An epidemiological study of injury in mines: implications for safety promotion

This paper is intended to raise risk management as a topic for discussion among product safety professionals and discuss one particular key element of understanding risk. Risk management is an essential part of good product safety management, whether at the policy level or the implementation stage, and is relevant to all those involved in the development and use of standards, including regulators and suppliers. The risk management process involves measuring the risks at the initial stage, by looking at consequence (possible injury) and likelihood (of that injury occurring) which then gives us the ‘inherent risk.’ We then seek ways to treat the risks. A second assessment of the risks is subsequently done to establish the extent to which the treatment will address the problem (‘assessed risk’). In product safety, this means how dangerous is the product as it is and how effective will a measure be in reducing the risk. Communication is vital in this process. When standards are developed and policy adopted, the factors that are taken into consideration need to be properly documented. The rationales for decisions, i.e., what the hazard is and how it is treated by the product specification, should be recorded within the standard itself. In the absence of recorded reasons, assumptions are made and these may well be incorrect. This paper discusses this topic in some detail and provides illustrative examples.     

Is there an association between director option compensation and the likelihood of misstatement?

Oversight bodies in the United States (US) have addressed the issue of director independence in recent years. Bebchuk et al. [Bebchuk, L., Grinstein, Y., Peyers, U. (2006). Lucky directors. (Working paper Harvard University Law School) SSRN # 952239.] found that director oversight may be impaired if directors receive option grants under favorable terms because these grants may create a mutuality of interest between directors and managers. We assess whether option grants to independent directors reduce oversight of financial reporting. Using a sample of 105 US firms that misstated their revenue matched with a sample of non-misstatement firms, we find that companies whose independent directors do not receive stock options are less likely to misstate revenues than companies who meet the Sarbanes-Oxley definition of independence. Our results show that compensating outside directors with stock options may weaken their independent oversight.     

The german inflation 1914–1923 Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986, 369 pp.

The views expressed are those of the author and are not to be read as the views of either the Congressional Research Service or the Library of Congress.