问责制：绩效管理的基石

绩效管理是将员工行为与高层战略相联系的有效途径。它还能够通过预测性分析为管理者和员工团队提供所需要的信息,帮助他们更好地完成决策和折衷分析。绩效管理的重点并不在于监督表盘,而在于推动表盘运转。     

绩效管理：打破“执行”藩篱

在发展过程中不通过谨慎控制投资与开销,而且不努力开发不同战略的公司将遭遇生存危机。相反,通过为其隐性知识员工提供信息技术与商业智能,从而提高员工能力的公司将取得突破。     

The disclosure of key performance indicators in the public sector

This article investigates the disclosure of key performance indicators in the annual reports of Irish public sector organizations. It begins by discussing the two main driving forces behind public sector bodies disclosing performance information in their annual reports for the first time as well as looking at other contributing factors. The present situation with regard to the disclosure of key performance indicators in the whole of Ireland is then analysed. A number of annual reports from central government departments or agencies, local government bodies, other public sector entities and, in the case of the Republic of Ireland, semi-state organizations are examined to see whether such information is being disclosed and, more importantly, whether performance indicators are being linked to predetermined objectives and targets.     

Debt contract strictness and auditor specialization

The conflicts of interest among managers, shareholders and creditors resulting in agency costs, can be mitigated by restricting managers’ adverse behavior, through financial covenants to better align the various stakeholder interests. Thus, debt contract strictness represents an important aspect of agency costs between creditors, shareholders, and management that is not always captured by interest rates. The contract setting provides a unique opportunity to investigate how creditors may rely on auditors to alleviate information uncertainty stemming from reliance on management's financial reporting and thus alleviate the creditor's potential loss of invested capital. After controlling for borrower risks, loan characteristics, and audit factors, we show that auditor industry specialization is significantly associated with a reduction in the strictness of debt contracts, consistent with creditors viewing certain industry expert auditors as effective monitors against financial reporting manipulation aimed at the avoidance of debt covenant triggers that protect creditors against potential loss. Further, we find that the association between loan strictness and auditor specialization is attenuated by stronger corporate governance systems, external monitors, and prior lender relationships.     

IPO anomalies and innovation capital

Innovation capital are typically expensed and/or unrecognized as assets under current generally accepted accounting principles. This results in accounting-related information asymmetry. This paper examines the association of innovation capital (as measured here by the proxies of R&D expenditures and granted patents) and initial public offerings (IPO) anomalies. These anomalies include initial IPO underpricing, duration of honeymoon (a distinct feature of the Taiwanese IPO environment), and long-term performance. The theoretical model underlying this research is a signaling model. The results indicate that more innovative firms are more likely to be underpriced, and have longer honeymoon periods than less innovative firms. Further, the more innovative firms have positive and growing long-term market-adjusted returns. This stands in contrast to the declining long-term stock performance of initial public offering firms that is evidenced in the literature. We conclude that pre-IPO research and development expenditures disclosed in the IPO prospectus, official monthly reports of newly developed patents released to the public, and the frequency of patent citations significantly signal both underpricing and future market performance of IPO firms in Taiwan.     

Regulator flexibility and the administrative allocation licensing of 3G spectrum

Globally, most nations assign radio spectrum to provide 3G mobile services during the period 1999–2007. While there is consensus among most economists that auctions are the preferred assignment mechanism, the assignment mode is split, more or less, equally (in terms of the number of licences issued) between administrative allocations and auctions. With auction procedures tending to raise more revenue for governments (Cartelier, 2003) the question that naturally arises is: why are administrative allocations so popular a method to assign spectrum? McMillan (1995) conjectures that administrative allocations provide additional ‘flexibility’. Accordingly, this study examines the performance of 3G assignments in terms of an econometric analysis of a unique sample of national 3G spectrum administrative allocations. These outcomes are modelled as depending on spectrum package attributes, and post-award network deployment requirements.     

Hypothesis testing based on goodness-of-fit in the moving average time series model

Small sample properties of t-tests are compared with those of tests based on relative goodness- of-fit in the context of the first order moving average time series model. Monte Carlo experiments reported in the paper suggest that the actual size of these t-tests greatly exceeds theoretical large sample significance levels, while conformity of goodness-of-fit statistics to the appropriate chi-square or F-distributions is much closer. The evidence presented suggests that practitioners are well advised to employ goodness-of-fit tests as a check on results of t-tests particularly when the latter indicate ‘significance’.