Intercultural Discourse Ethics: Testing Trompenaars' and Hampden-Turner's Conclusions about Americans and the French

Are culture driven ethical conflicts apparent in the discourse of the protagonists? A multi-year, multi-cultural study of managers by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner resulted in two conclusions relevant to business ethics. The first is that intercultural business conflicts can often be traced to a finite set of cultural differences. The second is that enough similarities exist between cultures to provide the grounds for conflict resolution. The research reported here gives credence to their study when applied to an ethical conflict viewed from French and American perspectives.     

Perspectives on Michael A. Bernstein's A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in Twentieth-Century America *

The article compares Joseph Schumpeter's well-known perspectives of long term economic development with those put forward in the 1920's by the German economist Werner Sombart who followed an approach of ‘theoretical historicism’. There was general agreement between Schumpeter and Sombart that capitalism as an economic system was on the decline. Whereas according to Sombart this was attributable to a tendancy towards stagnation; in Schumpeter's view capitalism was doomed due to its success, not for its failure. The strongest parallels are to be found with respect to forces driving the transformation process, at the end of which Schumpeter expected a socialist system whereas Sombart envisioned some kind of mixed economy. The article also discusses the relevance of differences of approaches and of value judgments for the results of both authors' investigations.     

Joint implementation

As a theoretical concept for cutting down on greenhouse-gas emissions where this can be done most cost-effectively, Joint Implementation is both straightforward and convincing. However, there are a number of issues relating to the putting into practice of the concept which have yet to be resolved.     

Constructive Pressures And Incentives To Reform: Globalization and its impact on public sector performance and governance in developing countries

Contrary to widespread pessimism regarding the effects of globalization on nation states and the quality of governance in developing countries, this contribution stresses that several of its features can be made instrumental, and be beneficial, in terms of public policy making and state capability. Four ‘constructive pressures’ stemming from globalization could be seized constructively by citizens and governments in the developing world: First, better informed and better connected citizens, and an emerging global civil society, demand improvements in service delivery, transparency, and participation. Second, subnational governments, often backed by local NGOs and businesses, and keen to attract foreign investment, increasingly exert pressure vis-à-vis central governments. Third, global investment strategies by private businesses increase the demand for appropriate institutional arrangements within developing countries as well as credible government policies. Although with mixed results, forth, International Organizations, in particular IFIs, have been addressing public sector modernization in developing countries, also sponsoring global public policy networks in critical areas. Moreover, policy coordination and cooperation among states increases significantly, constraining arbitrary action by governments. Globalization, thus, advances the discussion about, and the demand for, new institutional arrangements, clearly with new opportunities for improvements in state capability and governance.     

Deux conférences sur la théorie des probabilités

Abstract

Dans les pages suivantes, nous nous occuperons de quelques questions qui concernent Ie problème général de l'addition des variables éatoires independantes.     

An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact

We use a stylised model to analyse the Stability and Growth Pact for countries that have formed the European Monetary Union (EMU). In our model, shortsighted governments fail to internalise the consequences of their debt policies for the common inflation rate fully. Therefore, while governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact in the absence of a monetary union, they do so with monetary union to restrain this externality. With uncertainty, a monetary union combined with an appropriately designed pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy. With differences in initial conditions, conflicts of interest arise. We study the Nash bargaining solution.     

The German economy in the Autumn of 1993

The German economy in the Autumn of 1993     

A law of large numbers for large economies

Summary LetX(i),i[0; 1] be a collection of identically distributed and pairwise uncorrelated random variables with common finite mean and variance ². This paper shows the law of large numbers, i.e. the fact that ₀ ¹ X(i)di=. It does so by interpreting the integral as a Pettis-integral. Studying Riemann sums, the paper first provides a simple proof involving no more than the calculation of variances, and demonstrates, that the measurability problem pointed out by Judd (1985) is avoided by requiring convergence in mean square rather than convergence almost everywhere. We raise the issue of when a random continuum economy is a good abstraction for a large finite economy and give an example in which it is not.I am indebted to Hugo Hopenhayn. Furthermore I would like to thank Dilip Abreu, Glenn Donaldson, Ed Green, Ramon Marimon, Nabil Al-Najjar, Victor Rios-Rull, Timothy van Zandt and the editor for useful comments. The first version of this paper was written in 1987.     

A model of a systemic bank run

This paper provides a model of the view that the 2008 financial crisis is reminiscent of a bank run, focussing on six stylized key features. In particular, core financial institutions have invested their funds in asset-backed securities rather than committed to long-term projects: in distress, these can potentially be sold to a large pool of outside investors at steep discounts. I consider two different motives for outside investors and their interaction with banks trading asset-backed securities: uncertainty aversion versus adverse selection. I shall argue that the version with uncertainty averse investors is more consistent with the stylized facts than the adverse selection perspective: in the former, the crisis deepens, the larger the market share of distressed core banks, while a run becomes less likely instead as a result in the adverse selection version. Therefore, the outright purchase of troubled assets by the government at prices above current market prices may both alleviate the financial crises as well as provide tax payers with returns above those for safe securities.