On the use of low-price guarantees to discourage price cutting

This paper formulates a novel test to assess whether, and to what extent, firms might be using low-price guarantees to discourage their rivals from cutting prices. The test is based on a comparison of paired observations of advertised prices that are set by competing firms at the same point in time on similar items, where one price is set by a firm that has a low-price guarantee and the other by a firm that does not have a low-price guarantee. Using data on retail tire prices, we find that the majority of paired observations involving firms that have price-matching guarantees are consistent with what one would expect if firms were using them to discourage price cutting, whereas the majority of paired observations involving firms that have price-beating guarantees are not. This suggests that price-matching and price-beating guarantees may be serving different purposes. The evidence also suggests that guarantees that apply to advertised prices only may be serving different purposes than guarantees that apply to both advertised and selling prices.     

Understanding how attitudes affect physician compliance with legal behavioral constraints

The following study investigates how physicians in one state (Illinois) attitudinally cope with a recent law mandating physician behaviors. Specifically, this study focuses on OB/GYN physician compliance with The Sexual Assault Survivors Emergency Treatment Act (Public Law 92-156, 2002), which requires hospitals in the state of Illinois to have an approved plan for treating sexual assault survivors. What makes this research setting interesting are the potential linkages between the legal mandate, physician attitudes, and the ongoing controversy concerning abortion. The results of a census of OB/GYN physicians within the state suggest (1) this physician group is largely supportive of the letter and spirit of this law, (2) the emerging attitude models such as Perugini and Bagozzi's (2001) MGB model explaining the formation of behavioral intentions must be treated with caution when generalizing to situations mandating legal behaviors, and (3) moderating influences such as attitude strength and religiosity have no apparent effect in how attitudes relate to physician motivation to comply with such laws. The managerial and research implications of the reported study are presented and discussed.     

A Monte Carlo test of Slutsky symmetry

This paper demonstrates how Barnard's (1963) Monte Carlo test procedure can be applied to Slutsky symmetry in demand systems.     

POST-REFORM PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE AND SOURCES OF GROWTH IN CHINESE INDUSTRY: 1980–85

This paper examines the productivity growth and its sources in 39 Chinese industries in the post-reform period 1980–85. We use both the gross-output and value-added models to isolate the contributions of labor, capital, materials and technical efficiency to growth in industrial output. Using new data from the National Industrial Census of China (1988) for large and medium-size enterprises, we find that Chinese industries, in particular, those in the manufacturing experienced sharp increases in total factor productivity growth in the 1984–85 period as compared to the 1980–84 period. Moreover, collective and private enterprises show higher output and total factor productivity gains than do state enterprises. Our regression results show that total factor productivity gains are closely tied to increases in retained profits and the proportion of total employees that are technical workers. However, labor bonuses have a negative effect on total factor productivity growth.     

A marginal-predictive approach to identifying household parameters

Estimation of household parameters in scanner panel data requires the introduction of prior information. Traditionally, prior information is incorporated by restricting parameters to be constant across households or by specifying a random coefficient distribution. An alternative solution is to incorporate stochastic prior information in a formal Bayesian approach. In standard Bayesian analysis, a prior distribution over the model parameters is specified and combined with the household likelihood to obtain the Bayes estimates. The construction of the prior distribution over model parameters may be difficult, especially when working with new models whose parameters are difficult to interpret. In this paper, we propose a solution which specifies prior information through the marginal distribution of the data, i.e., the outcomes. We evaluate this marginal-predictive approach, using both actual and simulated panel data, and show it to be highly accurate relative to other available alternatives.     

The changing world of ancillary benefits

Amid salary and health care benefit cuts, ancillary benefits such as dental, life insurance, long-term disability and vision coverage can communicate employers' concern for their employees as well as serve as recruitment and retention tools. These benefits can be funded by the employer, the employee or both.     

Government pension policy and the cost of labor and capital

This article examines how the pension insurance provided by the PBGC and the tax treatment of pension plans affect the cost of labor and capital. Two important aspects of the insurance program are (1) the premium schedule and (2) an employer's liability for unfunded pension benefits (the deductible). These two aspects interact to increase the cost of capital relative to labor, especially for firms with underfunded plans.     

Opportunism and menus of two-part tariffs

We show that a menu of two-part tariffs can solve the opportunism problem identified by McAfee and Schwartz (1994) [McAfee, R.P., Schwartz, M., 1994. Opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting: nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity. American Economic Review, 84 210–230] in vertical games with sequential contracting, provided the sunk costs incurred by the first firm to invest are not too large. If the seller were to engage in opportunism with a second firm in an attempt to shift rents from the first firm, the first firm could mitigate the dissipation of its rents by choosing from its menu of contract options the tariff with the higher marginal price and lower fixed fee. The prospect of the first firm's choosing the ‘wrong’ two-part tariff in the event of opportunism is, in some environments, sufficient to make opportunism unprofitable for the seller.