Dilemmas of Downsizing During the Great Recession: Crisis Strategies of European Employers

The present paper analyzes the choices faced by European employers when threatened with the prospect of the mass lay-off of their employees as a result of the Great Recession. By means of a representative survey among employers in Italy, Germany, Denmark, Poland, the Netherlands and Sweden in 2009, we show that employers mainly prefer to tackle such threats by offering short-time work, and by early retirement packages to older workers, in conjunction with buy-outs. The latter preference is particularly visible in countries where employers perceive the level of employment protection to be high. The only notable exception is Denmark, where employers prefer to reduce working hours. In general, a sense of generational fairness influences downsizing preferences, with those employers who favor younger workers particularly likely to use early retirement and buy-outs when downsizing, followed by working time reductions. Wage reductions and administrative dismissal are less favored by European employers. In particular, CEOs and owners are more inclined than lower-level managers to cut wages.     

Purchasing power parity as an approximation to the equilibrium exchange ratio

Purchasing power parity (PPP) is re-examined in models with trade impediments and intermediate products that are not traded. A distinction is made between ‘local consumption PPP’ and ‘total consumption PPP’. These are tested on several data sets, with largely negative results.     

OPTIMAL INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFERENCE IN A DEMOGRAPHICALLY DIVIDED WORLD (*)

The international transmission of shocks in population growth and technology is examined in an interdependent two-country world economy; decisions concerning the intertemporal allocation are made by social planners with an infinite horizon and an endogenous rate of time preference. Steady state shocks in population growth are shown to be negatively transmitted to the rate of time preference. In the steady state, the optimal foreign debt is determinate and it brings about a convergence of time preference. The net creditor and debtor positions in the steady state depend on the discount rate functions, the states of technology and the rates of population growth.     

Timing the Start of Material Substitution Projects: Creating Switching Options under Volatile Material Prices

Firms developing new products often face the challenge of making investment decisions under uncertain input–cost conditions due to the price volatilities of the materials they use. These decisions need to be made long before the final products are launched on the market. Therefore, firms that invest in the opportunity to switch materials in a timely manner will have the flexibility to react to material price changes and realize competitive advantages. However, volatile material prices may also cause a firm to delay investment. Using real‐options reasoning, this paper studies the influence of input‐cost fluctuations on the timing decision to start new product development (NPD) and thus create the follow‐on opportunity to later replace an existing product. A model that combines waiting and switching options to derive influencing factors of the flexibility value that triggers the investment is developed and tested on a sample of material substitution projects from manufacturing firms. The results show how price uncertainty of the new and the old material, their joint price development, the expected project duration, and competitive preemption are related to the propensity to delay the start of NPD. The findings provide new insights on how timing in adopting materials can be used to hedge exposure to volatile material prices. The insights are relevant for adopters and producers of new materials, as well as for policy makers who strive for supporting the diffusion of new materials.     

Credit risk transfer and bank competition

We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’ access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is private information, banks have an incentive to grant unprofitable loans that are then transferred to other parties, leading to an increase in aggregate risk. Higher competition increases welfare in the presence of CRT with public information. In contrast, welfare eventually decreases for high levels of competition in the presence CRT with private information due to the expansion of unprofitable loans. This finding coincides with the decrease in credit quality observed during the late years of the credit boom preceding the subprime crisis.     

Interest Rate Risk Rewards in Stock Returns of Financial Corporations: Evidence from Germany

The interest rate sensitivity of stock returns of financial and non-financial corporations is a well-known phenomenon. However, only little is known about the part of total stock returns that is attributable to the compensation an investor receives for being exposed to interest rate risk when investing in equity securities. We pursue here a benchmark portfolio approach, constructing benchmark portfolios having the same interest rate risk exposure as a particular stock. By studying the time series of returns of these asset-specific benchmarks, we find: i) Regardless of the industry considered, the interest rate risk benchmarks of German corporations have mostly earned a significantly positive reward. ii) Returns of interest rate risk benchmarks of financial institutions exceeded significantly those of non-financial corporations. iii) An investor willing to bear nothing but the average interest rate risk of German financial institutions would have earned a mean return of about or even exceeding 70% of the corresponding total stock returns. iv) Returns of the interest rate risk benchmarks of the German insurance sector were significantly higher than those of German banks, which seems to contradict conventional market wisdom that insurances hedge interest rate risks.     

On the demographic realism of the Ricardian theory of public finance

Summary The possibility of public debt-neutrality is discussed for countries experiencing demographic changes. The heterogeneity of agents plays a decisive role in destroying Ricardian equivalence of public finance. In addition to the usual explanatory factors of non-neutrality, such as distortionary taxation, public debt is not equivalent to current taxation as a consequence of (1) disconnected dynasties, (2) uncertain lifetimes, (3) diverging birth rates, (4) international migration, (5) population growth uncertainty, (6) diverging rates of time preference, and (7) capital market imperfections. The paper concludes that thepure Ricardian model of public finance serves a purpose as a standard of argument for the more realistic models of public finance.Comments by Gerbert Hebbink, Evert van Imhoff, Herman Vollebergh and members of the Department of Public Finance are gratefully acknowledged.