Efficiency in Pari-Mutuel Betting Markets across Wagering Pools in the Simulcast Era

Simulcast wagering, where bets from across the country are taken at tracks, off-track betting facilities, casinos, by phone or online and incorporated into the same mutuel pool, has contributed to a large increase in betting volume on American horse races since the mid-1990s. This article investigates betting-market efficiency in the simulcast era focusing on whether the interrelated betting markets comprised of win, place (finishing in the top two), and show (finishing in the top three) wagering are efficiently priced. We find that the increased accessibility and betting volume associated with simulcasting has reduced, but not eliminated, the inefficiencies seen in prior studies. Despite the inefficiencies in these markets, arbitrage is not profitable because market closing prices are unknown when bets are placed.     

Reviews

POLICIES FOR TRAINING AND THE LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED.

Corney, M. 1990: The Black Hole in Britain's Training System; Training for People in Employment: Robinson, P. 1989: Stagflation; Lessons from Other Places; and Meacher, M. 1990: Adopting the Employment Principle: A Green Paper. All published by the Campaign for Work. The price of the first is £4.00, the second £5.00 and the third £3.50.

US LESSONS IN EVALUATION.

Bingham, R. D., Hill, E. W. and White, S. B. (eds) 1990: Financing Economic Development: An Institutional Response. Newbury Park, California and London: Sage Publications, £33.25 cloth, £16.75 paper.

LESSONS FROM THE USA.

Hambleton, R. 1990: Urban Government in the 1990s: Lessons from the USA,

Occasional Paper No. 35, Bristol: School for Advanced Urban Studies. No price stated.

SKILLS TRAINING.

CBI, 1989: Managing the Skills Gap. London: CBI, £10.00 paper; Report of the Vocational Education and Training Task Force, 1989: Towards a Skills Revolution. London: CBI, £20.00 paper; Association of London Authorities, 1990: Training for London. London: ALA.     

Involuntary unemployment and inventories: An exploratory model of equilibrium and pure competition

We build up a model where the combination of labor supervision costs and non-uniform tastes results in a perfect-foresight equilibrium with positive involuntary unemployment and inventories even when prices and wages are assumed to be perfectly flexible. We show that the model could explain a positive association between the real wage and the level of employment (contrary to the standard post-Keynesian model), and a negative one between inventories and employment.