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GILLES TRUDEAU 《劳资关系》1991,30(2):302-315
Reinstatement is central to many proposals of statuto y reform providing protection against wrongful dismissal for at-will employees. This paper discusses the results of an empirical study of the post-reinstatement experience of such rehired employees in Quebec. The Canadian experience demonstrates both the signijicant drawbacks to and the unique merits of reinstatement as a form of protection for nonunion employees. 相似文献
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What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors. Absent regulation, originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high. Effort incentives are below first‐best absent regulation. Optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness. Zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort. 相似文献
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Analyst Coverage and Financing Decisions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We provide evidence that analyst coverage affects security issuance. First, firms covered by fewer analysts are less likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. They issue equity less frequently, but when they do so, it is in larger amounts. Moreover, these firms depend more on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions. Finally, debt ratios of less covered firms are more affected by Baker and Wurgler's (2002) “external finance‐weighted” average market‐to‐book ratio. These results are consistent with market timing behavior associated with information asymmetry, as well as behavior implied by dynamic adverse selection models of equity issuance. 相似文献
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We posit that management forecasts, which are predictable transformations of realized earnings without random errors, are more informative than unbiased forecasts, which manifest small but unpredictable errors, even if biased forecasts are less accurate. Consistent with this intuition, we find that managers who make consistent forecasting errors have a greater ability to influence investor reactions and analyst revisions, even after controlling for the effect of accuracy. This effect is more economically significant and statistically robust than that of forecast accuracy. More sophisticated investors and experienced analysts are found to have a better understanding of the benefits of consistent management forecasts. 相似文献
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