REIT Dividend Policies and Dividend Announcement Effects During the 2008–2009 Liquidity Crisis

Real estate investment trust (REIT) dividend policies and dividend announcement effects during the 2008–2009 liquidity crisis are examined. Multinomial logit results indicate that REITs with higher market leverage or lower market‐to‐book ratios are more likely to cut dividends, suspend dividends or pay elective stock dividends. These results imply that mitigating going‐concern risk is an important motive for REITs adjusting dividend policies during the crisis and support dividend catering theory where investor demand for dividends impacts corporate dividend policies. Moreover, REITs that cut or suspend dividends experience positive cumulative abnormal returns during the post‐announcement period after controlling for the potential influence from simultaneous funds from operation announcements. The positive market response over the post‐announcement period supports the notion that dividend decisions convey information to investors and is also consistent with the broad catering theory of dividend policy.     

Market Value of REIT Liquidity

We examine the relation between firm value and liquidity among REITs. Results show shareholders benefit from both cash and unused credit line capacity. The market values an additional dollar of cash at a premium and, as theory predicts, unused credit lines are significantly less valued than cash. Evidence suggests an increase in the market value of liquidity during the recent financial crisis. We also find that financial characteristics quantifying financial constraint influence the value of REIT financial flexibility. Most notably, the value of cash decreases with remaining credit line capacity. Although prior studies argue that cash and credit lines are substitutes, this is one of the first tests of whether the market prices this substitutability.     

Dividend Size, Yield, Clienteles and REITs

Dividend size and dividend yield are typically highly correlated which substantially hinders the empirical assessment of ex-dividend stock pricing. The ability to disentangle the joint effect of dividend yield and dividend size on ex-dividend stock prices is thus of central importance in assessing existing theories. Fortunately, the REIT asset class provides data having a low correlation between dividend size and dividend yield allowing for a cleaner assessment of the extant theories. Evidence from the present study indicates that results that are typically interpreted as confirmatory of the tax-induced clientele effect may be spurious. Instead, transaction costs and limit order adjustments are likely the determinants of the observed relationships between the change in price to dividend ratio, dividend yield, and dividend size.     

Neighborhood Center Image and Rents

The impact of neighborhood-center image on rental rates is empirically modeled and tested. The neighborhood-center anchor does not substantially affect in-line, nonanchor rental rates and is more a proxy for a neighborhood center's trade-area economic base than an actual determinant of neighborhood-center rental rates. Image-related facilities specific variables do affect rental rates. Concurrently, relative center size does impact rental rates, providing marginal support for the use of gravity models at the property subtype level. More modeling of retail rents and sales activity is warranted.     

Banking Relationships and REIT Capital Structure

This article examines the evolution of real estate investment trust (REIT) capital structure in the new REIT era with a focus on the effects of banking relationships on REIT capital structure. Using a unique sample of REITs from 1992 to 2003, we find that, after controlling for firm characteristics, REITs with banking relationships are more likely to obtain long‐term debt ratings and subsequently issue public debt. Moreover, REITs with banking relationships tend to use less secured debt and have lower leverage. These findings support the notion that banking relationships facilitate REITs' access to the public debt markets and help explain why REITs shift from traditional mortgage financing to bank debt and public capital market financing. The results also support the proposition that firm leverage should be positively related to the amount of a firm's secured debt.     

Top executive compensation: Equity or excess? Implications for regaining American competitiveness

The debate over compensation packages for top executives is discussed. Particular emphasis is placed on the decoupling of CEO pay and organizational performance. A contrast is drawn between firms that are owner-controlled and those that are manager-controlled. Owner-controlled firms tend to be more market-driven. In manager-controlled firms, however, ownership can become diluted to the point where decisions may not always be in the best interest of shareholders. The process of determining CEO compensation packages is examined, and special attention is given to the handling of stock options. In order to stem the threat of increased government intervention, suggestions are made for increasing the leverage of compensation committees and of shareholders in general.Bruce Walters is a doctoral candidate and research/teaching assistant in the department of management at the University of Texas at Arlington, with emphasis in business policy and strategic management.Tim Hardin is a graduate student in the department of urban affairs at the University of Texas at Arlington, with emphasis in urban management.James Schick is a summa cum laude graduate of the department of finance at the University of Texas at Arlington.     

The Ex–Dividend Pricing of REITs

Past studies have shown that ex–dividend stock prices are not fully reflective of dividend payments. A tax–induced clientele effect and micromarket limitations in stock pricing have been used to explain this pricing anomaly. This study focuses on the ex–dividend behavior of real estate investment trusts (REITs). Due to a low correlation between dividend size and dividend yield, REITs permit a cleaner examination of a tax–induced clientele effect. The results indicate that tick constraints in pricing ex–dividend stocks create the appearance of a tax–induced clientele effect in REITs when none should exist.     

REIT Dividend Determinants: Excess Dividends and Capital Markets

The determinants of excess dividend payments above mandatory requirements in real estate investment trusts (REITs) are evaluated. Payment of excess dividends is related to factors associated with reduced agency costs, strong operating performance, the implementation of a stock repurchase plan and an ability to access short-term bank debt. Recognizing that access to external capital is essential for long-term growth, REITs manage dividend policy to allow for capital acquisition in the form of both equity and debt. The acquisition and use of short-term bank debt provides REIT management flexibility in determining dividend policy.     

We start from here

As James Buchanan often asserted, in constitutional design “we start from here” which is to say we design a constitution to fit the institutions, social practices and so forth that we already have. Comparison of the complicated case of the US constitution and the failed attempt at constitutionalism in contemporary Egypt suggest that many societies are not yet ready for serious constitutional design. The English civil wars were about religion; the US constitution ignores religion and thereby avoids the grim conflict of church and state.     

Firm and industry informational content from REIT FFO announcements

Conveyance of information associated with REIT FFO announcements is investigated by decomposing stock returns into three components: firm-specific, industry-level and market-wide. The relative importance of firm-specific and industry information is evaluated around and following FFO announcements. The initial market reaction to REIT FFO announcements is primarily driven by the firm-specific return component. The underreaction to firm-specific information appears in drift after the announcement, especially for negative FFO surprises. FFO surprises explain the firm-specific return component, but not the industry-level return component which further suggests that FFO announcements only convey firm-specific information.