Do Unions Affect Employer Compliance with the Law? New Zealand Evidence for Age Discrimination

Over the last thirty years, collective rights to organize into unions, bargain collectively and strike have been weakened in both New Zealand and the UK. At the same time, individual rights to due process and to protection from discriminatory or unjust management decisions have been strengthened, leading some to conclude that collective and individual rights are unrelated, incompatible or mutually exclusive. On the contrary, we use evidence of employer compliance with anti‐age provisions in the New Zealand Human Rights Act to show that the two sets of rights can be highly complementary: the presence of unions strengthens individual protection from discriminatory treatment.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

Events in the Gulf have finally brought an end to the world economic boom of the last eight years. The oil price shock itself is only partly responsible for the downturn. The previous tightening of monetary policy in the face of inflationary pressures and the end of a rapid period of credit and asset price expansion had severely weakened the ability of some economies to respond to the shock. This is reflected in the diversity of response, most obviously in the United States where Fed fine tuning and the credit crunch have already weakened the economy. The rise in oil prices has led to a sudden collapse in consumer confidence and a swift cutback in output. Although we do not expect the recession to be deep, the financial problems will delay recovery. The Japanese economy was already in financial difficulties before the shock, although the real economy was stronger and here we expect a sharp deceleration from almost 6 per cent growth last year to around 3.5 per cent. In contrast the German economy, partly shielded by the substantial appreciation of the DM over the last year, has been affected less by the oil price shock and we expect the consumer and investment boom to continue this year as the economies merge. This provides a welcome boost to other European economies.     

Economic Outlook 1991–1995: The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: THE CHANCELLOR'S ECONOMIC ADVICE

Within the last month the Chancellor has made two important speeches on macroeconomic policy. The first, to Surrey businessmen in June, pledged the UK to the French route to a ‘virtuous circle of low inflation, rising competitiveness and increasing market share’; the second, in July to the European Policy Forum, vigorously defended his present policy against the alternatives, which he dismissed as ‘illusory or destined to fail’, of devaluation or cutting interest rates. On both occasions Mr. Lamont placed the permanent conquest of inflation at the centre of his policy, arguing that holding sterling at its present central parity of DM 2.95 is the only way to achieve this objective. In his view the consequence of any of the alternative proposals would be ‘either higher interest rates, higher inflation, or most likely both’. In this Forecast Release we consider these claims and the economic advice on which it is based. On the latter we would surmise that the thrust of the advice which Mr. Lamont is receiving is that he has the opportunity to deliver a sustainably low inflation rate and that this requires a stable pound within the ERM. The alternatives involve a sterling devaluation which, no matter how obtained, would obstruct the goal of permanently low inflation in return for only transient benefits on output and unemployment. But the price of defeating inflation has been high and is not yet fully paid. Moreover the goalposts have been moved: to reach the French position on competitiveness, which underpins their gains in market share and which has taken the best part of a deeade to achieve, requires a still better inflation performance on the part of the UK and while this is being achieved, adjustment costs will persist. It is partly in defence of his own policies and partly in an attempt to moderate the already-high adjustment costs that Mr. Lamont has adopted a more combative stance. His advice is that to compete with Europe, we cannot award ourselves pay increases far in excess of European levels, indeed we need a period of below-average pay rises.     

Volatility clustering and the bid–ask spread: Exchange rate behavior in early Renaissance Florence

This paper investigates the nature and behavior of the domestic (local) currency market that existed in Florence (Italy) during the late 14th and early 15th centuries (a.k.a. the Early Renaissance). We find that the extant volatility and microstructure models developed for modern asset markets are able to describe the statistical volatility properties observed for the denaro-florin exchange rate. Volatility is clustered and is related to the bid–ask spread. This supports the notion that, although there are huge social, industrial and technological differences between capitalism then and now, individuals trading financial assets in an organized venue behave in a similar manner.     

UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE "PROBLEM": A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance.     

Spatial Competition and Shopping Externalities: Evidence from the Housing Market

In search markets, greater spatial concentration of sellers increases price competition. At the same time, though, a greater concentration of sellers can create a shopping externality by attracting more buyers to the site. Using housing sales data, we test for spatial competition and shopping externality effects on prices and marketing time. We find that they reflect both competitive and shopping externality effects from surrounding houses, although the relative strength varies with how fresh the house is in the market, the freshness of surrounding houses, and the phase of the market cycle. New listings have the strongest shopping externality effect on neighboring houses that have been on the market for some time. Vacant houses have their strongest competition effects in the declining market and externality effects in the rising market. Fresh houses on the market reap little benefit from shopping externalities in all phases of the market cycle.