Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne ZusammenfassungÜbersetzt von Gerhard Tintner, WienÜbersetzt von Ragnar Nurkse, z. Zt. Wienaus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Dr. Hans Fried, WienÜbersetzt von Paul Brüll, Wien.Aus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Dr. Hans Fried.     

Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Die Nachfrage im Monopolgebiet

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

A theory of operational cash holding,endogenous financial constraints,and credit rationing

This paper develops a theory of operational cash holding. Liquidity shocks due to delayed payments must be financed using cash or short-term debt. Debt holders provide an irrevocable credit line given a firm's expected insolvency risk, and equity holders select optimum cash holding. The model demonstrates the trade-off between cash holding and investing in fixed assets. Introducing uncertain cash flows leads to precautionary cash holding if debt holders impose financial constraints. Precautionary cash holding, in turn, reduces insolvency risk enhancing access to short-term finance. The theory shows that credit rationing can occur in the absence of market frictions. Using U.S. data from 1998 to 2012, empirical findings suggest that the decline in credit lines has contributed to the increase in cash holding in line with theoretical predictions.     

Market Designs for a Completely Renewable Power Sector

The article discusses whether the current German electricity market design is suitable for an electricity system completely based on renewable sources, and analyzes alternatives. Such a system becomes ever more likely due to the phase-out of nuclear power and the carbon reduction targets. Various existing scenarios for a completely renewable electricity system are analyzed and compared with respect to the contribution of different renewable technologies. Challenges for the market design arising from the differences between the current and a completely renewable system are identified??notably problems with cost recovery and investment incentives, an increased need for balancing and/or intraday adjustments, an increased diversity of actors, grid congestion and the continuing occurrence of market power. The current market design??s ability to solve these issues is assessed with the result that all but the critical problem of investment incentives and cost recovery can be solved by adapting certain rules. A?comparison with other suggested market designs reveals that some designs could ensure cost recovery and investment incentives. However, these market designs have other drawbacks. Therefore, the identification of the optimal market design for a completely renewable electricity system requires further research regarding the qualitative and quantitative effects of different changes to the current market design. The article concludes by developing concrete policy recommendations.     

A look into the factor model black box: Publication lags and the role of hard and soft data in forecasting GDP

We derive forecast weights and uncertainty measures for assessing the roles of individual series in a dynamic factor model (DFM) for forecasting the euro area GDP from monthly indicators. The use of the Kalman smoother allows us to deal with publication lags when calculating the above measures. We find that surveys and financial data contain important information for the GDP forecasts beyond the monthly real activity measures. However, this is discovered only if their more timely publication is taken into account properly. Differences in publication lags play a very important role and should be considered in forecast evaluation.     

Interbank market frictions, international banks and growth

In developing countries and countries in transition, a lack of finance is regarded as a major reason for the underperformance of the SME sector. The financial sector does not channel funds efficiently from savers to the most efficient investment. In a general equilibrium endogenous growth model, we explain the underperformance of the SME sector by interbank market frictions. High information costs in the interbank market lead to a high loan/deposit spread and hence to a low growth equilibrium. The solution to this problem is twofold. First, central bank policy could reduce interbank information problems by providing effective bank supervision. Second, if the central bank is expected not to have sufficient monitoring capabilities, reputation and reserves, opening up the interbank market to international banks can substitute for insufficient central bank activities.The sources of this advantage in efficiency are stronger incentives for workers and managers (direct connection between effort and return), easier monitoring and greater flexibility (McIntyre 2001).