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11.
The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider an n-country model in which (possibly asymmetric) countries trade differentiated industrial commodities. We show that if all countries are symmetric, the complete FTA network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable. We also compare FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as to which of these two regimes facilitates global trade liberalization, noticing that unlike CUs, each signatory of an FTA can have another FTA without consent of other member countries. 相似文献
12.
13.
Coalition formation as a dynamic process 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Hideo Konishi 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,110(1):1-41
We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be “justified” by the expectation of higher future value, compared to inaction. This future value, in turn, is endogenous: it depends on coalitional movements at each node. We study existence of equilibrium PCFs. We connect deterministic equilibrium PCFs with unique absorbing state to the core, and equilibrium PCFs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set. In addition, we study cyclical as well as stochastic equilibrium PCFs. 相似文献
14.
Hideo Ishizuka 《Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics》2002,73(2):241-267
The Social Economy Sector is a new comer in Japanese society. Based on two experiments and theories derived from the European concept of social economy and the American concept of the non profit organization, the Japanese way of integration of a social economy sector is developing under the name of the Non Profit and Co-operative Sector. The change of social policy and public policy under the influence of the new liberalism has urged a change in traditional relations between public sector and private sectors and created the new role of a social economy sector. Even though there is no clear image of the sector, both the financial need of public authorities and the social needs of citizen users especially in social security and medical care has made the social economy sector an alternative for realizing better service supply. 相似文献
15.
Kazufumi Fujimoto Hideo Nagai Wolfgang J. Runggaldier 《Asia-Pacific Financial Markets》2014,21(1):35-66
We consider the portfolio optimization problem for the criterion of maximization of expected terminal log-utility. The underlying market model is a regime-switching diffusion model where the regime is determined by an unobservable factor process forming a finite state Markov process. The main novelty is due to the fact that prices are observed and the portfolio is rebalanced only at random times corresponding to a Cox process where the intensity is driven by the unobserved Markovian factor process as well. This leads to a more realistic modeling for many practical situations, like in markets with liquidity restrictions; on the other hand it considerably complicates the problem to the point that traditional methodologies cannot be directly applied. The approach presented here is specific to the log-utility. For power utilities a different approach is presented in the companion paper (Fujimoto et al. in Appl Math Optim 67(1):33–72, 2013). 相似文献
16.
Summary This paper examines the conditions which guarantee that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the normal form games withoutspillovers. We find thatpopulation monotonicity properties of the payoff functions, when the payoff of a player changes monotonically when the size of the group of players choosing the same strategy increases, are crucial to obtain the equivalence of these two solution concepts. We identify the classes of games, satisfying population monotonicity properties, which yield the equivalence of the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the set of strong Nash equilibria. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equivalence result even when the population monotonicity assumptions are relaxed.We wish to thank Mamoru Kaneko, Akihiko Matsui, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Benyamin Shitoviz, Tayfun Sonmez, William Thomson, the participants of the Southeastern Economic Theory Meeting in Charlottesville and the seminars at CORE and University of Tsukuba for useful discussions and comments. Our special thanks due anonymous referee for the suggestion to add a section addressing the issue of existence of a strong Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
17.
Fumitoshi Mizutani Hideo Kozumi Noriaki Matsushima 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2009,36(3):308-323
This paper investigates the effectiveness of yardstick regulation by using a data set of rail companies in Japan and estimating
the variable frontier cost function. In the variable cost function, both the coefficient of the yardstick regulation dummy
and the coefficient of the competitive pressure outside the industry show the negative sign with statistical significance,
indicating that the introduction of yardstick regulation and competition tend to decrease a rail company’s variable cost.
Between 1995 and 2000, railways to which yardstick regulation was applied improved cost efficiency by about 11.5%. 相似文献
18.
This paper identifies a domain of payoff functions inno spillovernoncooperative games withPositive externalitywhich admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Since in general a Nash equilibrium may fail to exist, in order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, we impose two additional assumptions,AnonymityandOrder preservation. The proof of our main result is carried out by constructing, for a given gameG, a potential function Ψ over the set of strategy profiles in such a way that the maximum of Ψ yields a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies ofG.Journal of Economics LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D62, H73. 相似文献
19.
Tiebout's tale in spatial economies: Entrepreneurship, self-selection, and efficiency 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper establishes the existence and efficiency of equilibrium in a local public goods economy with spatial structures by formalizing Hamilton's [Hamilton, B.W., 1975. Zoning and property taxation in a system of local governments Urban Studies 12, 205–211] elaboration of Tiebout's [Tiebout, C., 1956. A pure theory of local public expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64, 416–424] tale. We use a well-known equilibrium concept from Rothschild and Stiglitz [Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J.E., 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics 40, 629–649] in a market with asymmetric information, and show that Hamilton's zoning policy plays an essential role in proving the existence and efficiency of equilibrium. We use an idealized large economy following Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer and Zame [Ellickson, B., Grodal, B., Scotchmer, S., Zame, W.R., 1999. Clubs and the market, Econometrica 67, 1185–1217] and Allouch, Conley and Wooders [Allouch, N., Conley, J.P., Wooders, M.H., The Tiebout Hypothesis: On the Existence of Pareto Efficient Competitive Equilibria, (2004), mimeograph]. Our theorem is directly applicable to the existence and efficiency of a discrete spatial approximation of mono- or multi-centric city equilibria in an urban economy with commuting time costs, even if we allow the existence of multiple qualities of (collective) residences, when externalities due to traffic congestion are not present. 相似文献
20.