Queues and Hierarchies

This paper examines the optimal structure of hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. A hierarchical system may reduce costs by allowing most tasks to be handled by unskilled workers. This may however increase delay for those tasks which must pass through several layers before reaching the appropriate level. The paper characterises an optimal hierarchy when such a trade-off exists.     

Toward global checks and balances

The rapid growth and importance of intergovernmental coordination in the regulation of markets, transportation and communication, the environment, and national security poses numerous challenges for democratic accountability within participating states. Direct public participation in the intergovernmental regulatory bodies is generally modest or absent. Information regarding their deliberations is limited. And the multiple oversight mechanisms and supervisory processes that exist at the domestic level of developed democracies that can scrutinize intergovernmental regulatory decisions tend to be lacking. This lack of accountability raises legitimacy concerns, the most prominent of which is the fear executive branch officials will delegate controversial policy decisions to intergovernmental bodies in order to escape democratic deliberation. In this paper we survey the ways that different review venues (other international institutions and national courts) are attempting to cope with these accountability related issues: we argue that national courts may prove to be the most effective venue for promoting democratic accountability. This is not because they are more reliably representative of their domestic constituency or possess a more cosmopolitan perspective than the bodies whose decisions they are reviewing. Rather their relative advantage lies in: (1) the increasing acceptance on the part of domestic courts that inter-judicial coordination is a prerequisite for their continued ability to fulfill their judicial review function; and (2) the visibility that the decisions of these courts possess. Acting together these two forces have the potential to foster greater transparency and public deliberation than most rival venues.     

Fifteen Theses on Classroom Teaching

The Southern Economic Association initiated a lecture series on teaching to be presented at its annual meeting. This paper, given on November 24, 2000, was the first such lecture. The editor invited the author to publish the lecture in Southern Economic Journal. Portions of the paper are the fruits of the author's more than 30 years of experience teaching economics. Parts of the paper are based on writings regarding pedagogy outside the discipline of economics. The paper puts forward 15 theses about teaching economics in the classroom. The theses range from propositions about why economics is a particularly difficult subject to teach to suggestions about how the classroom teaching of economics can be improved.     

The case of labour time reduction without wage compensation: More or less employment?

Summary In this paper a model of a closed economy, including a market sector and a public sector, is presented to analyse the consequences of a reduction of labour time with and without wage compensation. It turns out that a policy of labour time reduction without wage compensation is a very strong instrument to improve production and employment, if the economy is characterized by the Keynesiandemand model. But if the economy is characterized by the neoclassicalsupply model, a relatively large drop in wages is necessary to prevent a policy of labour time reduction from causing a process of stagflation.     

A Dynamic Model of Export Competition, Policy Coordination, and Simultaneous Currency Collapse

This paper shows that the "price wars during booms" logic of Rotemberg and Saloner ( American Economic Review , vol. 76, 1986, 390–407) provides an explanation of contagious currency crises. The idea is as follows. When a group of countries relies on exports to a common foreign market, pressures for competitive devaluations arise. In response, competing exporters peg their exchange rates to the currency of their export market. However, it must be in each country's self-interest to adhere to its peg, and a common adverse external shock can make an existing (implicitly) cooperative arrangement unenforceable. Maintaining the arrangement requires a collective devaluation that reduces the unilateral incentive to devalue.     

EMPLOYMENT-RELATED LEGAL OBLIGATIONS: A RISK MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE OF FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS

Abstract: The authors examine the statutes, protected classes and damages under federal antidiscrimination laws. Because of the limitations of insurance as a loss financing tool, the authors contend that loss control is a more prudent course of action for employers than loss financing.