Institutionalized pollution havens

A multiple-principal, multiple-agent lobby group model suggests that the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policies is conditional on the structure of host countries' political institutions such as the number of legislative units (veto players). The model also yields the novel concept of “aggregate honesty” which combines veto players and corruption. FDI raises environmental policy stringency where the number of legislative units are many (aggregate honesty is high), but reduces it where the legislative units are few (aggregate honesty is low). Our panel data evidence is fully consistent with these predictions. An additional contribution is to show the empirical importance of endogenizing environmental policy in Pollution Haven Hypothesis studies. Only when treated as endogenous does environmental policy have a significant negative effect on FDI.     

Bank Growth Choices and Changes in Market Performance

Changes in bank market performance are compared for banks that choose not to grow, to branch, bank acquire, product expand, or some combination. Using the change in market value‐to‐book value ratios, banks that include acquiring other banks as part of their growth strategy have significant positive changes in performance. Positive performance by bank acquirers is in contrast to many studies, but prior research has not reviewed other growth activities in a single model, nor used market‐based measures to review performance over longer time periods following bank expansion.     

Modelling with scenarios: Technology in North-South development

This article outlines work in progress on a study of technological choice in the context of North-South development. Its main purpose is to describe the methodology being developed in the pilot phase of the study. This is of interest because it links together a number of analytic techniques—sociopolitical scenario analysis, macroeconomic modelling, and certain microstudies. The methodological problems are general to much forecasting activity.     

Not all trade restrictions are created equally

There has been great focus in the recent trade theory literature on the introduction of firm heterogeneity into trade models. This introduction has highlighted the importance of the entry/exit decision of firms in response to changes in trade barriers. However, it is typical in many of these models to use iceberg transport costs as a general form of trade barriers that can be interchangeable with ad valorem tariffs. I show that this is not always an appropriate conclusion. Specifically, I illustrate that profit for an exporter is more elastic in response to tariffs than iceberg transport costs, which affects the entry/exit decision of firms. This has implications for welfare analysis and empirical specifications.     

Fiscal dependence on trade taxes and economic development: additional results and a reconciliation of the empirical evidence

Using Brazilian data spanning the period 1910–75,new evidence is presented on the hypothesis that a country's fiscal dependence on trade taxes is inversely related to her level of economic development, at least once the latter passes a certain threshold. Unlike previous studies, this study uses methods which highlight the dynamic and temporal nature of the underlying relationships. The results indicate strong support for the hypothesis and also suggest that the conflicting time-serious evidence can be reconciled.     

Seemingly altruistic behavior: selfish genes or cooperative organisms?

A largely unrecognized agency problem is embedded in Dawkins’s selfish gene theory, which treats an organism as an agent of its genes; the economic view of this problem is brought to bear on the theory and is used to offer an explanation of the correlation between altruistic behavior and biological closeness of interacting organisms that differs from that given by selfish gene theory. The essay also discusses differences between empirical implications of selfish gene theory and those of a reciprocity theory of seemingly altruistic behavior.