Economic progress and skill obsolescence with network effects

Summary. We construct an OLG model with network effects to examine skill obsolescence when individuals can choose technological vintages. In the absence of transfer payments, some regions of the parameter space have unique stationary equilibria, others have unique cyclical equilibria, and others have multiple stationary equilibria. All equilibria are Pareto efficient. However, rat race equilibria can exist in which all agents currently alive prefer a slower rate of progress than occurs in equilibrium. When contemporaneous transfers are allowed, equilibria are unique everywhere, but a cycle still exists, and a rat race can still arise in equilibrium. Allowing intertemporal transfers (debt) ensures that all equilibria are stationary. In the relevant parameter range, the introduction of debt can eliminate cycles and increase the long-run growth rate. No rat race equilibria exist when debt is allowed.Received: 3 January 2002, Revised: 3 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: 041, J24, O33. Correspondence to: Ian P. KingEarly versions of this paper were presented at the West Coast Macro Workshop, the Mid-West Macro Meetings, the Canadian Macroeconomics Study Group Meetings, and the Society for Economic Dynamics Meetings. We would like to thank V. V. Chari, Merwan Engineer, Don Ferguson, John Hillas, John Knowles, Dan Peled, Dan Usher, Linda Welling and Julian Wright for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee for some very useful and substantive comments.     

The decentralisation of employment relations in the British public sector

The aim of this article is to investigate differences between the British public and private sectors in terms of the decentralisation of employment relations. Drawing on data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, the article arrives at three main conclusions. First, the analysis reveals that while local‐level managers in both sectors have similar levels of responsibility for employment relations issues, those in the public sector are, on the whole, significantly less likely to be able to exercise authority. Second, the results indicate some marked variations in practice within the public sector, with managers in education having the greatest level of authority. Finally, the article explores the extent to which differences in local‐level authority between the public and private sectors can be explained by higher‐level collective bargaining, and the presence of higher‐level personnel specialists. These factors have only a partial influence, and do not fully explain why local‐level employee relations managers in some areas (notably health) are less able to exercise authority than their counterparts in the private sector.     

Education, Work and Wages in the UK

Abstract. This paper is concerned with the relationship between education, wages and working behaviour. The work is partly motivated by the sharp distinction in the literature between the returns to education and the effect of wages on labour supply. Education is the investment that cumulates in the form of human capital while labour supply is the utilization rate of that stock. Yet, variation in education is usually the basis for identifying labour supply models – education is assumed to determine wages but not affect labour supply. Moreover, it is commonly assumed that the private rate of return to education can be found from the schooling coefficient in a log-wage equation. Yet, the costs of education are largely independent of its subsequent utilization but the benefits will be higher the greater the utilization rate. Thus the returns will depend on how intensively that capital is utilized and we would expect that those who intend to work least to also invest least in human capital. Indeed, the net (of tax liabilities and welfare entitlements) return to education will be a complex function of labour supply and budget constraint considerations.
Here we attempt to model the relationship between wages, work, education and the tax/welfare system allowing for the endogeneity of education as well for the correlations between the unobservable components of wages and working behaviour. We use the estimates to simulate the effect of a new UK policy designed to increase education for children from low-income households.     

Abstracts

Quality & Quantity -     

Uncertainty and the theory of international trade in long-run equilibrium

We consider a country with two factors and two industries, each of which faces technical and price uncertainty. Entrepreneurs choose outputs in order to maximize the expected utility of profits. They also draw factor payments and purchase consumption goods after the uncertainty isresolved. They enter and exit from an industry according to whether participation there increases their expected utility. Within this model, the validity of the propositions of neoclassical trade theory depends on how the entrepreneurs' entry decisions are affected by parameter changes via their roles as risk bearers, consumers and factor owners.     

Valuing ecosystem goods and services: a new approach using a surrogate market and the combination of a multiple criteria analysis and a Delphi panel to assign weights to the attributes

A new approach to valuing ecosystem goods and services (EGS) is described which incorporates components of the economic theory of value, the theory of valuation (USappraisal), a multi-model multiple criteria analysis (MCA) of ecosystem attributes, and a Delphi panel of experts to assign weights to the attributes. The total value of ecosystem goods and services in the various tenure categories in the Wet Tropics World Heritage Area (WTWHA) in Australia was found to be in the range AUD$188 to $211 million year⁻¹, or AUD$210 to 236 ha⁻¹ year⁻¹ across tenures, as at 30 June 2002. Application of the weightings assigned by the Delphi panelists and assessment of the ecological integrity of the various tenure categories resulted in values being derived for individual ecosystem services in the World Heritage Area. Biodiversity and refugia were the two attributes ranked most highly at AUD$18.6 to $20.9 million year⁻¹ and AUD$16.6 to $18.2 million year⁻¹, respectively.     

Toward a Phylogenetic Reconstruction of Organizational Life

Synopsis Classification is an important activity that facilitates theory development in many academic disciplines. Scholars in fields such as organizational science, management science and economics and have long recognized that classification offers an approach for ordering and understanding the diversity of organizational taxa (groups of one or more similar organizational entities). However, even the most prominent organizational classifications have limited utility, as they tend to be shaped by a specific research bias, inadequate units of analysis and a standard neoclassical economic view that does not naturally accommodate the disequilibrium dynamics of modern competition. The result is a relatively large number of individual and unconnected organizational classifications, which tend to ignore the processes of change responsible for organizational diversity. Collectively they fail to provide any sort of universal system for ordering, compiling and presenting knowledge on organizational diversity. This paper has two purposes. First, it reviews the general status of the major theoretical approaches to biological and organizational classification and compares the methods and resulting classifications derived from each approach. Definitions of key terms and a discussion on the three principal schools of biological classification (evolutionary systematics, phenetics and cladistics) are included in this review. Second, this paper aims to encourage critical thinking and debate about the use of the cladistic classification approach for inferring and representing the historical relationships underpinning organizational diversity. This involves examining the feasibility of applying the logic of common ancestry to populations of organizations. Consequently, this paper is exploratory and preparatory in style, with illustrations and assertions concerning the study and classification of organizational diversity.     

