Pricing Monitoring Uncertainty in Climate Policy

This article assesses the environmental and economic efficiency of three different approaches to treat monitoring uncertainty in climate policy, namely prescribing uncertainty, setting minimum certainty thresholds and pricing uncertainty through a discount. Our model of the behavior of profit-maximizing agents demonstrates that under the simplest set of assumptions the regulator has no interest in reducing monitoring uncertainty. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, monitoring uncertainty may hamper the economic and environmental performance of climate policy due to adverse selection. In a mandatory policy, prescribing a reasonable level of uncertainty is preferable if the regulator has enough information to determine this level. For voluntary mechanisms, such as carbon offsets, allowing agents to set their own monitoring uncertainty below a maximum threshold or discounting carbon revenues in proportion to monitoring uncertainty are the best approaches for the regulator to mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry. These conclusions are much more pronounced when agents do not accrue revenues from their mitigation action, other than carbon. Our analysis of monitoring uncertainty under information asymmetry, which results in heterogeneity in the agents’ benefits from abatement, generalizes the classical trade-off between production efficiency and information rents.     

Primary Energy Consumption Stagnates in Germany

Original Papers

Primary Energy Consumption Stagnates in Germany     

Necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency of generalizedM-estimates

GeneralizedM-estimates (minimum contrast estimates) and their asymptotically equivalent approximate versions are considered. A relatively simple condition is found which is equivalent with consistency of all approximateM-estimates under wide assumptions about the model. This condition is applied in several directions. (i) A more easily verifiable condition equivalent with consistency of all approximateM-estimates is derived and illustrated on models with stationary and ergodic observations. (ii) A condition sufficient for inconsistency of all approximateM-estimates is obtained and illustrated on models with i.i.d. observations. (iii) A simple necessary and sufficient condition for consistency of all approximateM-estimates in linear regression with i.i.d. errors is found. This condition is weaker than sufficient conditions for consistency ofM-estimators known from the literature. A linear regression example is presented where theM-estimate is consistent and an approximateM-estimate is incosistent.Supported by CSAS grant N. 17503.     

A model of cost-based transfer pricing

In most decentralized organizations, goods and services are transferred between divisions. These transfers are frequently recorded in the accounting books of the divisions; the term transfer price refers to the dollar amount of the interdivisional exchange. This study considers two main issues: (i) the costs and the benefits of delegating decisions through a system of transfer pricing and divisional performance evaluation, and (ii) the performance of one common method of pricing intrafirm transactions: cost-based transfer pricing.The study analyzes a firm in which each divisional manager has better information about the divisional environment than what is known by the firm's top management. The first half of the paper demonstrates that the firm can attain the optimal level of profits with a compensation system utilizing (i) reports by divisional managers describing in complete detail each manager's private information, and (ii) divisional performance evaluation with cost-based transfer pricing. Next, a situation is considered in which divisional managers are not able to communicate their private information to the firm's top management because of complexity of divisional environments or managers' specialized expertise. In this bounded-rationality setting, a managerial-compensation system employing cost-based transfer pricing allows the firm to earn strictly higher expected profits than if all decisions are made by the firm's top management relying on divisional managers' reports.Financial support from the Unisys Corporation is gratefully acknowledged.     

The road not taken: competition and the R&D portfolio

This article examines the effects of market structure on the variety of research projects undertaken and the amount of duplication of research. A characterization of the equilibrium market portfolio of R&D projects and the socially optimal portfolio is provided. It is shown that a merger decreases the variety of developed projects and decreases the amount of duplication of research. An increase in the intensity of competition among firms leads to an increase in the variety of developed projects and a decrease in the amount of duplication of research.     

Estimation of the most influential science and technology factors for economic growth forecasting by soft computing technique

Economic growth may be developed on the basis on combination of different factors. In this investigation was analyzed the economic growth forecasting based on the different factors. The main goal was to analyze the influence of science and technology factors on the economic growth. Gross domestic product (GDP) was used as economic growth indicator. The method of adaptive neuro fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) was applied to the data in order to select the most influential factors for the GDP growth rate forecasting. Ten inputs are considered: research and development (R&D) expenditure in GDP, scientific and technical journal articles, patent applications for nonresidents, patent applications for residents, trademark applications for nonresidents, trademark applications for residents, total trademark applications, researchers in R&D, technicians in R&D and high-technology exports. The ANFIS process for variable selection was also implemented in order to detect the predominant factors affecting the forecasting of GDP growth rate.     

Uncertainty and the specificity of human capital

This paper studies the choice between general and specific human capital. A trade-off arises because general human capital, while less productive, can easily be reallocated across firms. Accordingly, the fraction of individuals with specific human capital depends on the amount of uncertainty in the economy. Our model implies that while economies with more specific human capital tend to be more productive, they also tend to be more vulnerable to turbulence. As such, our theory sheds some light on the experience of Japan, where human capital is notoriously specific: while Japan benefited from this predominately specific labor force in tranquil times, this specificity may also have been at the heart of its prolonged stagnation.     

Statement of editorial policy

Systematic strategic management is a recent and still developing concern of both practitioners and students of management. It is necessary, therefore, to define in this first issue of the Strategic Management Journal (SMJ) both the limits and the contents of the subject which will be welcomed to its pages. Since we hope to attract our readers and contributors from both practice and academia, it is appropriate to describe strategic management from their respective viewpoints.     

Earnings Management in Domestic and Foreign IPOs in the United States: Do Home Country Institutions Matter?

Using a large sample of domestic and foreign IPOs in the US, we investigate how threats of enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and private litigation influence earnings management in IPO prospectuses. We propose that perceptions of foreign institutions may influence SEC enforcement action and private litigation. We provide evidence that enforcement and litigation threats are negatively related to the strength of legal institutions in the foreign IPO’s country of origin. We find earnings management is more pronounced in foreign IPOs from countries with strong legal institutions. We further explore whether earnings management is priced in the IPO market and find no relation between IPO proceeds and earnings management. Our results are consistent with upward earnings management as in Stein (1989), the magnitude of which is reduced when the anticipated cost of enforcement and litigation is higher. Collectively, our results cast doubt on the validity of the bonding hypothesis.