announced calls of in-the-money warrants and find a significant average devaluation in excess of 4 percent, consistent with the recent literature. We test theoretical predictions based on asymmetric information, agency costs, and corporate control in a cross-sectional model of announcement-period returns and find support for voting rights and ownership dilution as an explanation. We find evidence of some price recovery after the call announcement; however, further evidence of a liquidity-based explanation is mixed.     

CHANGES IN POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper presents new data on poverty, inequality, and growthin those developing countries of the world for which the requisitestatistics are available. Eco-nomic growth is found generallybut not always to reduce poverty. Growth, however, is foundto have very little to do with income inequality. Thus the "economiclaws" linking the rate of growth and the distribution of benefitsreceive only very tenuous empirical support here.      

Is Bancassurance a Viable Model for Financial Firms?

The bancassurance (i.e., bank and insurance company combinations) model for financial firm architecture has been widely used in Europe and recently has been adopted by U.S. financial firms. We provide evidence regarding the viability of bancassurance combinations for U.S. and non‐U.S. mergers between 1997 and 2002. We find positive gains and no significant risk shifts for shareholders of bidding firms, and that higher CEO stock ownership results in less positive gains for shareholders. These and other results suggest that bancassurance firms are viable entities that may play an important role in the future evolution of the U.S. financial system.     

INEQUALITY AND PANEL INCOME CHANGES: CONDITIONS FOR POSSIBILITIES AND IMPOSSIBILITIES

Income changes in an economy are usually assessed through the changes over time in cross-sectional variables such as economy-wide inequality. An alternative is to use panel data to gauge income changes among identified income recipients. In this article, we analyze these two approaches taken together, each measured in multiple ways. We establish that under specific conditions, it is impossible to have falling inequality together with divergent panel income changes. We also provide conditions explaining when rising inequality can arise together with convergent panel changes. We provide the intuition behind these results and show when such results fail to hold.