Local deficits and local jobs: Can US states stabilize their own economies?

Using a sample of the 48 mainland US states for the period 1973–2009, we study the ability of US states to expand their own state employment through the use of state deficit policies. The analysis allows for the facts that US states are part of a wider monetary and economic union with free factor mobility across all states and that state residents and firms may purchase goods from “neighboring” states. Those purchases may generate economic spillovers across neighbors. Estimates suggest that states can increase their own state employment by increasing their own deficits. There is evidence of spillovers to employment in neighboring states defined by common cyclical patterns among state economies. For large states, aggregate spillovers to its economic neighbors are approximately two-thirds of the large state's job growth. Because of significant spillovers and possible incentives to free-ride, there is a potential case to actively coordinate (i.e., centralize) the management of stabilization policies. Finally, the job effects of a temporary increase in state own deficits persist for at most one to two years, and there is evidence of a negative impact on state jobs when these deficits are scheduled for repayment.     

The financial crisis of 2008 in fixed-income markets

We explore how a relatively small amount of heterogeneous securities created turmoil in financial markets in much of the world in 2007 and 2008. The drivers of the financial turmoil and the Financial Crisis of 2008 were heterogeneous securities that were hard to value. These securities created concerns about counterparty risk and ultimately created substantial uncertainty. The problems spread in ways that were hard to see in advance. The run on prime money market funds in September 2008 and the effects on commercial paper were an important aspect of the crisis itself and are discussed in some detail.     

Optimal agenda-setter timing

Abstract .  We analyze the optimal timing problem of an agenda setter who can propose a project that is then voted on by a committee. The payoff consists of a common stochastic component and an idiosyncratic component that differs among committee members. The agenda setter may be biased for or against the project, relative to the median committee member, and chooses when to call the vote. We analyze how the timing decision depends on the political environment and the bias of the agenda setter. We show that both positively and negatively biased agenda setters can implement decisions that differ from those preferred by the median committee member.     

Do Investors Pay Sufficient Attention to Banks’ Unrealized Gains and Losses on Available-for-sale Securities?

Abstract

Unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities (AFSGL) are included in Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) and directly affect shareholders’ equity but are not included in earnings. We investigate whether unrealized AFSGL help predict future earnings and whether analysts and investors incorporate the information conveyed by unrealized AFSGL in a timely manner. We conduct our investigation on a sample of banks because unrealized AFSGL are material in the banking industry. First, we show that unrealized AFSGL are material and help in predicting next period realized AFSGL and future earnings change. Second, we document that financial analysts are slow to react to unrealized AFSGL and update their forecasts after AFSGL are realized in earnings. Third, we find that investors are also slow to react to unrealized AFSGL and do so only after AFSGL are included (realized) in earnings and after financial analysts update their forecasts. We document an annual difference of 5% in future abnormal returns between banks in the top and bottom quintiles of past unrealized AFSGL. A zero-cost trading strategy that relies on public information about unrealized AFSGL generates a sizeable monthly alpha that ranges between 1.8% and 1.9%.