Adverse Selection and Pay Compression

A fundamental result of the principal-agent literature is that pay will be linked to performance when it is difficult for the principal to monitor the agent's actions. However, performance pay can lead to adverse incentives. In these models, high-powered incentives encourage workers to neglect some aspects of their job or to sabotage their coworkers' efforts. This paper offers another explanation for the weak link between pay and performance: worker heterogeneity. When workers are heterogeneous and labor contracts are contests, the Nash equilibrium often pools workers. I show that this implies that the link between pay and performance is weaker than would be the case if firms could observe workers' types before contracting and offer each type their respective optimal contests.     

Cow-calf profitability and leptin genotyping

Profitability of cow-calf production is determined largely by market prices, calf weaning weights, and cow productive life. While producers individually have no effect on prices, weaning weights and productive life have genetic influences and hence can be altered by selection programs implemented by producers. We investigate the impact of a mutation in the leptin gene (exon 2; single nucleotide polymorphism [SNP] 305) on cow-calf profitability. Prior research shows that this mutation has effects on performance and traits of fed cattle and milk production in dairy cows. Using data from a teaching-research herd, we find that it is also associated with calf weaning weights and cow productive life. A bio-economic stochastic simulation demonstrates that the mutation has statistically positive impacts on profits, suggesting that producers can profitably make use of this information.     

Swiss Exchange Rate Policy in the 1930s. Was the Delay in Devaluation Too High a Price to Pay for Conservatism?

In this paper we examine the experience of Switzerland’s devaluation in 1936. We ask the following questions: what were the issues at stake in the political debate? What was the cost to Switzerland of the delay in the franc devaluation? What would have been the costs and benefits of an earlier exchange rate policy? To answer these questions we construct a simple open economy macro model of the interwar Swiss economy. We then posit counterfactual scenarios of alternative exchange rate pegs in 1931 and 1933. Our simulations clearly show a significant and large increase in real economic activity.     

Integrating human resource management and corporate strategy: A preview of the 3M story

This article describes the initial stages of an endeavor to bring about an integration of strategic management and human resource management in a major manufacturing organization—3M. The focus is on the agenda of the organization's Vice President of Human Resources for bringing about the innovation through a systematic program of cultural analysis, professional development of line managers and human resource specialists, restructuring of the human resource management organization, and creation of a new partnership between line and human resource managers.     

WHO GETS FORMAL HOUSING FINANCE IN JORDAN?

The role of housing finance in actualizing housing demand is widely appreciated. Many developing nations have established special institutions in an attempt to assure that adequate volumes of financing are made available. Jordan offers an especially interesting case because the Jordan Housing Bank has the resources to serve almost any number of applicants at highly competitive rates. In addition, several other formal lenders make mortgage loans as do some government programs. This paper analyzes the determinants of the likelihood of recent home purchasers actually obtaining a loan from a formal finance institution. We find that purchasers in rural areas are much less likely to obtain such loans. In urban areas, the probability of using formal finance rises steadily with income. Also in urban areas, a household that purchases a unit that is an addition to an existing structure is much more likely to obtain formal financing than an otherwise similar household.     

Do Termination Provisions Truncate the Takeover Bidding Process?

We provide new evidence on termination provisions and the takeoverbidding process. Our central contribution is a novel databasefrom Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents thataccurately measures the incidence of termination provisionsand the depth of competition in takeover deals. We show thatbiased data in prior research produced incorrect conclusionson the relation between termination provisions and judicialdecisions, bidder toeholds, and deal size. Our comprehensivedata also show that termination provisions are positively relatedto takeover competition. Our evidence is consistent with theinformation/commitment hypothesis in which termination provisionsdo not truncate bidding but instead culminate the takeover process.(JEL G34; K22; D44).