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51.
John?K.?StranlundEmail author Christopher?Costello Carlos?A.?Chávez 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2005,28(2):181-204
We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871. 相似文献
52.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
53.
János Gács 《Empirica》1994,21(1):83-104
The direct effect of market losses in CMEA on Hungarian output was 4%, out of the 18% decline registered in gross output in 1988–1992. Total (direct and indirect) effects amounted to 8%. In the same period Hungary's export expansion in western markets led to direct and total effects equivalent to 2.9% and 5.6% of the 1988 output, respectively. The share of reorientation within this switch from east to west was not negligible, it amounted to 19% of respective trade volumes. The 1991 price explosion of imported inputs inhibited the activity of Hungarian firms only moderately, due to earlier realistic domestic prices. In 1991 Hungary suffered a 26% terms of trade loss, and could have experienced an income terms of trade loss of USD 1400 to 1600 million, had the trade volume of 1990 been repeated. Since adjustments in 1991, much smaller income losses accrued. Due to earlier special tax arrangements, much of the burden of terms of trade losses had to be born by the budget. 相似文献
54.
Seven computerprograms for non-linear regression or curve fitting problems are compared. The comparison of the programs, running in different computing centra, is restricted to the fit performance. Six model functions are fitted according to the least squares criterion to data series, arising from practical work. The special least squares minimization programs turned out to be better suited for these problems than general optimizing programs. 相似文献
55.
This article investigates the role of taxation when public goods are privately provided. Externalities between consumers via the public good are shown to cause kinks in social indifference curves. As a result, a government restricted to income taxation should engineer enough inequality to ensure there are some non-contributors to the public good. Whether commodity taxation changes this conclusion depends on the extent to which consumers "see through" the government budget constraint. If they can, inequality should still be sought. When they cannot, in contrast to the case of an economy with only private goods, commodity taxation can be used in conjunction with income transfers to achieve the first-best. 相似文献
56.
Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, C72.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. 相似文献
57.
Technology-forcing through environmental regulation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Andries Nentjes Frans P. de Vries Doede Wiersma 《European Journal of Political Economy》2007,23(4):903-916
This paper analyzes the demand characteristics of innovation in pollution abatement and the interaction between a regulator and a polluter under a technology-forcing policy. Important demand-driven determinants of innovation in pollution control are examined, such as uncertainties surrounding unexplored technologies, the length of the compliance period and the maximum abatement costs the regulator is willing to accept. We derive the formal condition that the regulator balances the marginal utility of emissions reduction against the marginal disutilities of a longer compliance time and the increased uncertainty about the feasibility of a more stringent standard. 相似文献
58.
In this paper I analyze the impact of regulatory policy on prices and demand for mobile telecommunications services across the European Union. I estimate a reduced form model of the mobile industry using panel data for the EU countries from 1998 to 2002. Among others, I find the following effects: liberalization of fixed telephone lines has a negative impact on prices and a positive impact on the demand for mobile services, and the introduction of mobile number portability has a negative impact on prices.*I am grateful to Toker Doganoglu, Gerd Hansen, Eric Kodjo Ralph, Guido Friebel, participants at the 30th EARIE Conference 2003, the 2nd International Industrial Organization Conference 2004 and the 19th Annual Congress of the EEA 2004, and anonymous referees for valuable comments. I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support from the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Munich Graduate School of Economics which made this research possible. All errors are mine.1 Source: European Commission (1994). 相似文献
59.
60.
Geoffroy de Clippel 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):144-158
The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo [Cooperative outcomes through non-cooperative games, Games Econ. Behav. 7 (1994) 428-440] to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson's coarse core [Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy, Econometrica 46 (1978) 807-816]. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated. 相似文献