The mixed economy for public service consumers. The case of consumer agencies for public transportation

The phrase mixed economy of welfare refers to the observation that the provision of public services in western countries frequently involves the participation of other sectors in addition to government. For example, a service may be privately financed and produced but regulated by government, financed by government subsidies or vouchers but produced privately, or produced by a commercial or voluntary organization under contract to government. But such different ways in which government can arrange public service supply by no means exhaust the varieties of arrangements in a mixed economic system. Other examples include alternative institutional arrangements for articulating consumer wants for public services, evaluating consumer satisfaction, and holding the producers of services accountable for their performance.This paper examines the role of official public advisory bodies and private, voluntary associations whose purposes are to improve services to users of U.S. public transportation. At variance with some of the theory of political economy, it is found that the public and private consumer organizations generally enjoy a symbiotic rather than substitute or competitive relationship with one another, and that both kinds of organizations arise and complement each other in addressing the problems of consumers of a government service produced under monopoly conditions.

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Die Beteiligung mehrerer Wirtschaftssektoren bei der Versorgung mit öffentlichen Diensten — der Fall der amerikanischen Verbraucher-Agenturen für öffentlichen Nahverkehr

Zusammenfassung Der Ausdruck mixed economy of welfare bezieht sich auf die Beobachtung, daß die Versorgung mit öffentlichen Gütern in westlichen Ländern häufig nicht allein durch den Staat erfolgt. So kann zum Beispiel ein öffentliches Gut privat finanziert und hergestellt werden, aber unter öffentlicher Aufsicht stehen, oder es kann von der öffentlichen Hand bezahlt aber privat produziert werden, oder es kann durch eine kommerzielle oder gemeinnützige Organisation in Absprache mit staatlichen Stellen produziert werden. Ebenso gibt es Fälle, wo öffentlicher und privater Hersteller eines vergleichbaren Gutes verschiedene Marktseggmente versorgen. Beispielsweise stehen in den USA den Bürgern, die mit öffentlichen Schulen unzufrieden sind, private Schulen zur Verfügung.Diese Beispiele zeigen, auf welchen unterschiedlichen Wegen die Versorgung mit öffentlichen Gütern rangiert werden kann. Solche angebotsorientierten Beispiele zeigen aber nur einen Teil der möglichen Sektorverbindungen in einer Mischwirtschaft. Andere Beispiele treffen eher die Nachfrageseite bei öffentlichen Gütern, insbesondere die institutionellen Möglichkeiten für die Artikulation von Verbraucherwünschen hinsichtlich öffentlicher Güter für die Erfassung der Zufriedenheit und dafür, daß die Anbieter öffentlicher Güter für ihr Leistungsniveau einstehen müssen. Solche Beispiele zeigen, daß Einrichtungen wie Kommissionen für öffentliche Dienste, Departements für Konsumentenfragen, Ombudsmänner und eine Vielzahl privater und freiwilliger Organisationen in unterschiedlichster Weise tätig werden, um die Interessen von Bürgern zu schützen, die öffentliche Leistungen in Anspruch nehmen.Der vorliegende Beitrag betrachtet solche Einrichtungen für öffentlichen Nah- und Fernverkehr in den USA. Ebenso wie in England gibt es hier sowohl offizielle öffentliche Beratungsgremien wie auch private freiwillige Einrichtungen, deren Zielsetzung ganz ähnlich sind, nämlich die Leistungen der öffentlichen Verkehrsunternehmungen zu verbessern. Der Beitrag berichtet über die Ergebnisse einer empirischen Studie beider Arten von Gremien und versucht die Rolle beider Arten in einer Mischwirtschaft zu beschreiben. Insbesondere versucht der Beitrag, zu erklären, warum beide Arten von Gremien entstehen, welches Verhältnis sie zu einander und zu den Transportunternehmen haben. Im Gegensatz zu manchen theoretischen Annahmen erwies sich, daß öffentliche und private Verbraucherorganisationen weniger in einem substitutiven oder wettbewerblichen Verhältnis zueinander stehen, sondern eher eine Symbiose miteinander bilden, und daß sich beide Arten von Organisationen häufig bei der Behandlung von Problemen ergänzen.The author is indebted to his former student and research assistant Chester Phillips for carrying out the survey for this paper. He would also like to thank his colleague Richard Silkman for insightful comments and suggestions on the first draft and Beverly Dolinsky of the Permanent Citizens Advisory Committee to the MTA in New York City for the time and information she provided. Finally, the author wants to thank Ken Judge for providing the stimulus to write this paper through the invitation to participate in the 1983 Social Administration Association Conference in Canterbury, England, where this paper was first presented, and Harry Weiner for arranging support to allow attendance at that conference.

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Dennis R. Young is a Professor at W. Averell Harriman College for Policy Analysis and Public Management, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York 11794, USA.