The Convergence of Price–cost Margins

This paper provides estimates of sectoral price–cost margin (PCM) trends in thirteen OECD countries over the last three decades, once controlled for inflation and cycle effects. It concludes with the absence of a decrease in average PCM. More strikingly, it establishes a clear pattern of PCM convergence both across countries and sectors. This convergence means that high margins have shrunk and low margins grown. Better capital market efficiency might be a driving force in the PCM convergence. These results point to a need to search for factors countervailing the pro-competitive effect on markups. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the OECD or its member countries.     

The Murphy-Kirk-Beresford Correspondence 1982-1996: Commentary on the Development of Financial Accounting Standards

Robert J. Bricker and Gary J. Previts (eds) (Foreword by Eugene Glem), Studies in the Development of Accounting Thought, Volume 5 Oxford: JAI (Elsevier Science), 2002, $85.00, e85.00, 223pp. ISBN: 0-7623-0834-6     

General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery

We consider a general equilibrium model of trade ex ante with differential information in which agents choose plans of state-contingent lists of bundles. Being unable to verify that the state of nature is s and not t, an agent has to accept the delivery of any bundle in the list for delivery in state s or in the list for delivery in state t. Under the assumption that each state of nature can be verified by at least one agent, we establish existence of equilibrium and we show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies a notion of coalitional incentive compatibility.     

Walrasian prices in markets with tradable rights

In this paper, we consider an exchange economy where there is an external restriction for the consumption of goods. This restriction is defined by both, a cap on consumption of certain commodities and the requirement of an amount of rights for the consumption of these commodities. The caps for consumption are imposed exogenously due to the negative effects that the consumption may produce. The consumption rights or licenses are distributed among the agents. This fact leads to the possibility of establishing license markets. These licenses do not participate in agents’ preferences, however, the individual’s budgetary constraint may be modified, leading to a reassignment of resources. Our aim is to show the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium price system linking tradable rights prices with commodity prices.     

Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency

Summary. A service is produced for a set of agents. The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service. We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served, and then share the cost among them. If such a mechanism is budget balanced (covers cost exactly), it cannot be efficient (serve the surplus maximizing set of users) and vice-versa. We characterize the rich family of budget balanced and group strategyproof mechanisms and find that the mechanism associated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula is characterized by the property that its worst welfare loss is minimal. When we require efficiency rather than budget balance – the more common route in the literature – we find that there is a single Clarke-Groves mechanism that satisfies certain reasonable conditions: we call this the marginal cost pricing mechanism. We compare the size of the marginal cost pricing mechanism's worst budget surplus with the worst welfare loss of the Shapley value mechanism. Received: October 26, 1998; revised version: December 3, 1999     

Two versions of the tragedy of the commons

The commons are a one input-one output production process with increasing marginal cost. In the everage return game, each agent chooses his input contribution and total output is shared in proportion to individual contributions. In the average cost game, each agent chooses his output share and total input cost is shared in proportion to individual demands. The tragedy is that the non cooperative equilibrium results in inefficient overutilization of the technology. We prove formally the tragedy when individual preferences are convex and both goods are normal. This result has not been proved previously on such a general preference domain. We also show that overutilization is less severe in the average cost game than in the average return game.     

The social economics of job security

Using a social economics perspective, this essay examines the positive and negative effects of job security, insecurity and the perceptions thereof on the welfare of workers, organizations, and society, as well as policy options that could alleviate the negative socio-economic consequences of job insecurity. The essay questions perceived job insecurity as a device to increase worker effort, both on efficiency and ethical grounds. It also suggests that increased perceptions of job insecurity have adversely affected workers' well-being and have undesirable macroeconomic and social effects. Public policy makers and researchers should examine ways to minimize the negative consequences associated with involuntary job loss. They should also consider to what extent both limiting firms' ability to layoff workers and providing incentives to firms that downsize to use alternatives to layoffs are socially desirable. The authors thank two anonymous referees for comments, and Elizabeth Kirkwood and Deanna Behrens for outstanding research assistance. The authors invite others to e-mail them if interested in organizing a panel for a future ASE meeting.     

A discrete approach to continuum economies

Summary We consider a perfectly competitive economy in which only a finite number of different agents' characteristics can be distinguished. We associate this economy with ann-agents' economy with an ordered Banach commodity space, and we prove that the continuum and the discrete approach to the equilibrium problem can be considered equivalent.The authors are indebted to Javier Ruiz-Castillo for his helpful suggestions to an earlier version of this paper. We would like to thank Nicholas C. Yannelis and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions and ecomments.     

Banking Relationships and Syndicated Loans during the 2008 Financial Crisis

The research shows that banking relationships are important to lending. However, few studies focus on the banking relationships in syndicated loans, although these loans have became a major source of financing. The last financial crisis clearly shows the impacts of credit rationing and tightening credit conditions, even in the syndicated loans market. We investigate whether banking relationships help firms to benefit from better terms for syndicated loans in a chaotic financial environment. Using a sample of syndicated loans arranged from 2003 to 2008 in North America and Europe, we find that firms with a previously developed relationship with a lead bank obtained a lower spread and a longer maturity during the financial crisis but did not benefit from larger loan facilities.     

The Effects of Education on Labour Force Participation in Cameroon: A Gender Perspective

This paper seeks to understand if education can be an effective tool in achieving gender equality in labour force participation in Cameroon. For this purpose, the multinomial and binary logit models are estimated. The paper accounts for the potential endogeneity of education in the equation of labour force participation by using the instrumental variables approach. Data used are data on employment and the informal sector obtained from the National Institute of Statistics in Cameroon. The findings shed light on the negative impact of being a woman on the probability of getting a job. They also show that education and the interaction term between gender and education has a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability of working in the public and the formal private sectors. These results suggest that education yields a premium skill which offsets the negative effect of being a woman.