Who does private equity buy? Evidence on the role of private equity from buyouts of divested businesses

Research Summary: We examine the role of nonventure private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high‐powered incentives, patient capital, and business independence makes private equity firms uniquely suited to correcting underinvestment problems in public corporations, and that they will therefore systematically target divested businesses that are outside their parents’ core area, whose rivals invest more in long‐term strategic assets than their parents, and whose parents have weak managerial incentives both overall and at the divisional level. Results from a sample of 1,711 divestments confirm these predictions. Our study contributes to our understanding of private equity ownership, highlighting its advantage as an alternate governance form. Managerial Summary: Private equity firms are often portrayed as destroyers of corporate value, raiding established companies in pursuit of short‐term gain. In contrast, we argue that private equity investors help to revitalize businesses by enabling investments in long‐term strategic resources and capabilities that they are better able to evaluate, monitor, and support than public market investors. Consistent with these arguments, we find that when acquiring businesses divested by public corporations, private equity firms are more likely to buy units outside the parent's core area, those whose peers invest more in R&D than their parents, and those whose parents have weak managerial incentives, especially at the divisional level. Thus, private equity firms systematically target those businesses that may fail to realize their full potential under public ownership.     

Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance

In this paper, we present experimental evidence on the effect adverse selection has on coverage choices and pricing in corporate insurance markets. Two sets of experimental data, each generated by experiments utilizing a specific parameterization of a corporate insurance decision, are presented to gauge these effects. In the first, subject behavior conforms to a unique equilibrium in which high risk firms choose higher coverage and contracts are priced accordingly. Insurers act competitively and convergence to equilibrium behavior is marked. In the second set, there is little evidence that subject behavior is consistent with either of the two equilibrium outcomes supported by the experimental setting—pooling by fully insuring losses and pooling by self insuring. JEL Classification C90, G14, G22 Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9152-y.     

Extending the universality of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton model

Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (HJM) developed an important model of the evolution of interest rates. A key assumption of the model is that interest rate changes are normally distributed in continuous time. Implementing the HJM-method of evolution of interest rates in discrete time for more complex volatility functions remains a significant challenge. In this article, we present a relatively simple and flexible method of implementation, that extends the usefulness of the HJM model. The derivation assumes that the distribution of interest rates is stable, but not necessarily identical, for each discrete time period. This allows us to identify the drift-adjustment terms necessary to build interest rate lattices and trees and Monte Carlo simulations that satisfy exactly the no-arbitrage and volatility conditions, even complex ones, of the model. The much more difficult discrete-time implementation methods suggested in the literature (Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1991) [Heath, D., Jarrow, R. & Morton, A. (1991). Contingent claim valuation with a random evolution of interest rates. Review of Futures Markets, 54-76.] and Jarrow (1996) [Jarrow, R. (1996). Modeling fixed income securities and interest rate options. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Companies Inc.]) do not accomplish that. We illustrate our analytical implementation with three examples of volatility functions and demonstrate its superiority to other methods of implementation.     

Endogenous Farmer Schooling and the Application of High-Yielding Variety Technology in a Less-Developed Country

The paper uses data from the World Bank's Pakistan Integrated Household Survey to study the effect of farmer schooling on the application of high-yielding variety technology in Pakistan in 1990–91. Unlike previous studies of the role of schooling in agriculture in less-developed countries, it emulates estimation of Mincer earnings functions to treat schooling as an endogenous variable. This purges the estimates of inconsistency arising from positive correlation between unobserved farmer ability and schooling, and measurement errors in observed schooling. A measure of access to schools identifies the true causal effect of schooling on the use of improved seeds.     

Learning and the value of information: Evidence from health plan report cards

This paper develops a framework to analyze the value of information in the context of health plan choice. We use a Bayesian learning model to estimate the impact and value of information using data from a large employer, which started distributing health plan ratings to its employees in 1997. We estimate the parameters of the model with simulated maximum likelihood, and use the estimates to quantify the value of the report card information. We model both continuous specifications with Gaussian priors and signals, and discrete specifications with Beta priors and Binomial signals. We find that the release of information had a statistically significant effect on health plan choices. Consumers were willing to pay about $330 per year per below expected performance rating avoided, and the average value of the report card per employee was about $20 per year. We find large variation in valuations across different performance domains, but no significant evidence of heterogeneity based on observable employee characteristics or unobservable dimensions.     

Estimation of the bid - ask spread and its components: a new approach

We show that time variation in expected returns and/or partialprice adjustments lead to a downward bias in previous estimatorsof both the spread and its components. We introduce a new approachthat provides unbiased and efficient estimators of the componentsof the spread. We find that between 77 and 97 percent of thedownward bias in previous spread estimate is caused by timevariation in expected returns. More importantly, the adverse-selectioncomponent, though significant, accounts for a much smaller proportion(8 to 13 percent) of the quoted spread, at least for small trades,than the proportion (over 40 percent) previously reported inthe literature. Order processing costs are the predominant componentof quoted spreads.     

Asymmetric predictability of conditional variances

We show that there is an asymmetry in the predictability ofthe volatilities of large versus small firms. Using both univariateand multivariate ARMA - GARCH-M parameterziations, we find thatvolatility surprises to large market value firms are importantto the future dynamics of their own returns as well as the returnsof small firms. Conversely, however, shocks to smaller firmshave no impact on the behavior of either the mean or the varianceof the returns of larger capitalization companies.