Agency Costs,Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

Standard theories of ownership assume insiders ultimately bear all agency costs and therefore act to minimize conflicts of interest. However, overvalued equity can offset these costs and induce listings associated with higher agency costs. We explore this possibility by examining a sample of public listings of Japanese subsidiaries. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.     

Leopold von Wieses „Gebildelehre“

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

The Russian Tax System and Its International Competitiveness

The last several years were very favourable to the development of the Russian economy. While this has partly been the consequence of favourable conditions on the international markets for raw materials, the economic policy of President Vladimir Putin, including the tax reforms initiated at the end of the 1990s, also played a major role. Our authors examine in detail the effects of the tax reforms to date and point out the room for further improvements under Putin’s successor, Medvedev.