MEASURING RISK AVERSION: ALLOCATION,LEVERAGE, AND ACCUMULATION

The risk-asset ratio that measures Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion reflects a multidimensional risk behavior. The risk-asset ratio is decomposed into the product of ratios that measure portfolio allocation between riskless and risk assets, use of financial leverage, and accumulation of wealth in marketable form. The three dimensions are less sensitive to the definition of wealth than is the composite risk-asset ratio. Constant relative risk aversion can be characterized by offsetting changes in the three dimensions as wealth changes.     

The Effect of Information Systems on Honesty in Managerial Reporting: A Behavioral Perspective*

This study examines the behavioral impact of an information system, and how that impact varies with the information system's precision, in an internal reporting environment. We propose that a manager's reporting decisions are affected by his or her trade‐off of the benefits of appearing honest against the benefits of misrepresentation. The information system affects the manager's trade‐off by improving the owner's ability to make an inference regarding the manager's level of honesty. Thus, to the extent that the manager perceives benefits to appearing honest, the presence of an information system can increase managerial honesty. As the information system becomes more precise, however, the manager must forgo greater benefits of misrepresentation in order to achieve the same appearance of honesty. For managers under a precise system, this will shift the trade‐off decision toward the benefits of misrepresentation and away from the benefits of appearing honest. Notably, in our experiment, the only benefit of appearing honest is an intrinsically motivated desire for social approval. We find that, although the existence of an information system increases managerial honesty, honesty is lower under a precise than under a coarse information system. We also compare profit earned by the owners in our experiment, which relies on a behavioral role of an information system, with the maximum profit theoretically possible given a contractual use of the information system. This comparison suggests that, unless the available information system is sufficiently precise, the owner will obtain greater profits by not contracting on its output, even if that output is fully contractible.     

Prison Labor: The Local Effects of Ohio Prison Industries

Prison labor has both positive and negative effects. Keeping prisoners active, training and socializing them to be productive citizens after prison, and helping to pay for their incarceration are some of the positives. Potential crowding out of free labor and industry is the major potential negative. This paper addresses the quantitative financial and employment consequences on local free labor and industry of prison industries in Ohio using an input–output model for Ohio. Based on the analysis, prison industries employment in Ohio has negligible to positive employment consequences for the Ohio economy and partially offsets the incarceration cost of the inmates who participate – providing between 5 and 10 percent of the incarceration cost in net cash flow and induced tax revenues.Presented at the 59th International Atlantic Economic Conference, London, March 9–13, 2005.     

Segmenting high technology adopters

This article highlights a link between the innovative behavior of high technology firms and their buying. An empirical indepth study of 16 firms manufacturing electrical and electronic measuring instruments shows how components are bought by different types of firms. The findings suggest a useful basis for segmenting high technology industrial markets.     

A description of farmland investor expectations

We consider how best to characterize agricultural real estate market participants' expectation formation mechanism. The expectation formation mechanism links current agricultural policies to asset prices and tells us how current policies change expectations for future transfers. We examine behavior of real estate prices and returns using the present value model. We derive estimable equations incorporating two rival expectation formation mechanisms: rational and adaptive expectations. Assuming rational expectations, the present value model yields parameter estimates that imply the model should be rejected. Instead of rejecting the present value model while maintaining the rational expectations hypothesis, we let the data reveal which expectations hypothesis best fits the data. When we assume the rival hypothesis, the model yields parameter estimates that conform to adaptive expectations.     

Consumption loans under uncertainty

A stationary equilibrium for a sequence of markets under uncertainty is defined as a stationary stochastic process of temporary market equilibria. The purpose of this paper is to apply this equilibrium concept to a consumption-loans model with stochastic resources. Given that agents live for only two periods, that resources are allocated independently and identically, and that traders make “admissible” consumption decisions, it is shown that the sequence of equilibrium trades on forward markets is a Markov chain. When this chain is strictly stationary with a unique invariant distribution, the sequence of markets is in stationary equilibrium. Using Gale's classification scheme, a strictly stationary chain exists for each type of economy (classical, Samuelson, mixed). Questions concerning convergence to the invariant distribution for each type of economy are addressed by determining when the chain satisfies various recurrence conditions.