How Corporate Diversity and Size Influence Spinoffs and Other Breakups

In recent months, the list of large diversified companies that have decided they would be worth more as several smaller, focused companies has grown sharply. In many of these cases, it has been outside pressure from activist investors that has motivated these actions by management—and with some pretty favorable results. But what is driving these strategic actions and what is most important in determining whether breakups create value? To answer this fundamental questions, it is critical to decide whether large, diversified companies have a value recognition problem or a value creation problem. In this article, the authors present and try to integrate the findings of two separate but related research studies on business diversity and size with the aim of identifying their implications for corporate strategy and helping company executives create more value for their investors. The specific reasons for underperformance by large diverse companies vary greatly, but there are a number of potential problems discussed in this article, including organizational “distance,” capital allocation, human capital allocation, cross subsidies, and ineffective governance. Instead of waiting for activist investors to demand a breakup, executives of large diverse companies should be proactive in addressing the potential weaknesses of their organizations. Private equity firms understand how to make diversification work and many of today's executives could learn some valuable lessons from these firms. Large diverse businesses should embrace “Internal Capitalism,” a corporate culture and set of practices that emphasizes the importance of strategic decision‐making that is linked through continuous performance assessment to the corporate goals of boosting efficiency and sustainable growth.     

Common information asymmetry factors in syndicated loan structures

This paper provides a comprehensive study of the syndicate structure and its relationship to information asymmetry and loan spread by using principal component analysis on a large set of 40 structure-related variables. A total of six structure components are identified and related to syndicate quality, syndicate members’ heterogeneity or share concentration, lead arranger’s characteristics, lead lender’s or syndicate’s location, lender–borrower relationships, and lead institution type. In multivariate settings, all six components are significant determinants of loan spread, either directly or indirectly through their impact on other components. Lead share retention, previous lender–borrower relationships and syndicate quality are shown to be bilaterally related to loan spread. Structure components differ regionally, which can provide an explanation for the European pricing discount observed in the literature. An Asian discount is observed and cannot be explained by structure differences.     

Stochastic duration and fast coupon bond option pricing in multi-factor models

Generalizing Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1979), this paper defines the stochastic duration of a bond in a general multi-factor diffusion model as the time to maturity of the zero-coupon bond with the same relative volatility as the bond. Important general properties of the stochastic duration measure are derived analytically, and the stochastic duration is studied in detail in various well-known models. It is also demonstrated by analytical arguments and numerical examples that the price of a European option on a coupon bond (and, hence, of a European swaption) can be approximated very accurately by a multiple of the price of a European option on a zero-coupon bond with a time to maturity equal to the stochastic duration of the coupon bond. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Managerial ownership and firm performance: A re-examination using productivity measurement

The role of productivity in firm performance is of fundamental importance to the US economy. Consistent with the corporate finance approach, this paper uses the ownership stake of a firm's managers as an argument in estimating the firm's production function. Accordingly, this paper brings together the corporate finance and productivity literature. Using a large sample of randomly selected manufacturing firms that does not suffer from any survivorship or large firm size biases, we find that managerial ownership changes are positively related to changes in productivity. We also find a higher sensitivity of changes in managerial ownership to changes in productivity for firms who experience greater than the median change in managerial ownership. These results are robust to including lagged estimates of production inputs, year dummies and separate dummies for each firm to control for unobservable firm characteristics. In addition, we find that the stock market rewards firms with increases in firm value when these firms increase their level of productivity.     

Supply chain environmental investments in dynamic industries: Comparing investment and performance differences with static industries

Research linking investments in environmental practices to firm performance has matured over the past years. However, empirical research is still ambiguous on how and whether investments in environmental practices improve a plant's performance. We believe that contingency factors, especially the industry in which plants act has a significant role in the success of environmental investments. Using empirical data collected across a wide range of industries our results indicate that plants competing in dynamic industries such as apparel do on average invest less in supply chain environmental practices compared to plants in static industries. In addition, these environmental investments do not significantly improve operational performance in dynamic industries in terms of cost, quality, delivery and flexibility. However, in static industries environmental investments do significantly improve a plant's operational performance in terms of cost, quality and flexibility.