Schedule evaluation in unstable manufacturing environments

This paper provides a new approach to validate the feasibility of schedules of multiple-step mixed-model unstable manufacturing environments with different changeover times. Traditionally, continuous lines in a manufacturing process run the same sequence in order to minimize WIP inventory and lead time. Nevertheless, multiple reasons such as different product mixes or setup times can lead managers to run different sequences in continuous lines. Unfortunately, lack of reliability of supply and demand in these environments makes it difficult to manage product inventories and often leads to starvation due to the discoordination between the schedules of both lines. This approach is based on a new type of visual representation of schedules and an estimate the probability of starvation. It assumes stochastic supply and demand and a predefined schedule sequence based on batches of different sizes.     

Spillovers in Space: Does Geography Matter?

Using U.S. firm level panel data we simultaneously assess the contributions to productivity of three potential sources of research and development spillovers: geographic, technological, and product market (“horizontal”). To do so, we construct new measures of geographic proximity based on the distribution of a firm's inventor locations as well as its headquarters. We find that geographic location is important for productivity, as are technology (but not product) spillovers, and that both intra and inter–regional (counties) spillovers matter. The geographic location of a firm's researchers is more important than its headquarters. These benefits may be the reason why local policy makers compete so hard for the location of local R&D labs and high tech workers.     

THE ESSENCE OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL

In a lecture in November 2008, Professor Huerta de Soto set out the key contributions of the Austrian School to economic thought.     

Principles for a European Union''s Public Debt

The EU has neither the power to tax nor the right to run a public debt. We analyze if the EU should receive the right for public indebtedness. We make use of the normative theory of public indebtedness and of positive political economy analysis. Our normative analysis identified specific cases for an appropriate use of public indebtedness. According to the political economy analysis, a misuse of public debt may be possible. As the implementation of strict constitutional constraints can limit this misuse, we propose the assignment of a right to public borrowing to the EU within tight constitutional restrictions.     

CONSUMPTION GROWTH ACCOUNTING

The methodology in this paper combines an input–output structural decomposition approach with the supply-side perspective of mainstream growth accounting. In explaining the intertemporal change in consumption per worker, three sets of effects are distinguished. First, contributions due to several types of technological changes are considered. Second, effects caused by changes in international trade are discerned. Third, composition effects that reflect structural shifts in demand (including changes in tastes) are quantified. As an empirical illustration, we analyze the developments in the U.K. between 1979 and 1990.     

A model of biased intermediation

We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary's advice when choosing among sellers. We introduce the notion that sellers' and consumers' payoffs can be congruent or conflicting, and show that this has important implications for the effects of bias. Under congruence, the firm benefiting from bias has an incentive to offer a better deal than its rival and consumers can be better‐off than under no bias. Under conflict, the favored firm offers lower utility, and bias harms consumers. We study various policies for dealing with bias and show that their efficacy also depends on whether the payoffs exhibit congruence or conflict.     

Elections with platform and valence competition

We study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences (e.g., engage in campaign spending). The marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization—the closer platforms are, the more valence affects the election outcome. Consequently, candidates without policy preferences choose divergent platforms to soften valence competition. Moreover, exogenous increases in incentives for valence accumulation lead to both increased valence and increased polarization—the latter because candidates seek to avoid the costs of extra valence. As a result, the increase in valence is smaller than it would have been with exogenous platforms. Finally, the model highlights the overlooked substantive importance of common modeling assumptions. Changing the source of uncertainty in our model from noise around the median voter's ideal point to a shock to one candidate's valence (as is common in the literature) leads to complete platform convergence for all parameter values.     

Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values

We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present an example of a double auction with interdependent values where all equilibria are trivial, that is, they have zero probability of trade. This is related to Akerlof's “market for lemmons” example and to the “winner's curse,” establishing a connection between them. However, we are able to provide sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibrium existence.