A trend filtering method closely related to $$\ell _{1}$$ trend filtering

The filtering method developed by Kim et al. (SIAM Rev 51:339–360, 2009), \(\ell _{1}\) trend filtering, is attractive because it enables us to estimate a continuous piecewise linear trend. This paper introduces a new filtering method closely related to \(\ell _{1}\) trend filtering in order to contribute to the accumulation of knowledge on \(\ell _{1}\) trend filtering. We show that the piecewise linearity, which is the key feature of \(\ell _{1}\) trend filtering, is derived from the new filtering. For this reason, we refer to the filtering as ‘pure’ \(\ell _{1}\) trend filtering. We also demonstrate some other miscellaneous results concerning the new filtering.     

Increasing marginal costs and satiation in the private provision of public goods: group size and optimality revisited

It is widely recognized that the degree of inefficiency in the voluntary provision of a public good increases with the group size of an economy. However, we find that only a slight modification in the conventional assumptions gives rise to a profound difference in outcome. In particular, we show that there is a case where the Nash equilibrium provision and the efficient provision will converge as the size of an economy grows. To show this, we assume individuals face increasing marginal cost of voluntary provision and their preference function has a finite satiety point.      

Credit rationing and implicit contract theory : An empirical study

This paper investigate whether or not implicit contract relations predominate in the Japanese bank loan market and produce equilibrium credit rationing. The empirical evidence suggests that risks are shared between banks and firms through interest rate arrangements. This implies that commercial banks in Japan operate in a market dominated by implicit contract relations. However, the evidence does not support the view that Japanese commercial banks execute credit rationing in the sense of Fried and Howitt (1980). Furthermore, the results show that large banks differ from small banks in the risk consideration of loan contracts. These empirical results are completely consistent with the intermarket business group hypothesis such that the group formation aims to share risks and profits among members.     

Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer

The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for supporting desired equilibrium actions in a one-principal, multi-agent model when the principal makes a renegotiation offer. We show that there exists a mechanism in which the principal's most preferred mixed strategy is always supported. Received: 30 May 1997 / Accepted: 10 October 1998     

Anticipatory effects of voluntary export restraints: a study of home video cassette recorders market, 1978-86

This paper investigates the impact of voluntary export restraints (VERs) at the pre-implementation stage when exporters have a good prospect for the VERs. Distinctive features of the VCR market in 1978-86 provide a testable hypothesis to analyze the effect of the EC-Japan VERs, which were implemented in the fiscal years of 1983-85. The paper finds consistent evidence that the VERs affected firms’ pricing behavior in the U.S. market prior to the VER period, as a result of Japanese exporters’ anticipation of the VERs.     

Trading and Ordering Patterns of Market Participants in High Frequency Trading Environment: Empirical Study in the Japanese Stock Market

In this study, we investigate ordering patterns of different types of market participants in Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) by examining order records of the listed stocks. Firstly, we categorize the virtual servers in the trading system of TSE, each of which is linked to a single trading participant, by the ratio of cancellation and execution in the order placement as well as the number of executions at the opening of the afternoon session. Then, we analyze ordering patterns of the servers in the categories in short intervals for the top 10 highest trading volume stocks. By classifying the intervals into four cases by returns, we observe how different types of market participants submit or execute orders in the market situations. Moreover, we investigate the shares of the executed volumes for the different types of servers in the swings and roundabouts of the Nikkei 225 index, which were observed in September in 2015. The main findings of this study are as follows: Server type A, which supposedly includes non-market making proprietary traders with high-speed algorithmic strategies, executes and places orders along with the direction of the market. The shares of the execution and order volumes along with the market direction increase when the stock price moves sharply. Server type B, which presumably includes servers employing a market making strategy with high cancellation and low execution ratio, shifts its market making price ranges in the rapid price movements. We observe that passive servers in Server type B have a large share and buy at low levels in the price falls. Also, Server type B, as well as Server type A, makes profit in the price falling days and particularly, the aggressive servers in the server type make most of the profit. Server type C, which is assumed to include servers receiving orders from small investors, constantly has a large share of execution and order volume.     

Dynamic Free Trade Networks: Some Numerical Results

To help predict whether the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) continues until global free trade is effectively attained, this paper investigates dynamic paths of FTAs, generated by numerical simulations of a model of an FTA network formation game with many countries. The characteristics of the final FTA network naturally depend on how the proposer of an FTA is chosen in each period. The paper finds that if the country that has the largest incentive to form an FTA is chosen as a proposer in each period, the network evolution always leads to a unique final FTA network, which may or may not be the complete network of FTAs. FTA networks often evolve to a partition of the world into a small number of groups of asymmetric size owing to the negative network externality caused by preference erosion.     

Agency Contracts,Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options

Given that an owner lacks the ability to commit to his or her timing decisions under a manager's hidden action, we consider the optimal design of the contract and the owner's optimal timing decisions. Using a real options approach, we show that, compared with the full commitment case, a higher (lower)‐quality project is launched later than (at the same time as) the first‐best case, whereas the replacement of the manager is (is not necessarily) made later if the hidden‐action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Severance pay may serve to minimize the compensation for the manager's loss of corporate control.     

Cointegration and spatial price transmission among wheat and wheat-flour markets in Afghanistan

This article examines cointegration and spatial price transmission among Afghan wheat and flour markets as well as their linkages with those of supplier countries and global markets. Unit root tests, consistent momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) models and vector error correction models (asymmetric and symmetric) are employed to achieve research objectives. The results suggest that provincial wheat and flour markets may have a long-run relationship with principal market of Kabul. Afghan wheat and flour markets may also be cointegrated with their respective global, Kazakh and Pakistani markets. While provincial wheat markets might adjust to divergence from their long-run equilibrium with Kabul wheat market, some of the provincial flour markets may not respond to deviation from their long-run equilibrium with Kabul flour market. The speed of adjustment towards the long-run Afghan–Pakistani and Afghan–Kazakh equilibrium may be faster for Afghan flour than wheat markets. The equilibrium adjustment coefficients are generally small and market imperfections may exist, however. A shock in Kabul wheat and flour markets may have long-lasting effect on the respective provincial markets whereas a shock in global wheat and Pakistani, and Kazakh wheat and flour markets might have transitory effect on the corresponding Afghan markets.