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131.
Hedonic models and air pollution: Twenty-five years and counting 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:2
This paper reports a meta analysis of how effectively hedonic property models have detected the influence of air pollution on housing prices. Probit estimates are reported describing how data, model specification, and local property market conditions in cities represented in thirty-seven studies influence the ability of hedonic models to uncover negative, statistically significant relationships between housing prices and air pollution measures.Partial support for this research was provided by the Russell Sage Foundation. Thanks are due David Cordray, Heidi Hartman, and Larry Hedges of the Foundation's Meta-Analysis Panel for constructive comments, to Ray Palmquist for suggestions and assistance in assembling the results from his studies, to Rick Freeman and Tom Tietenberg and two anonymous referees for comments on the research, and to Barbara Scott for constructive editing of earlier drafts of this paper. 相似文献
132.
In this paper we discuss the fundamental inconsistency that results from employing the two traditional concepts of rationality as the basis of selecting social goals. We then consider the possibility that the selection of social goals must be based on explicitly ethical criteria. To do so a third concept of rationality namely, ontological rationality, should be adopted. Moreover, we argue that J. M. Keynes in A Tract Monetary Reform based his public policy recommendations on a modified version of ontological rationality, thereby introducing ontological rationality into economics as the basis for selecting social goals.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Fifty-Eighth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 7–10, 2004. The authors are grateful to session participants for their helpful suggestions, though the authors alone are responsible for the contents of the paper. 相似文献
133.
Economic reforms,efficiency and productivity in Chinese banking 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper analyzes the impact of banking reforms on efficiency and total factor productivity (TFP) change in Chinese banking
industry. Using an input distance function, we find that joint-equity banks are more efficient than wholly state-owned banks
(WSOBs). Furthermore, both WSOBs and joint-equity banks are found to be operating slightly below their optimal size, suggesting
potential advantages in expansion of their businesses. Overall, TFP growth was 4.4% per annum for the sample period 1993–2002.
Joint-equity banks experienced much higher growth in TFP (5.5% per annum) compared to the WSOBs (1.4% per annum).
相似文献
134.
Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma.
In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to
reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge
sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties.
We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also
punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease
the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly
lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation.
We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University
of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson,
Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful
comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available
from the authors. 相似文献
135.
Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’ types. Such an estimate can
be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule
yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders’ types are affiliated or independent. We highlight the link between
the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results offer sharp insights into the strengths
and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of informational rents in such environments.
Harstad acknowledges hospitable accommodation by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Olin School of Business,
Washington University in St. Louis, during parts of this research. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Richard
McLean and Jeroen Swinkels. 相似文献
136.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
137.
Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search
to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In
equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with
the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes
under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter
values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used
to achieve separation.
Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000 相似文献
138.
139.
This article was prepared by Dr L. V. Defris and J. S. McDonnell of the Institute research staff. The authors wish to thank Professor R. F. Henderson and Dr P. J. Sheehan for their helpful comments. 相似文献
140.